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Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Massey Claims Arising From Close Of Merger Despite FTC Challenge and European Commission Standstill
11/17/2026On October 30, 2026, Vice Chancellor Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr. of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed with prejudice a stockholder derivative action alleging that the directors and former CEO of a biotechnology company (the “Company”) breached their fiduciary duties by closing the Company’s acquisition of a cancer-detection business in violation of European Union and U.S. antitrust laws. In re Illumina, Inc. Consol. Deriv. S’holder Litig., No. 2024-1337-PAF (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2026). The Court held that plaintiffs were required to make a pre-suit demand on the board because they failed to plead that a majority of the directors faced a substantial likelihood of personal liability for knowingly causing the Company to break the law.
Plaintiffs alleged that the closing harmed the Company by exposing it to an approximately €432 million European Commission (“EC”) fine, a forced divestiture of the acquired business, and $3.09 billion in costs to fund and hold that business separate until the divestiture. Plaintiffs argued that the directors breached their duty of loyalty under In re Massey Energy Co., 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2011), which requires a showing that fiduciaries knowingly caused the corporations to violate “positive law” (i.e., an enacted statute, regulation, or other legally binding rule). According to plaintiffs, the board caused the Company to violate positive law when it closed the merger while an EC “standstill” order barring closing was in effect and while the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) was challenging the deal under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
Plaintiffs urged the Court to disregard the fact that the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) later decided that the EC lacked jurisdiction, arguing that the standstill deserved the same respect notwithstanding the ECJ’s subsequent ruling. Defendants countered that no law was violated and that the board, which had been advised by counsel, believed that closing was lawful and made an informed decision to accept a legal risk.
The Court agreed with defendants, reasoning as to the EU law: “The predicate to a ‘violation of law’ is that the law applies to the alleged violator—one cannot violate a law which does not apply to oneself.” There was no valid EU law for the Company to break because the ECJ annulled the referrals that triggered the standstill—leading the EC to withdraw all of its merger decisions, including the fine. As to U.S. law, the Court highlighted that the waiting periods had expired, no court order barred closing, and no court ever made a final ruling that the merger violated the Clayton Act. Finally, the Court held that plaintiffs failed to plead bad faith: the board received extensive advice from counsel and operated on the understanding that the EU did not have jurisdiction to invoke the standstill, held the acquired business separately, and continued to litigate the jurisdictional challenge. The Court characterized the decision as “an exercise in business judgment in the face of uncertain regulatory risk.” “In short,” according to the Court, “this is not the stuff of a board’s bad faith decision to knowingly violate positive law to generate corporate profits.”
M&A and Corporate Governance