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			<title>A&amp;O Shearman |  M&amp;A and Corporate Governance Litigation Blog</title>
			<link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com</link>
			<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
			<atom:link href="https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/rss/blogs" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
			
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Holds Restrictive Covenants Still Enforceable After Stock Unit Consideration Forfeited</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-holds-restrictive-covenants-still-enforceable-after-stock-unit-consideration-forfeited</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On February 3, 2026, the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed a decision from the Delaware Court of Chancery that had dismissed claims for breach of restrictive covenants and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing brought by a company against a former employee. N. Am. Fire Ultimate Holdings, LP v. Doorly, No. 142, 2025, 2026 WL 274647 (Del. Feb. 3, 2026). The Court ruled that consideration must be measured at the time a contract was formed, not at the time of its enforcement, and thus the automatic forfeiture of the stock units granted in consideration did not nullify the covenants.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 17:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-holds-restrictive-covenants-still-enforceable-after-stock-unit-consideration-forfeited</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms That Unreasonable Restrictive Covenants Are Not Enforceable, Regardless Of The Remedy Sought</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-affirms-that-unreasonable-restrictive-covenants-are-not-enforceable-regardless-of-the-remedy-sought</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On February 10, 2026, the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed a ruling by the Delaware Court of Chancery that restrictive covenants in employment agreements are subject to a reasonableness analysis regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief or monetary damages and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Fortiline, Inc. v. McCall, No. 300, 2025, 2026 WL 369934 (Del. Feb. 10, 2026). This decision clarifies an important distinction in Delaware law between restrictive covenants and forfeiture-for-competition provisions, with significant implications for employers seeking to enforce noncompete and non-solicitation agreements.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 17:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-affirms-that-unreasonable-restrictive-covenants-are-not-enforceable-regardless-of-the-remedy-sought</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms That Bump-Up Exclusion In D&amp;O Insurance Does Not Apply To Securities Claims Arising Out Of An M&amp;A Transaction</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-affirms-that-bump-up-exclusion-in-do-insurance-does-not-apply-to-securities-claims-arising-out-of-an-ma-transaction</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On January 27, 2026, in an opinion authored by Justice Valihura, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed a decision by the Delaware Superior Court granting a plaintiff company&apos;s motion for summary judgment against its insurers in a directors and officers (&quot;D&amp;O&quot;) insurance denial case. Illinois Nat&apos;l Ins. Co. v. Harman Int&apos;l Indus., Inc., No. 47, 2025 (Del. Jan. 27, 2026). The Court held that the underlying settlement of a securities class action alleging inadequate disclosures in connection with the acquisition of the insured company did not increase the deal consideration, and thus the bump-up exclusion in the D&amp;O policies did not excuse coverage.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 17:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-affirms-that-bump-up-exclusion-in-do-insurance-does-not-apply-to-securities-claims-arising-out-of-an-ma-transaction</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Declines To Dismiss Fiduciary Duty And Aiding And Abetting Claims After Applying Entire Fairness To Take-Private Transaction</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-court-of-chancery-declines-to-dismiss-fiduciary-duty-and-aiding-and-abetting-claims-after-applying-entire-fairness-to-take-private-transaction</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On February 27, 2026, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part defendants&apos; motions to dismiss in a putative stockholder class action challenging a $4 billion take-private transaction of a software company (the &quot;Company&quot;). In re EngageSmart, Inc. S&apos;holder Litig., C.A. No. 2023-1093-JTL (Del Ch. Feb. 27, 2026). The Court held that the entire fairness test would apply to breach of fiduciary duty claims after finding the MFW safe harbor inapplicable because the complaint adequately alleged the stockholder vote was not fully informed. The Court also sustained a claim for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty against the Company&apos;s financial advisor but dismissed the aiding and abetting claim against the buyer.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 17:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-court-of-chancery-declines-to-dismiss-fiduciary-duty-and-aiding-and-abetting-claims-after-applying-entire-fairness-to-take-private-transaction</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Books And Records Demand May Rely On Post-Demand Evidence And Sufficiently Reliable Hearsay To Establish A Credible Basis</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-affirms-books-and-records-demand-may-rely-on-post-demand-evidence-and-sufficiently-reliable-hearsay-to-establish-a-credible-basis</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On March 25, 2026, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a divided en banc opinion, affirmed a Court of Chancery order to comply with a Section 220 demand based on a petition that included post-demand evidence and hearsay. Paramount Global v. Rhode Island, No. 2024-0457 (Del. Mar. 25, 2026). The Court agreed that evidence arising after a books and records demand can be used to establish a credible basis &quot;under exceptional circumstances&quot; and that &quot;sufficiently reliable hearsay&quot; evidence is admissible for books and records demands.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 17:27:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-affirms-books-and-records-demand-may-rely-on-post-demand-evidence-and-sufficiently-reliable-hearsay-to-establish-a-credible-basis</guid>
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					      <title>Chancery Declines To Dismiss Claims Against Non-Independent Directors Who Voted in Favor of Special Committee-Approved Spin-Off Transaction </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/chancery-declines-to-dismiss-claims-against-non-independent-directors-who-voted-in-favor-of-special-committee-approved-spin-off-transaction</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On April 13, 2026, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed claims for breach of fiduciary duty asserted by minority stockholders against a special committee but declined to dismiss those asserted against non-independent directors and executives in connection with a multi-step spin-off transaction. Vladimir Fishel, et al. v. Liberty Media Corporation, et al., C. A. No. 2024-1057-KSJM (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2026). The Court held that, while plaintiffs failed to allege a reasonable inference that the special committee was so controlled that it acted in bad faith, all that was needed to sustain a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the non-independent directors was &quot;a showing that the conflicted directors voted in favor of the interested transaction.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 17:22:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/chancery-declines-to-dismiss-claims-against-non-independent-directors-who-voted-in-favor-of-special-committee-approved-spin-off-transaction</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Enforces Texas Forum Selection Bylaw Retroactively</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-court-of-chancery-enforces-texas-forum-selection-bylaw-retroactively</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On April 13, 2026, Vice Chancellor Bonnie W. David of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted defendants&apos; motions to dismiss derivative claims brought by stockholders of Tesla, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) in Delaware. In re Tesla, Inc. Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2024-0631-BWD (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2026). The Company had redomesticated from Delaware to Texas and, at the same time, adopted a bylaw designating Texas as the exclusive forum for derivative litigation. The Court enforced the bylaw and dismissed the case even though the claims were brought and the alleged conduct at issue occurred prior to the formal adoption of the bylaw and the Company&apos;s redomestication in Texas.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 17:19:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-court-of-chancery-enforces-texas-forum-selection-bylaw-retroactively</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Constitutionality Of Senate Bill 21 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-upholds-constitutionality-of-senate-bill-21</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On February 27, 2026, the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the constitutionality of Delaware Senate Bill 21 (&quot;SB 21&quot;), which amended Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;) to alter the standard of review applicable to certain controlling stockholder transactions.  Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Group LLC, No. 248, 2025, 2026 WL 548504 (Del. Feb. 27, 2026).  The decision resolves the constitutional uncertainty that had surrounded the amendments since their enactment and confirms that companies may proceed with confidence that compliance with the safe harbor provisions in SB 21 will provide the intended protections.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 20:23:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-upholds-constitutionality-of-senate-bill-21</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Special Litigation Committee&apos;s Motion To Terminate Due To Questions About Independence</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-court-of-chancery-denies-special-litigation-committees-motion-to-terminate-due-to-questions-about-independence</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On January 30, 2026, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted defendants&apos; motion to strike but denied a motion to terminate a derivative action asserting fiduciary breach claims against certain directors following a Special Litigation Committee (&quot;SLC&quot;) investigation. Grabski ex rel. Coinbase Global, Inc., v. Andreessen, et al., C.A. No. 2023-0464-KSJM (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2026). The Court found that plaintiff adequately alleged that one of the two SLC members had sufficient connections to one of the director defendants to raise a material question about his independence to be raised and thus declined to terminate the litigation based on the SLC&apos;s recommendation.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 18:15:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-court-of-chancery-denies-special-litigation-committees-motion-to-terminate-due-to-questions-about-independence</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Finds Attorneys&apos; Fee Award Excessive In Excessive Compensation Case</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-finds-attorneys-fee-award-excessive-in-excessive-compensation-case</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On January 30, 2026, the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed a settlement resolving excess compensation claims against non-employee director defendants but reversed and modified the portion of the settlement allocated by the Court of Chancery to plaintiffs&apos; counsel fee award, reducing it from approximately $173 million to $71 million. In re Tesla, Inc. Dir. Comp. S&apos;holder Litig., C.A. No. 2020-0477 (Del. Jan. 30, 2026). Defendants alleged that the fee award improperly took into account the intrinsic value of stock options returned to the company for cancellation and applied an excessive percentage to the valuation of the associated financial benefit.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 18:13:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-finds-attorneys-fee-award-excessive-in-excessive-compensation-case</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Invalidation Of Stockholder Agreement, Finding Belated Facial Challenge Was Barred by Laches</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-reverses-invalidation-of-stockholder-agreement</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On January 20, 2026, in an opinion authored by Justice Gary F. Traynor, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery that had invalidated certain provisions in a stockholder agreement between a financial institution (the &quot;Company&quot;) and its founder and controlling stockholder.  Moelis &amp; Co. v. West Palm Beach Firefighters Pension Fund, No. 340, 2024 (Del. Jan. 20, 2026).  ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2026 15:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-reverses-invalidation-of-stockholder-agreement</guid>
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					      <title>Court Of Chancery Issues First Decision Interpreting Amended Section 220 And Grants Books And Records Inspection On Default</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/court-of-chancery-issues-first-decision-interpreting-amended-section-220-and-grants-books-and-records-inspection-on-default</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On December 22, 2025, Magistrate Christian Douglas Wright of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted default judgment in a books and records action brought by the Company&apos;s former CEO and largest stockholder. Moran v. Unation, C.A. No. 2025-0718-CDW (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2025).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 22:09:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/court-of-chancery-issues-first-decision-interpreting-amended-section-220-and-grants-books-and-records-inspection-on-default</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Rescission Of CEO Compensation Package Where Status Quo Ante Cannot Be Restored</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-reverses-rescission-of-ceo-compensation-package</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On December 19, 2025, the Delaware Supreme Court issued a unanimous per curiam opinion that affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Chancery&apos;s post-trial decision rescinding Tesla&apos;s CEO&apos;s $55.8 billion compensation package.  In re Tesla, Inc. Deriv. Litig. No. 534, 2024 (Del. Dec. 19, 2025).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Dec 2025 22:20:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-reverses-rescission-of-ceo-compensation-package</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Holds That Fiduciary&apos;s Personal Misconduct Involving Corporation&apos;s Employees Does Not Constitute A Per Se Breach Of Fiduciary Duty</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-chancery-holds-that-fiduciarys-personal-misconduct-involving-corporations-employees-does-not-constitute-a-per-se-breach-of-fiduciary-duty</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On December 1, 2025, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed with prejudice a derivative breach of fiduciary duty claim against a former director and officer of a closely held corporation alleging that his sexual harassment of employees constituted a breach of his duty of loyalty to the corporation.  Brola v. Lundgren, C.A. No. 2024-1108 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 2025).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Dec 2025 13:52:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-chancery-holds-that-fiduciarys-personal-misconduct-involving-corporations-employees-does-not-constitute-a-per-se-breach-of-fiduciary-duty</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Award Of Nominal Damages To Plaintiffs Unharmed By Unfair Conflicted Controller Transaction</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-upholds-award-of-nominal-damages-to-plaintiffs-unharmed-by-unfair-conflicted-controller-transaction</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On December 3, 2025, Chief Justice Collins Seitz, on behalf of the Delaware Supreme Court sitting en banc, upheld the Court of Chancery&apos;s award of nominal damages in an action against a conflicted controller for breach of his fiduciary duty. In re Straight Path Commc&apos;ns Inc. Consol. S&apos;holder Litig., No. 19, 2025 (Del. Dec. 3, 2025) (affirming In re Straight Path Commc&apos;ns Inc. Consol. S&apos;holder Litig., CA No. 2017-0486-SG (Del. Ch. Oct. 3, 2023).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Dec 2025 18:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-supreme-court-upholds-award-of-nominal-damages-to-plaintiffs-unharmed-by-unfair-conflicted-controller-transaction</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Cancellation And Repurchase Of Shares Unauthorized For Failure To Adhere To Corporate Formalities</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Finds-Cancellation-And-Repurchase-Of-Shares-Unauthorized</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On September 9, 2025, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a post-trial decision in favor of plaintiffs with respect to a conversion claim in an action brought by two co-founders of a startup who alleged that defendants, two other co-founders, including the CEO, and the Company wrongfully deprived them of their shares. Foley v. Session Corp., C.A. No. 2023-0186-JTL (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2025).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Sep 2025 18:09:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Finds-Cancellation-And-Repurchase-Of-Shares-Unauthorized</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Grants Partial Judgment On Post-Acquisition Earnout Payments, Finding They Were Not Conditioned On Compliance With Other Provisions</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Partial-Judgment-On-Post-Acquisition-Earnout-Payments</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On July 31, 2025, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted partial judgment on the pleadings on a breach of contract counterclaim asserted by defendant, the former majority owner of two intellectual property insurance underwriting companies that were sold to a risk management company (the &quot;Buyer&quot;), in his individual capacity and also as the representative of the sellers (the &quot;Sellers&apos; Representative&quot;) in a post-acquisition dispute.  ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2025 17:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Partial-Judgment-On-Post-Acquisition-Earnout-Payments</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Certifies Constitutional Challenge To SB21 Safe Harbor</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Certifies-Constitutional-Challenge-To-SB21-Safe-Harbor</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[The Delaware Supreme Court has accepted both questions certified by the Delaware Court of Chancery concerning constitutional challenges to the safe harbor provisions implemented by Senate Bill 21 (&quot;SB21&quot;), which became law on March 26, 2025.  Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Group LLC, et al., No. 248, 2025 (Del. June 10, 2025).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2025 19:13:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Certifies-Constitutional-Challenge-To-SB21-Safe-Harbor</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Vacates Accounting Expert Determinations That Implicated Legal Indemnity Claims</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Vacates-Accounting-Expert-Determinations-Implicating-Legal-Indemnity-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On June 3, 2025, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part respective cross-motions for summary judgment in a dispute between a Bitcoin mining company (the &quot;Buyer&quot;) and a data center company (the &quot;Seller&quot;) regarding an accounting expert&apos;s determinations in the post-closing price adjustment process for the transaction.  Northern Data AG v. Riot Platforms, Inc., 2023-0650-LWW (Del. Ch. June 3, 2025).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2025 19:03:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Vacates-Accounting-Expert-Determinations-Implicating-Legal-Indemnity-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Holds Business Judgment Rule Applies To Controlled Corporation&apos;s Change Of Corporate Domicile From Delaware To Nevada </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-Business-Judgment-Rule-Applies</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On February 4, 2025, the Delaware Supreme Court, on interlocutory appeal, reversed the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery to deny defendants&apos; motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors and a controller related to a decision to convert the state of incorporation of a travel guidance corporation and its parent (collectively, the &quot;Corporation&quot;) from Delaware to Nevada.  Maffei v. Palkon, No. 125, 2024 (Del. Feb. 4, 2025). ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Feb 2025 21:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-Business-Judgment-Rule-Applies</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds That Controller Sale Of Company Did Not Harm Minority Interests</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-That-Controller-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On January 7, 2025, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a post-trial decision in favor of defendant, a private equity fund (the &quot;Fund&quot;), finding that the Fund&apos;s sale of a portfolio company (the &quot;Company&quot;) was protected by the business judgment rule and did not harm the interests of minority stockholders.  Manti Holdings, LLC, et al. v. The Carlyle Group Inc., No. 2020-0657-SG, 2025 WL 39810 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 2025).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jan 2025 19:22:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-That-Controller-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Superior Court Holds That Bump-Up Exclusion In D&amp;O Insurance Does Not Apply To Securities Claims Arising Out Of An M&amp;A Transaction</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Superior-Court-Holds-That-Bump-Up-Exclus</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On January 3, 2025, Judge Paul R. Wallace of the Superior Court for the State of Delaware granted plaintiff&apos;s motion for summary judgment in a directors and officers (&quot;D&amp;O&quot;) insurance denial case against.  Harman Int&apos;l Indus. Inc. v. Illinois Nat&apos;l Ins. Co., 2025 WL 24364 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2025).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jan 2025 19:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Superior-Court-Holds-That-Bump-Up-Exclus</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds Stockholder Vote Following Post-Trial Decision Cannot Retroactively Ratify A Transaction That Failed Entire Fairnes</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-court-of-chancery-holds-stockholdedelaware</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On December 2, 2024, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to revise the Court&apos;s post-trial decision to rescind a CEO compensation package based on a subsequent stockholder vote to &quot;ratify&quot; the package.  Tornetta v. Musk, C.A. No. 2018-0408-KSJM (Del. Ch. Dec. 2, 2024).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Dec 2024 17:02:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-court-of-chancery-holds-stockholdedelaware</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery &quot;Barely&quot; Sustains Claims Challenging Representations About Value Of SPAC Shares</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Barely-Sustains-Claims-Challenging-Representations-About-Value</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On October 18, 2024, Vice Chancellor Glasscock of the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss a putative class action brought by stockholders of special purpose acquisition company (&quot;SPAC&quot;) Mountain Crest Acquisition Corp. II (&quot;MCAD&quot;) against MCAD&apos;s sponsor and alleged controlling stockholder (&quot;Sponsor&quot;), asserting that they breached their fiduciary duties in connection with MCAD&apos;s acquisition of a digital therapeutics company in a so-called &quot;deSPAC&quot; merger. Solak v. Mountain Crest Capital LLC, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 2023-0460-SG (Oct. 18, 2024). Plaintiff alleged that defendants issued a materially misleading proxy, breaching their fiduciary duties by misrepresenting that the SPAC&apos;s shares were worth $10 per share—the same as their redemption value. The Court held that, while the allegations were &quot;not strong,&quot; plaintiff &quot;barely&quot; alleged reasonably conceivable claims for breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty and unjust enrichment under the entire fairness standard.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Nov 2024 17:29:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Barely-Sustains-Claims-Challenging-Representations-About-Value</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds That Corwin Cleansing Applies To Claims Related To Reduction Of Acquisition Price</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Corwin-Cleansing-Applies</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On June 21, 2024, Vice Chancellor Nathan A. Cook of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss a putative stockholder class action asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against the officers and directors of a software company (the &quot;Corporation&quot;) after its acquisition.  In re Anaplan, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 2022-1073-NAC (Del. Ch. June 21, 2024). 

Plaintiff contended that certain post-signing equity grants allegedly violated a merger agreement and enabled the acquiror to negotiate a price reduction.  The Court, however, dismissed the claims under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), because the transaction was &quot;approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jul 2024 20:02:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Corwin-Cleansing-Applies</guid>
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					      <title>New York Court Of Appeals Clarifies Application Of Internal Affairs Doctrine But Reverses Dismissal Of Fiduciary Duty Breach Claims Under Scottish Law</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Court-Of-Appeals-Clarifies-Application</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On May 23, 2024, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by former shareholders of a fantasy sports company (the &quot;Company&quot;) against its directors and other defendants following a merger. Eccles v. Shamrock Capital Advisors, LLC, No. 49 (N.Y. May 23, 2024). The Company was incorporated in Scotland and headquartered in New York. As we reported previously, the New York State Appellate Division had found that the trial court erred in applying New York—rather than Scots—law and dismissed the claims. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division &quot;correctly concluded&quot; that Scots law applied under the internal affairs doctrine. The Court of Appeals nevertheless reversed the dismissal and found that the complaint adequately pleaded Scots law claims for breach of fiduciary duties.
]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 29 May 2024 15:10:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Court-Of-Appeals-Clarifies-Application</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Holds Proxy Disclosures Deficient In Failing To Disclose Advisors&apos; Conflicts Of Interests</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-Proxy-Disclosures-Deficient</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On May 1, 2024, the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed the dismissal of breach of fiduciary claims against Inovalon Holdings, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) and its CEO and directors in connection with the Company&apos;s acquisition by a private equity firm (the &quot;Acquiror&quot;) and its co-investors (the &quot;Transaction&quot;). City of Sarasota Firefighters&apos; Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 2022-0698 (Del. May 1, 2024). The Court held that the trial court erred in finding that the MFW1 requirements were met because plaintiffs adequately alleged that the proxy statement seeking approval for the Transaction failed to adequately disclose information that was potentially material to investors. The Court did not address plaintiffs&apos; argument that MFW &quot;cleansing&quot; was also unavailable because the Company allegedly failed to condition the Transaction ab initio on special committee approval.
]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2024 18:16:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-Proxy-Disclosures-Deficient</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Holds MFW Is Applicable To Controlling Stockholder Transactions Even Outside Of Freeze-Out Context</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-MFW-Is-Applicable-To-Controlling</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On April 4, 2024, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Collins J. Seitz, Jr., the Supreme Court of Delaware sitting en banc held that the framework articulated in Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;) applies to a controlling stockholder transaction, even if it does not involve a freeze-out merger. In re Match Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation, No. 368, 2022 (Del. Apr. 4, 2024). The Court reached this conclusion in considering the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s dismissal of breach fiduciary duty claims asserted by pre-transaction minority stockholders relating to a reverse spin-off transaction. The Delaware Supreme Court clarified that &quot;entire fairness&quot; is the &quot;presumptive standard of review&quot; for a controlling stockholder transaction and that only compliance with the &quot;procedural safeguards&quot; of MFW changes it to &quot;the more deferential business judgment standard.&quot; The Court further held that the special committee required by MFW must be &quot;wholly independent.&quot; Because the complaint adequately pleaded that one of the special committee members was not independent of the controller, the Court reversed the dismissal.
]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 19:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-MFW-Is-Applicable-To-Controlling</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Requires Compliance With DGCL Provisions Governing Board Negotiation And Board And Stockholder Approval Requirements For Merger Agreements</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Requires-Compliance-With-DGCL-Provisions</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On February 29, 2024, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick granted in part and denied in part defendants&apos; motion to dismiss claims seeking to invalidate the acquisition of a gaming company (&quot;Target&quot;) by a large technology company under Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;) Sections 251 and 141 and asserting claims of conversion. Sjunde Ap-Fonden v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., C.A. No. 2022-1001-KSJM (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2024), as corrected (Mar. 19, 2024). The Court ruled that plaintiffs adequately alleged violations of (i) Section 251(b) of the DGCL, which requires a board to approve an &quot;essentially complete&quot; version of the merger agreement; (ii) Section 251(c), which requires that the notice of the stockholder meeting contain either a copy or a summary of the complete merger agreement; and (iii) Section 141(c), which requires the full board to approve a merger agreement. The Court also sustained the conversion claim but dismissed the claims under Section 251(d), which prohibits any amendment of a merger agreement having an adverse effect on stockholders.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Apr 2024 14:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Requires-Compliance-With-DGCL-Provisions</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Applies Entire Fairness To State Of Incorporation Conversions</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Applies-Entire-Fairness-T</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On February 20, 2024, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied in part and granted in part a motion to dismiss a stockholder action against TripAdvisor, Inc. and its parent (together, the &quot;Company&quot;), controlling stockholder and certain directors and officers challenging the conversion of the Company from a Delaware to a Nevada corporation. Palkon v. Maffei, No. 2023-0449-JTL (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2024). The Court held that the conversion was subject to entire fairness review because it conferred benefits to the controller—in the form of more limited fiduciary obligations—that minority stockholders did not receive and found the complaint adequately stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty but stopped short of enjoining the conversion.
]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2024 18:07:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Applies-Entire-Fairness-T</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Claim For Breach Of Duty Of Oversight, Finding Failure To Establish Demand Futility</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On February 19, 2024, Vice Chancellor Lori Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a derivative breach of fiduciary duty action against nominal defendant Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) and its board of directors (the &quot;Board&quot;), alleging the Company&apos;s billing practices for insulin resulted in unnecessary refill reminders and overbilling of third-party payers. Clem v. Skinner, No. 2021-0240-LWW (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2024). Plaintiffs asserted that pre-suit demand was excused because the Board faced a substantial likelihood of liability for breaching their duty of oversight. The Court found that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege facts suggesting that the Board acted in bad faith, as required to plead a Caremark claim, and thus granted the motion to dismiss, finding that pre-suit demand was not excused.
]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2024 18:03:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Invalidates Stockholder Agreement Provisions That Deprive Board Of Key Decision-Making Powers</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Invalidates-Stockholder</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On February 23, 2024, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery invalidated a number of significant provisions in a stockholder agreement between a financial institution (the &quot;Company&quot;) and its founder and controlling stockholder. West Palm Beach Firefighters Pension Fund v. Moelis &amp; Co., No. 2023-0309-JTL (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2024). The Court found that a number of the provisions impermissibly delegated to the controller authority over governance activities that, under Delaware General Corporation Law, are within the exclusive providence of the board, in violation of Section 141(a) and, as to a provision governing committee composition, Section 141(c). The Court so concluded notwithstanding that many of the provisions are commonly included in controller stockholder agreements.
]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2024 17:59:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Invalidates-Stockholder</guid>
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					      <title>After Derivative Litigation Judgment For Defendants, Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Application For &quot;Mootness&quot; Fee For Purportedly Prompting Appointment Of Independent Directors Who Served On Special Litigation Committee
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/After-Derivative-Litigation-Judgment-For-Defendants</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 7, 2024, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion for a &quot;mootness&quot; fee of plaintiffs in a derivative action brought against the founder of a technology company (the &quot;Company&quot;), its CEO, certain of its directors, and other individuals affiliated with a counterparty to an acquisition by the Company. In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2024). Plaintiffs had alleged that the founder and CEO caused the Company to overpay for the target and asserted claims for breaches of fiduciary duty seeking damages. After issuing a post-trial judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiffs applied for a $5 million fee for precipitating the appointment of two independent directors who served on the special litigation committee (&quot;SLC&quot;) of the board. The Court held that the appointment of the new directors &quot;did not moot any issues in the case, nor was it an aim of [p]laintiffs&apos; litigation.&quot; Accordingly, plaintiffs were not entitled to a fee under the corporate benefit doctrine.
]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 2024 20:48:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/After-Derivative-Litigation-Judgment-For-Defendants</guid>
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					      <title>Court Of Chancery Rescinds CEO Compensation Package Under Entire Fairness Review
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Court-Of-Chancery-Rescinds-CEO-Compensation-Package</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
In a January 30, 2024, post-trial ruling, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery rescinded a compensation package valued at $55.8 billion awarded by Tesla, Inc. to its CEO, notwithstanding that stockholders had previously voted to approve the package.  Tornetta v. Musk, No. 2018-0408-KSJM, 2024 WL 343699 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2024).  In so holding, the Court found that neither the value of the compensation nor the process by which it was achieved was entirely fair to stockholders.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Feb 2024 22:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Court-Of-Chancery-Rescinds-CEO-Compensation-Package</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds That Controlling Stockholder Conduct Did Not Breach Fiduciary Duties But Rendered Buyout Transaction Unfair
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Stockholder-Conduct-Did-Not-Breach-Fiduciary-Duties</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 24, 2024, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery awarded a stockholder plaintiff class more than $18 million, finding that the acquisition of the &quot;Hometown&quot; division of Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores, Inc. (&quot;SHOS&quot;) by its controlling stockholder failed the entire fairness test.  In re Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2019-0798-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2024).  The Court so ruled, even after finding, that the controlling stockholder&apos;s conduct leading up to the transaction—including the ouster of two members of SHOS&apos;s Special Committee and a bylaw amendment limiting the company&apos;s alternatives—did not breach his fiduciary duties.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Feb 2024 22:20:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Stockholder-Conduct-Did-Not-Breach-Fiduciary-Duties</guid>
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					      <title>Applying Unocal, Delaware Court Of Chancery Upholds Board&apos;s Denial Of Stockholder&apos;s Director Nomination Notice Pursuant To Amended Bylaws
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Applying-Unocal-Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Upholds-Board-Denial</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 28, 2023, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a post-trial ruling upholding the decision by the board of directors of AIM Immunotech Inc. to reject a director nomination notice submitted by plaintiff stockholder.  Kellner v. AIM Immunotech Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2023-0879-LWW (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 2023).  The Board rejected the notice pursuant to recently amended bylaws (the &quot;Amended Bylaws&quot;) and, while the Court invalidated certain of the amendments, the Court ultimately concluded that the valid bylaws were equitably applied and plaintiff&apos;s failure to comply with those bylaws was fatal to his nomination effort.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Feb 2024 14:32:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Applying-Unocal-Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Upholds-Board-Denial</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Claims Related To The Acquisition Of An Alleged Controller&apos;s Portfolio Company For Failure To Plead Demand Futility
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Claims-Related</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On December 28, 2023, Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed derivative breach of fiduciary duty and other claims asserted by a plaintiff shareholder after nCino, Inc. (the &quot;Corporation&quot;) acquired a portfolio company (the &quot;Target&quot;) of the Corporation&apos;s alleged controlling shareholder. City of Hialeah Employees&apos; Retirement System v. Insight Venture Partners, LLC, C.A. No. 2022-0846-MTZ (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 2023). Plaintiff generally contended that the Corporation overpaid for the Target to the benefit of the alleged controller and the detriment of the Corporation, as reflected in the decline in the Corporation&apos;s stock price after the deal was announced. Plaintiff sought to establish that pre-suit demand was excused because the directors faced a substantial likelihood of liability and were beholden to the alleged controller. The Court found that plaintiff did not adequately allege that the board approved the acquisition in bad faith or lacked independence from the alleged controller and, therefore, failed to plead demand futility.
]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jan 2024 17:22:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Claims-Related</guid>
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					      <title>Addressing The Enforceability Of Con Ed Provisions In Merger Agreements, Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Petition For Post-Closing Mootness Fee, Finding Stockholders Lacked Third-Party Beneficiary Standing To Seek Lost-Premium Damages
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Addressing-The-Enforceability-Of-Con-Ed-Provisions-In-Merger-Agreements-Delaware-Court</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 31, 2023, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery issued final judgment denying a petition for a mootness fee award to a stockholder—who had previously asserted claims for breach of a merger agreement—after the merger closed.  Crispo v. Musk, No. 2022-0666-KSJM (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2023).  The Court explained that, to obtain a mootness fee, a &quot;plaintiff-stockholder must demonstrate that his mooted claim was meritorious when filed.&quot;  The claim at issue was for breach of a so-called &quot;Con Ed provision&quot; in the merger agreement purporting to provide for lost-premium damages.  The Court found that plaintiff did not have third-party beneficiary status, at least at the time he filed suit, and therefore his claim was not meritorious.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Nov 2023 20:26:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Addressing-The-Enforceability-Of-Con-Ed-Provisions-In-Merger-Agreements-Delaware-Court</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Stockholder Demand For Corporation To Supplement Its Section 220 Production With Searches And Production Of Email
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Stockholder-Demand-For-Corporation-To-Supplement</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 25, 2023, Magistrate Bonnie W. David of the Delaware Chancery Court issued a post-trial report denying stockholder requests for supplemental productions of emails from Zendesk, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) pursuant to a books and records demand.  In re Zendesk, Inc. Section 220 Litig., C.A. No. 2023-0454-BWD (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2023).  Plaintiffs served the demands pursuant to 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220 seeking to investigate possible wrongdoing in connection with the Company&apos;s entry into a merger (the &quot;Transaction&quot;).  The Company voluntarily produced &quot;Formal Board Materials,&quot; including board minutes, presentations, and other board-level documents in response.  Plaintiffs, however, asserted that there were &quot;gaps&quot; and &quot;inconsistencies&quot; that purportedly necessitated searches and production of email.  The Court found that plaintiffs &quot;have not met their burden to prove that [the requested] electronic communications &amp;hellip; are essential to accomplishing the proper purposes stated in their [d]emands.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Sep 2023 14:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Stockholder-Demand-For-Corporation-To-Supplement</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Clarifies Standard Applicable To Mootness Fee Awards For Supplemental Disclosures
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Clarifies-Standard-Applicable-To-Mootness-Fee-Awards</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 6, 2023, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a written opinion explaining a prior bench ruling on a mootness fee awarded to plaintiff&apos;s counsel in connection with a putative stockholder class action brought against Magellan Health, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) and its directors in connection with its acquisition by Centene Corporation.  Anderson v. Magellan Health, Inc., C.A. No. 2021-0202-KSJM (Del. Ch. July 6, 2023).  Plaintiff&apos;s suit, commenced after the publication of the merger proxy and prior to closing, alleged that &quot;don&apos;t-ask-don&apos;t-waive&quot; provisions contained in confidentiality agreements between the Company and other prospective bidders impeded the deal process and were not fully disclosed in the proxy.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Aug 2023 22:53:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Clarifies-Standard-Applicable-To-Mootness-Fee-Awards</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Stockholder&apos;s Section 220 Books And Record Demand In Connection With Corporation&apos;s Expression Of Opposition To Legislation
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Stockholders-Section-220-Books-And-Record-Demand</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 27, 2023, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a judgment in favor of a &quot;leading media and entertainment&quot; company with a &quot;substantial presence in Florida&quot; (the &quot;Corporation&quot;), rejecting a demand for corporate books and records under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 220.  Simeone v. The Walt Disney Company, C.A. No. 2022-1120-LWW (Del. Ch. June 27, 2023).  As explained by the Court, the Corporation publicly expressed opposition to certain Florida state legislation &quot;limit[ing] instruction on sexual orientation or gender identity in Florida classrooms&quot; (the &quot;Legislation&quot;).  Thereafter, Florida&apos;s legislature voted to dissolve a special district that had benefitted the Corporation.  Plaintiff, a stockholder, sought the records purportedly to investigate potential breaches of fiduciary duties by the Corporation&apos;s directors and officers in connection with the opposition to the Legislation.  The Court explained that &quot;Delaware law vests directors with significant discretion to guide corporate strategy—including on social and political issues&quot; and found that plaintiff &quot;decidedly&quot; had not &quot;demonstrated a proper purpose&quot; for the records request.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 06 Jul 2023 16:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Stockholders-Section-220-Books-And-Record-Demand</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Decision Rejecting Fiduciary Duty Claims As To Allegedly Conflicted Acquisition Because It Satisfied Entire Fairness Review
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Decision-Rejecting-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 6, 2023, in an opinion authored by Justice Karen L. Valihura, the Supreme Court of Delaware sitting en banc unanimously affirmed judgment in favor of defendant, the CEO/Founder and then-Chairman (the &quot;Chairman&quot;) of Tesla Motors, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;), on derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty asserted by stockholders in connection with the Company&apos;s acquisition of SolarCity Corporation (the &quot;Target&quot;).  In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 181, 2022 (Del. June 6, 2023).  Plaintiffs alleged that the Chairman was the Company&apos;s controlling stockholder and that he was conflicted because he also was the chairman of the board and largest stockholder of the Target.  As discussed in our prior post, following a trial, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the transaction was &quot;entirely fair&quot; and rejected plaintiffs&apos; claims.  In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 12711-VCS (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2022).  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the record supported the trial court&apos;s determinations that &quot;despite certain process flaws, the [a]cquisition was the product of fair dealing&quot; and &quot;the price paid was a fair one.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jun 2023 16:44:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Decision-Rejecting-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Concludes Founder And Largest Shareholder Was Not A Controller In Connection With Allegedly Conflicted Transaction
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Concludes-Founder-And-Largest-Shareholder-Was-Not-A-Controller</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 12, 2023, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled in favor of defendant, the founder and largest shareholder (the &quot;Founder&quot;) of a technology company (the &quot;Company&quot;), on derivative breach of fiduciary duty claims in connection with the Company&apos;s acquisition of a financial software company (the &quot;Target&quot;), for which he was also a co-founder and the largest shareholder.  In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation, No. 2017-0337-SG (Del. Ch. May 12, 2023).  Defendant owned approximately 28% of the Company and 40% of the Target.  Plaintiff shareholders alleged that the Founder, who was also a director and Chief Technology Officer of the Company, &quot;used his outsized influence&quot; to cause it to overpay because he owned a larger percentage of the Target than of the Company.  After a ten-day trial, the Court determined that the Founder &quot;was not in control of [the Company] generally&quot; and, although he &quot;could have influenced the directors&apos; decision&quot; in connection with the transaction, &quot;he did not.&quot;  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Founder was not a &quot;controller&quot; and, therefore, the transaction was entitled to deferential review under the business judgment rule.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jun 2023 15:38:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Concludes-Founder-And-Largest-Shareholder-Was-Not-A-Controller</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds That Corwin Cleansing Does Not Apply To Claims For Injunctive Relief Related To Alleged Defensive Measures
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Corwin-Cleansing-Does-Not-Apply-To-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 1, 2023, Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a putative stockholder class action asserting a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the directors of a telecommunications company (the &quot;Corporation&quot;) and seeking to enjoin alleged defensive measures.  In re Edgio, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 2022-0624-MTZ (Del. Ch. May 1, 2023).  The action was brought after the Corporation acquired a portfolio company of an investor (the &quot;Investor&quot;) in exchange for a 35% stake in the post-merger entity and entry into a stockholders&apos; agreement that allegedly &quot;restricted the [I]nvestor&apos;s voting and transfer rights.&quot;  The stockholders of the Corporation voted in favor of the transaction in advance.  Defendants argued that they were entitled to the &quot;irrebuttable presumption of the business judgment rule&quot; that applies &quot;when a transaction is approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders&quot; under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).  The Court, however, found that the relevant provisions in the stockholders&apos; agreement were subject at the pleading stage to &quot;enhanced scrutiny&quot; as alleged &quot;defensive measures . . . designed to entrench the board.&quot;  The Court held that &quot;Corwin cleansing&quot; does not apply to a claim seeking to enjoin such alleged defensive measures.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 09 May 2023 19:53:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Corwin-Cleansing-Does-Not-Apply-To-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Breach Of Contract Claims Against Buyer, Finding Seller Retained Post-Closing Liability Related To Certain Product-Liability Litigations
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Contract-Claims-Against-Buyer-Finding-Seller-Retained</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 3, 2023, Vice Chancellor Nathan A. Cook of the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed the breach of contract claims by one pharmaceutical company (the &quot;Seller&quot;) against another (the &quot;Buyer&quot;) in connection with the Buyer&apos;s acquisition of Seller&apos;s consumer product lines in 2014 pursuant to a Stock and Asset Purchase Agreement (the &quot;Agreement&apos;). Merck &amp; Co., Inc. v. Bayer AG, No. 2021-0838-NAC (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2023). After closing, product liability claims relating to talcum powder used in one of the product lines were filed against both companies. Seven years after the closing, Seller informed Buyer that as of the seventh anniversary, it would no longer pay for defense and liability stemming from the claims and, after Buyer refused to assume the liability, sued Buyer for breach of the Agreement. The Court found that the Agreement—which was negotiated by sophisticated parties—unambiguously established that Seller was indefinitely liable for the products liability claims for products sold before closing.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Apr 2023 18:04:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Contract-Claims-Against-Buyer-Finding-Seller-Retained</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court of Chancery Finds Revlon Violation For Founder Who Favored Buyer And Failed To Disclose, And Aiding &amp; Abetting Violation For Buyer
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Finds-Revlon-Violation-For-Founder-Who-Favored-Buyer-And-Failed</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 15, 2022, Chancellor Kathaleen McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that the founder and former CEO of Mindbody Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) breached his fiduciary duties to stockholders in connection with the 2019 sale of the Company to private equity firm Vista Equity Partners Management, LLC (&quot;Buyer&quot;). In Re Mindbody, Inc., Stockholder Litigation, CA. No. 2019-0442-KSJM (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2023). The Court ruled that the founder breached his duty of loyalty by structuring the sale process to favor the Buyer for personal gain and breached his duty of disclosure by creating a &quot;false narrative&quot; in the proxy to obscure the truth about the flawed process. The Court also concluded that Buyer aided and abetted the founder&apos;s disclosure breaches by failing to correct the inaccuracies in the proxy. The Court awarded $1 per share in damages for the fiduciary duty breach, based on the difference between the deal price and the price that the Court concluded Buyer would have paid in a fair process, and the same $1 per share as nominal damages for the disclosure breach and aiding and abetting.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Apr 2023 17:59:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Finds-Revlon-Violation-For-Founder-Who-Favored-Buyer-And-Failed</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Caremark Claims Against Directors For Failure To Allege Bad Faith After Permitting Related Claims To Advance Against Officer
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-Claims-Against-Directors-For-Failure-To-Allege</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 1, 2023, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed derivative claims brought by stockholders for breach of the fiduciary duty of oversight under Caremark against the directors of McDonald&apos;s Corporation (the &quot;Company&quot;). The decision follows the Court&apos;s earlier decision to deny a motion to dismiss similar claims brought against the Company&apos;s officers and to extend the Caremark duty to corporate officers, as discussed here. In re McDonald&apos;s Corp. S&apos;holder Deriv. Litig., Case No. 2021-0324-JTL (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2023).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2023 20:56:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-Claims-Against-Directors-For-Failure-To-Allege</guid>
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					      <title>Applying Entire Fairness, Delaware Court of Chancery Sustains Class Action Claims for Breaches of Fiduciary Duties Arising from Alleged Omissions in SPAC Merger Proxy
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Pair-Of-Delaware-Chancery-Court-Decisions-Deny-Motions-To-Dismiss-SPAC-Shareholder-Fiduciary</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 1, 2023, Vice Chancellor Lori Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss a putative class action brought by stockholders of special purpose acquisition company (or &quot;SPAC&quot;) GigCapital2, Inc. (&quot;Gig2&quot;) against Gig2&apos;s controlling stockholder and directors, asserting that they breached their fiduciary duties in connection with Gig2&apos;s acquisition of UpHealth Holdings, Inc. and Cloudbreak Health, LLC in a so-called &quot;de-SPAC&quot; merger. Laidlaw v. Gigacquisitions2, LLC, et. al., C.A. No. 2021-0821-LWW (Del. Ct. Ch. Mar. 1, 2023) (&quot;Gigacquisitions2&quot;). Plaintiffs alleged that defendants issued a false and misleading merger proxy to obtain approval of a value-destructive de-SPAC transaction and thereby enrich themselves through their unique ownership interests. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that (i) plaintiffs&apos; claims were derivative (alleging harm to the company rather to individual stockholders) but plaintiffs failed to make a demand or plead demand futility, and (ii) the business judgment rule applied. The Court held that plaintiffs&apos; claims were direct, not derivative, and that entire fairness—Delaware law&apos;s most stringent standard of review—applied because inherent conflicts of interest existed between defendants and Gig2&apos;s public stockholders.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2023 16:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Pair-Of-Delaware-Chancery-Court-Decisions-Deny-Motions-To-Dismiss-SPAC-Shareholder-Fiduciary</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Validates SPAC Charter Amendment Called Into Question By A Recent Decision
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Validates-SPAC-Charter-Amendment-Called-Into-Question</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 21, 2023, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the petition of Lordstown Motors Corporation (the &quot;Company&quot;) under Section 205 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;) to validate and declare effective the Company&apos;s certificate of incorporation as amended in connection with a &quot;de-SPAC&quot; merger more than two years ago.  In Re Lordstown Motors Corp., C.A. 2023-0083-LWW (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2023).  In advance of the merger, the Company—then a special purpose acquisition company (&quot;SPAC&quot;)—adopted the amendment to increase the number of authorized Class A common shares, which were subsequently issued in connection with the merger.  The Company requested validation from the Court after the approval of the amendment—by a majority of Class A and Class B shares voting together rather than a vote exclusively by the Class A stock—was called into question by a recent decision related to another SPAC.  Because a &quot;significant number of SPACs&quot; had similar provisions and followed a similar process, that decision, Garfield v. Boxed, Inc., No. 2022-0132-MTZ (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2022)—discussed in a prior post—resulted in &quot;pervasive uncertainty&quot; regarding their capital structures and the validity of their stock.  Granting the petition, the Court concluded that validation of the charter amendment would be &quot;just and equitable.&quot;  The Court added that its decision &quot;should prove instructive to other companies seeking the court&apos;s assistance to validate similar corporate acts.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 18:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Validates-SPAC-Charter-Amendment-Called-Into-Question</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Declines To Dismiss Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Nondirector Officer, Holding That Officers Owe A Caremark Duty Of Oversight
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Dismiss-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims-Against-Nondirector</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 25, 2023, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a derivative suit brought by stockholders asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against a former officer of McDonald&apos;s Corporation (the &quot;Company&quot;).  In Re McDonald&apos;s Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litig., Case No. 2021-0324-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2023).  Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, who served as the Chief People Officer responsible for human resources at the Company, breached oversight duties by &quot;consciously ignoring red flags&quot; regarding sexual harassment at the Company.  The Court acknowledged that Delaware courts had not previously &quot;expressly held that officers . . . owe oversight duties&quot; comparable to the duty of oversight owed by directors under In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).  But the Court sustained the claim, noting that &quot;[t]his decision clarifies that corporate officers owe a duty of oversight.&quot;  The Court also found that plaintiffs adequately pled a claim against defendant for breach of the duty of loyalty based on specific purported acts of sexual harassment in which he allegedly engaged.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Feb 2023 17:48:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Dismiss-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims-Against-Nondirector</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Grants Plaintiff Attorneys&apos; Fees Award Under Corporate Benefit Doctrine For Demand To SPAC Board Leading To Adjusted Voting Structure In Connection With Merger
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Plaintiff-Attorneys-Fees-Award-Under-Corporate-Benefit-Doctrine</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 27, 2022, Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn of the Delaware Court of Chancery substantially granted plaintiff&apos;s motion for summary judgment in an action seeking attorneys&apos; fees.  Garfield v. Boxed, Inc., No. 2022-0132-MTZ (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2022).  Plaintiff, a stockholder of defendant Seven Oaks Acquisition Corp., a special purpose acquisition company (the &quot;SPAC&quot;), made a demand on the board challenging the structure of stockholder votes on proposed charter amendments regarding the issuance of shares in connection with a merger.  The SPAC made the change demanded by plaintiff and consummated the deal.  However, defendant opposed the attorneys&apos; fees award, contending that the previously contemplated voting structure had already been legally compliant.  The Court held that plaintiff had correctly determined that the contemplated voting structure would have been inconsistent with Delaware law.  The Court thus awarded attorneys&apos; fees because &quot;[b]y taking the [SPAC] off a path that violated [Delaware law] and the stockholder franchise, [p]laintiff conferred a substantial benefit.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jan 2023 22:57:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Plaintiff-Attorneys-Fees-Award-Under-Corporate-Benefit-Doctrine</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Assesses The Application Of Timeliness Principles To Caremark Red Flags Claim And Applies &quot;Separate Accrual Approach&quot; But Subsequently Dismisses Complaint For Failure To Plead Demand Futility
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Assesses-The-Application-Of-Timeliness-Principles-To-Caremark-Red-Flags</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 15, 2022, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss claims as untimely in a derivative action brought by stockholders against the officers and directors of AmerisourceBergen Corporation (the &quot;Company&quot;).  Lebanon County Employees&apos; Retirement Fund v. Collis, C.A. No. 2021-1118-JTL (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2022).  The Company is a wholesale distributor of pharmaceuticals that faced extensive investigations and litigation related to the opioid epidemic.  Plaintiffs primarily alleged that defendants breached their fiduciary duties by ignoring &quot;red flags&quot; related to the Company&apos;s purported failure to report suspicious opioid orders.  Although the challenged conduct began nearly a decade earlier, plaintiffs did not even seek books and records until 2019.  The Court highlighted that &quot;[n]o Delaware court has addressed the timeliness principles that govern&quot; a Caremark red-flags claim.  The Court held that the &quot;separate accrual approach&quot; applies and, therefore, plaintiffs could assert claims with respect to alleged &quot;conduct and consequences&quot; that occurred within the three-year limitations period prior to their &quot;vigilant[]&quot; pursuit of claims.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2023 17:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Assesses-The-Application-Of-Timeliness-Principles-To-Caremark-Red-Flags</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Special Committee Defendants For Failure To Plead Breach Of Loyalty
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims-Against-Special-Committee</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 30, 2022, Vice Chancellor Glasscock of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss claims asserted against directors who served as members of the special committee (the &quot;Special Committee&quot;) of Isramco Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) for failure to plead a breach of the duty of loyalty in connection with a take-private merger. Ligos v. Tsuff, et. al., C.A., No. 2020-0435-SG (Del. Ct. Ch, Nov. 30, 2022). Plaintiff asserted that the Special Committee lacked independence because it was selected by the Company&apos;s controlling stockholder, who also allegedly controlled the company with whom the Company merged, Naptha Israel Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (the &quot;Buyer&quot;) and allegedly negotiated in bad faith. Vice Chancellor Glasscock held that even with the &quot;plaintiff-friendly inferences&quot; required on a motion to dismiss, there was no reasonably conceivable basis for Plaintiff&apos;s claims.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Dec 2022 17:49:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims-Against-Special-Committee</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Personal Jurisdiction Over LLC &quot;Acting Manager&quot; In Post-Closing Investor Action Challenging Merger With SPAC
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Personal-Jurisdiction-Over-LLC-Acting-Manager-In-Post-Closing</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 26, 2022, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction claims of tortious interference asserted against a principal of a private equity fund (the &quot;Fund&quot;), which had been the majority investor of a limited liability company (the &quot;LLC&quot;).  In re P3 Health Grp. Holdings, LLC, Consol. C.A. No. 2021-0518-JTL (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2022).  Plaintiff — which had been the second largest investor in the LLC — alleged that defendant tortiously interfered with its contractual rights under the limited liability company agreement in connection with the merger of the LLC with a special purpose acquisition company (&quot;SPAC&quot;).  The Court concluded that the complaint adequately alleged that defendant &quot;participated materially in the management&quot; of the LLC such that he &quot;can be served [process] as an acting manager&quot; and that the &quot;exercise of personal jurisdiction over [defendant] comports with &amp;hellip; due process.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Nov 2022 21:42:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Personal-Jurisdiction-Over-LLC-Acting-Manager-In-Post-Closing</guid>
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					      <title>New York Appellate Court Dismisses Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims Under Foreign Law, Clarifying That The Internal Affairs Doctrine Applies To Directors And Officers Even If They Are No Longer Serving At The Time Of Suit
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Appellate-Court-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims-Under-Foreign-Law</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 13, 2022, a five-judge panel of the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, First Department, unanimously reversed a trial court decision and dismissed a breach of fiduciary duty action brought by former shareholders of an online fantasy sports company (the &quot;Company&quot;) against its directors and officers following a merger.  Eccles v. Shamrock Cap. Advisors, LLC, Case No. 2022-00866 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 13, 2022).  The Company was incorporated in Scotland and headquartered in New York.  The trial court had upheld the claims under New York law, declining to apply the internal affairs doctrine to former directors and officers.  Applying Scots law, the Appellate Division reversed, explaining: &quot;To the extent our past decisions could be interpreted as suggesting otherwise we clarify that the internal affairs doctrine applies to an officer or director at the time of the conduct at issue.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Nov 2022 21:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Appellate-Court-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims-Under-Foreign-Law</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Buyer Assumed Post-Closing Liability In Connection With Seller&apos;s Pre-Existing Settlement Agreement
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Buyer-Assumed-Post-Closing-Liability</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 30, 2022, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted summary judgment to the seller of several cigarette brands, finding that the buyer was responsible pursuant to an asset purchase agreement (&quot;APA&quot;) for post-closing liability in connection with a pre-existing settlement between the State of Florida and the seller.  ITG Brands, LLC v. Reynolds American Inc., et. al., C.A. No. 2017-0129-LWW (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2022).  As part of the settlement entered nearly twenty years before the sale of the brands, the seller and other tobacco companies agreed to make annual payments to Florida based on the companies&apos; respective market shares of annual tobacco product sales in the United States.  The Court focused on a provision of the APA that stated that the buyer assumed &quot;all Liabilities &amp;hellip; to the extent arising, directly or indirectly, out of &amp;hellip; the use of the Transferred Assets &amp;hellip; from and after the Closing.&quot;  The Court found that the provision unambiguously assigned the post-closing liability in connection with the Florida settlement to the buyer.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2022 16:20:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Buyer-Assumed-Post-Closing-Liability</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Caremark Claims Alleging Breaches Of Fiduciary Duty Following A Cyberattack
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-Claims-Alleging-Breaches-Of-Fiduciary-Duty</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 6, 2022, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought by stockholders of a software company (the &quot;Company&quot;) against its directors following a cyberattack.  Construction Industry Laborers&apos; Pension Fund v. Bingle, No. CV 2021-0940-SG (Del. Ch. Sep. 6, 2022).  After the Company allegedly fell victim to hackers who accessed confidential information on the systems of thousands of its customers, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had failed to adequately address the risk to cybersecurity in breach of their oversight obligations under Caremark.  The Court indicated that cybersecurity is &quot;mission critical&quot; for online service providers and the complaint alleged oversight practices that were &quot;far from ideal.&quot;  But the Court held that pre-suit demand was not excused because the complaint did not plead &quot;specific facts&quot; from which the Court could &quot;infer bad faith liability.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Sep 2022 16:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-Claims-Alleging-Breaches-Of-Fiduciary-Duty</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Stockholder Challenge To Certificate Of Incorporation Amendment Prolonging Voting Control By CEO/Chairman
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-court-of-chancery-dismisses-stockholder-challenge-to-certificate-of</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 11, 2022, Vice Chancellor Paul A. Fiorvanti of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a stockholder challenge to an amendment of the certificate of incorporation of The Trade Desk, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;).  According to the complaint, the amendment effectively extended the voting control of the Company&apos;s co-founder, Chairman, and CEO (the &quot;CEO&quot;) by extending the duration of a dual-class stock structure.  Plaintiff asserted claims against the CEO and other directors for breach of fiduciary duties in approving the amendment.  The Court dismissed the complaint because it found that the transaction process complied with the procedural protections necessary for application of the deferential business judgment rule pursuant to Kahn v. M &amp; F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Aug 2022 20:14:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/delaware-court-of-chancery-dismisses-stockholder-challenge-to-certificate-of</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Dismissal Of A Post-Merger Suit For Alleged Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Related To Disclosures On Appraisal Rights
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-A-Post-Merger-Suit-For-Alleged-Breach</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 19, 2022, in an opinion authored by Justice Gary F. Traynor, a majority of the Supreme Court of Delaware sitting en banc affirmed in part and reversed in part the dismissal of breach of fiduciary duty claims against the directors of a real estate investment trust (the &quot;Company&quot;) brought by former stockholders of the Company after its acquisition.  In re GGP, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, No. 202, 2021 (Del. July 19, 2022).  Plaintiffs alleged that the merger was structured to eliminate the statutory appraisal rights of the Company&apos;s stockholders and that the proxy disclosures regarding appraisal rights were misleading.  The Delaware Court of Chancery had dismissed the claims.  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the claim alleging an improper merger structure because &quot;defendants did not, by paying a large portion of the merger consideration by way of a pre-closing dividend, structure the merger in a manner that effectively and unlawfully eliminated appraisal rights.&quot;  However, the Court reversed the dismissal of the disclosure claim because it found the complaint adequately alleged that defendants &quot;consciously crafted the transaction and the related disclosures in such a way as to deter [the Company&apos;s] stockholders from exercising their appraisal rights.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 28 Jul 2022 15:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-A-Post-Merger-Suit-For-Alleged-Breach</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Suit For Failure To Allege Substantial Likelihood Of Liability Sufficient To Excuse Pre-Suit Demand
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Suit-For-Failure-To-Allege-Substantial</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 30, 2022, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought by a stockholder of an energy company (the &quot;Company&quot;) against its directors following an incident involving explosions in the pipeline system of one of its natural gas distribution subsidiaries. City of Detroit Police and Fire Retirement System v. Hamrock, C.A. No. 2021-0370-KSJM (Del. Ch. June 30, 2022).  Plaintiff claimed that the board breached its oversight obligations under Caremark by allegedly failing to implement a reporting and monitoring system relating to pipeline safety and ignoring &quot;red flags.&quot;  The Court held that pre-suit demand under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 was not excused because the complaint did not adequately plead that the directors faced a substantial likelihood of liability.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Jul 2022 16:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Suit-For-Failure-To-Allege-Substantial</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Declares Company Actions On Behalf Of One Half Of Deadlocked Board Were Unauthorized And Contrary To Corporate Neutrality Principle
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declares-Company-Actions-On-Behalf-Of-One-Half-Of-Deadlocked-Board</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 16, 2022, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiffs — four members of the board of Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;), including its Executive Chairman — against defendants — the other four members of the Company&apos;s board, including its CEO — after the eight-member board had deadlocked in connection with the Company&apos;s impending board election.  In Re Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings Inc., No. CV 2022-0127-LWW (Del. Ch. June 16, 2022).  The case arose after each faction had proposed its own slate of board nominees.  Plaintiffs challenged certain actions allegedly undertaken by the Company at the behest of defendants, such as the issuance of a Company press release purporting to express the Company&apos;s disappointment in the slate proposed by plaintiffs and the retention of counsel on behalf of the Company to pursue litigation against plaintiffs.  Following a trial, the Court held that such actions were unauthorized and contrary to the corporate neutrality principle.  The Court explained that a Delaware corporation &quot;must remain neutral when a there is a legitimate question as to who is entitled to speak or act on its behalf,&quot; and [w]here a board cannot validly exercise its ultimate decision-making power, neither faction has a greater claim to the company&apos;s name or resources.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Jul 2022 21:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declares-Company-Actions-On-Behalf-Of-One-Half-Of-Deadlocked-Board</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Declines To Dismiss Claims Related To Direct Offering At The Outset Of The Pandemic
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Dismiss-Claims-Related-To-Direct-Offering</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 30, 2022, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss stockholder derivative claims for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty against the CEO/Chairman of an e-commerce car company (the &quot;Company&quot;).  In Re Carvana Co. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 2020-0415-KSJM (Del. Ct. Ch, Jun. 30, 2022).  Plaintiffs alleged that the CEO/Chairman and his father controlled the Company and &quot;orchestrated&quot; a $600 million direct offering to selected investors in which they purchased $50 million of common stock in March 2020 when the Company&apos;s stock price was depressed due to pandemic-related volatility.  The Court held that plaintiffs adequately pleaded that pre-suit demand was excused because two of the Company&apos;s other directors lacked independence from the CEO/Chairman.  The Court further found that the transaction was subject to entire fairness—rather than deferential business judgment—review because it allegedly involved a non-ratable benefit not shared by the public stockholders and half the board lacked independence.  Finally, the Court held that the CEO/Chairman&apos;s abstention from the board&apos;s vote approving the offering was insufficient to warrant dismissal at the pleadings stage.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Jul 2022 16:52:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Dismiss-Claims-Related-To-Direct-Offering</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Issues Post-Trial Judgment In Favor Of Defendant, Rejecting Stockholder&apos;s Section 220 Books And Records Demand
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Issues-Post-Trial-Judgment-In-Favor-Of-Defendant</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 1, 2022, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of defendant retail company (the &quot;Corporation&quot;), rejecting a demand for corporate books and records under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 220.  Plaintiff, a stockholder, sought the records purportedly to investigate possible mismanagement in connection with the Corporation&apos;s compliance with certain antitrust and tax laws.  In response to the demand, the Corporation produced certain board-level materials but declined to comply with plaintiff&apos;s request for a wide array of additional documents.  Following a trial on a paper record, the Court found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the requisite &quot;credible basis&quot; to suspect wrongdoing, and in any event, the demand was &quot;satisfied&quot; because the Corporation &quot;produced all necessary and essential documents related to the alleged wrongdoing discussed in the demand.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jun 2022 18:53:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Issues-Post-Trial-Judgment-In-Favor-Of-Defendant</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion To Dismiss Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claim Against Director Who Abstained From Merger Vote
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claim</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 25, 2022, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a stockholder derivative claim against a director of Fat Brands Inc. (the &quot;Corporation&quot;) for alleged breach of fiduciary duty.  Harris v. Junger, C.A. No. 2021-0511-SG (Del. Ch. May 25, 2022).  Plaintiffs challenged the merger of the Corporation with Fog Cutter Capital Group, Inc. (the &quot;Merger Partner&quot;), which allegedly held more than 80% of the Corporation&apos;s stock before the merger.  In a previous oral ruling, the Court had found that the Complaint sufficiently pleaded that the merger &quot;constituted reasonably conceivable bad faith and waste,&quot; but reserved judgment on the claim against one director who had been a minority stockholder of the Merger Partner before the merger and therefore abstained from voting on the merger.  In this decision, the Court declined to dismiss the claim against that director at the pleading stage because the complaint adequately alleged that it was &quot;reasonably conceivable&quot; that he &quot;breached his duty of good faith by participating in negotiating a [m]erger that constituted corporate waste.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2022 15:14:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claim</guid>
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					      <title>California Superior Court Strikes Down Director Diversity Mandate
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/California-Superior-Court-Strikes-Down-Director-Diversity-Mandate</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 13, 2022, Judge Maureen Duffy Lewis of the Superior Court of the State of California for Los Angeles County entered judgement in favor of three taxpayers bringing state constitutional challenges to S.B. 826, a bill for a California law that required the boards of California corporations to include women.  Crest v. Padilla, Case No. 19 STCV 27561 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. May 13, 2022).  The law mandated that, by December 31, 2021, publicly held companies incorporated in California must appoint at least one woman on boards of four or fewer directors, two women on boards of five directors, and three women on boards of six or more directors.  The Court agreed with plaintiffs that the law violated the California constitution&apos;s Equal Protection Clause.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 24 May 2022 21:30:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/California-Superior-Court-Strikes-Down-Director-Diversity-Mandate</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion To Dismiss Breach Of Fiduciary Duty And Unjust Enrichment Claims Related To Compensation Committee Awards
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Breach-Of-Fiduciary</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 27, 2022, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied, in part, a motion to dismiss a derivative complaint against directors for breaches of fiduciary duties brought by stockholders of Universal Health Services Inc. (the &quot;Corporation&quot;).  Knight v. Miller, C.A. No. 2021-0581-SG (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2022).  Plaintiff, a stockholder, alleged that the directors serving on the board&apos;s compensation committee took advantage of an &quot;obvious dip&quot; in stock price in the wake of the emergence of COVID-19 in March 2020 to grant option awards, including to themselves.  Noting that &quot;[s]elf-interested compensation decisions are subject to the entire fairness standard of review,&quot; the Court found that plaintiff &quot;cleared the low hurdle of pleading sufficient facts to make it plausible that the price and process of the option awards transaction were not entirely fair.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2022 17:42:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Breach-Of-Fiduciary</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Applies Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement And Declines To Extend Equitable Derivative Standing
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Contemporaneous-Ownership-Requirement</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 13, 2022, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed certain stockholder derivative claims for breaches of fiduciary duty brought against the founder-CEO and other directors of Flashpoint Technology, Incorporated (the &quot;Corporation&quot;).  SDF Funding LLC v. Fry, C.A. No. 2017-0732-KSJM (Del. Ch. May. 13, 2022).  Plaintiffs were a limited liability company (the &quot;New LLC&quot;) that held shares in the Corporation and its sole owner (the &quot;Beneficial Owner&quot;).  The New LLC received its shares from another limited liability company (the &quot;Old LLC&quot;) — a nonparty to the suit — also wholly owned by the Beneficial Owner.  Plaintiffs challenged certain related-party transactions, including leases from and loans to entities affiliated with the CEO.  Applying the &quot;contemporaneous ownership requirement,&quot; the Court granted summary judgment to defendants for claims based on conduct that predated the acquisition of shares by the New LLC.  In doing so, the Court rejected plaintiffs&apos; contention that the Beneficial Owner should have &quot;equitable standing.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2022 16:52:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Contemporaneous-Ownership-Requirement</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Finding That Allegedly Conflicted Acquisition Satisfied Entire Fairness Review, Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-That-Allegedly-Conflicted-Acquisition-Satisfied-Entire-Fairness-Review</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 27, 2022, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of defendant, the CEO/Founder and then-Chairman (the &quot;Chairman&quot;) of Tesla Motors, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;), following a trial on derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty asserted by stockholders in connection with the Company&apos;s acquisition of SolarCity Corporation (the &quot;Target&quot;).  In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S&apos;holder Litig., C.A. No. 12711-VCS (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2022).  Plaintiffs alleged that at the time of the acquisition, the Chairman, who held approximately 22% of the Company&apos;s stock, was its controlling stockholder.  He also was the chairman of the board and largest stockholder of the Target.  Plaintiffs asserted that the Chairman caused the Company&apos;s allegedly conflicted Board to approve the deal—despite the Target&apos;s alleged insolvency—at a purportedly &quot;patently unfair price.&quot;  Assuming without deciding that the Chairman was the Company&apos;s controlling stockholder and that a majority of the Company&apos;s Board was conflicted, the Court reviewed the claims under an &quot;entire fairness&quot; standard.  Noting that the process was &quot;far from perfect&quot; and that &quot;defense verdicts after an entire fairness review&quot; are &quot;not commonplace,&quot; the Court nevertheless found that the Company&apos;s Board &quot;meaningfully vetted&quot; the acquisition and the price paid was &quot;entirely fair in the truest sense of the word&quot;—and rejected plaintiffs&apos; claims.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 04 May 2022 20:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-That-Allegedly-Conflicted-Acquisition-Satisfied-Entire-Fairness-Review</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Eighth Circuit Affirms Dismissal Of Merger-Related Derivative Suit For Failure To Plead Demand Excusal
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Eighth-Circuit-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Merger-Related-Derivative-Suit-For-Failure</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 7, 2022, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of derivative claims brought by shareholders of Centene Corporation (the &quot;Corporation&quot;) against directors and officers of the Corporation following its merger with Health Net, Inc. (the &quot;Target&quot;).  Carpenters&apos; Pension Fund of Ill. v. Neidorff, No. 20-3216 (8th Cir. Apr. 7, 2022).  In connection with the merger, the companies issued a joint proxy statement soliciting shareholder approval of the merger.  Plaintiffs&apos; central allegation was that defendants purportedly concealed their knowledge of &quot;significant financial problems&quot; faced by the Target.  Plaintiffs thus asserted derivative claims for violation of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and breaches of fiduciary duty.  The Court held that pre-suit demand was not excused, because the complaint failed to adequately plead that at least five of the nine board members at the time the suit was filed faced a substantial likelihood of liability.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Apr 2022 16:53:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Eighth-Circuit-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Merger-Related-Derivative-Suit-For-Failure</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Grants Motion To Stay Pending Appeal Of Specific Performance Judgment Requiring Completion Of Acquisition Of Yoga Studios
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Motion-To-Stay-Pending-Appeal</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 31, 2022, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery &amp;shy;granted the motion of CorePower Yoga, LLC and CorePower Yoga Franchising, LLC (together, &quot;defendant&quot;) to stay the Court&apos;s judgment in favor of plaintiff Level 4 Yoga, LLC pending defendant&apos;s appeal.  Level 4 Yoga, LLC v. CorePower Yoga, LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0249-JRS (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2022).  As discussed in our prior post, the Court of Chancery previously (i) found that defendant breached the parties&apos; asset purchase agreement (&quot;APA&quot;) at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic when defendant failed to close on the acquisition of plaintiff&apos;s yoga studios, and (ii) issued a decree of specific performance directing defendant to complete the transaction.  &quot;Balanc[ing] all of the equities&quot; and highlighting that defendant &quot;is at risk of suffering irreparable harm,&quot; the court issued the stay.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Apr 2022 17:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Motion-To-Stay-Pending-Appeal</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Motion To Stay SPAC Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Suit Pending Parallel Federal Securities Action
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Motion-To-Stay-SPAC-Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 7, 2022, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to stay a putative class action brought by legacy stockholders of DiamondPeak Holding Corp., a special purpose acquisition company (&quot;SPAC&quot;), alleging that its directors and controlling stockholders breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the SPAC&apos;s acquisition of Lordstown Motors Corp. (&quot;Legacy LMC&quot;).  In re Lordstown Motors Corp. Stockholders Litigation, CA. No. 2021-1066-LWW (Del. Ch. March 10, 2022) (the &quot;Delaware Action&quot;).  Plaintiffs alleged that  defendant directors failed to disclose certain information about Legacy LMC&apos;s business and that the SPAC&apos;s controlling stockholders pursued the acquisition to advance their own interests to the detriment of minority stockholders.  Defendants argued that the Delaware Action should be stayed pending resolution of an earlier-filed securities class action (the &quot;Securities Action&quot;) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.  The Court declined to grant the stay, reasoning that application of Delaware fiduciary duty law to SPACs &quot;raises emerging issues&quot; and that the Court&apos;s &quot;essential role in providing guidance in developing areas of our law would be impaired if the court were to denude its jurisdiction because a federal securities action resting on similar facts was filed first.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Mar 2022 16:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Motion-To-Stay-SPAC-Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds COVID-19 Pandemic Did Not Excuse Purchaser&apos;s Obligation To Complete Acquisition Of Its Franchisee&apos;s Yoga Studios
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-COVID-19-Pandemic-Did-Not-Excuse</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 1, 2022, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled in favor of plaintiff Level 4 Yoga, LLC in a breach of contract action against CorePower Yoga, LLC and CorePower Yoga Franchising, LLC (together, &quot;defendant&quot;), stemming from the parties&apos; pre-COVID agreement for defendant to acquire plaintiff&apos;s yoga studios.  Level 4 Yoga, LLC v. CorePower Yoga, LLC, CorePower Yoga Franchising, LLC, No. CV 2020-0249-JRS (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2022).  Plaintiff alleged defendant breached the parties&apos; asset purchase agreement (&quot;APA&quot;) at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic when defendant refused to close the transaction, failed to deliver required payments under the APA, and failed to take possession of plaintiff&apos;s yoga studios.  The Court found that the APA &quot;unambiguously contain[ed] no conditions to closing and no express right for either party to terminate the contract pre-closing.&quot;  The Court further held that plaintiff neither repudiated nor materially breached the APA.  Therefore, the Court issued a verdict with a decree of specific performance directing defendant to complete the transaction.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Mar 2022 17:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-COVID-19-Pandemic-Did-Not-Excuse</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds That Company And Its Directors Did Not Breach Bylaws Or Fiduciary Duties In Rejecting Director Nomination Notice
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Company-And-Its-Directors-Did-Not-Breach</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 14, 2022, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of Lee Enterprises, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) and its directors following an expedited trial on claims for breach of the Company&apos;s bylaws and the directors&apos; fiduciary duties.  Strategic Investment Opportunities LLC v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., C.A. No. 2021-1089-LWW (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2022).  Plaintiff, a beneficial stockholder, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to allow its nomination of directors—attempted in conjunction with a takeover bid by plaintiff—to move forward.  The Court found that plaintiff did not comply with advance notice requirements for director nominations in the Company&apos;s &quot;clear and unambiguous&quot; bylaws.  Applying &quot;enhanced scrutiny,&quot; the Court also concluded that the board did not breach fiduciary duties by rejecting plaintiff&apos;s nomination based on &quot;a validly adopted bylaw with a legitimate corporate purpose.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Mar 2022 17:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Company-And-Its-Directors-Did-Not-Breach</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds That Consent To Merger In Stockholders Agreement Did Not Waive Right To Bring Post-Closing Fiduciary Duty Claims
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-That-Consent-To-Merger-In-Stockholders-Agreement</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 14, 2022, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a post-closing damages action for breaches of fiduciary duty brought by former stockholders of Authentix Acquisition Company, Inc. (&quot;Authentix&quot; or the &quot;Company&quot;), rejecting defendant&apos;s claim that stockholders waived the right to bring suit.  Manti Holdings, LLC v. Carlyle Grp. Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0657-SG, (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2022).  The Court concluded that language in a Stockholders Agreement consenting to the transaction was not sufficiently specific to waive the stockholders&apos; right to challenge the sale.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Feb 2022 17:32:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-That-Consent-To-Merger-In-Stockholders-Agreement</guid>
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					      <title>Southern District Of New York Denies Application For Mootness Fee In Connection With Merger-Disclosure Litigation
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Southern-District-Of-New-York-Denies-Application-For-Mootness-Fee</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 7, 2022, Judge J. Paul Oetken of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied an application by plaintiff&apos;s counsel for attorneys&apos; fees after plaintiff&apos;s merger-related disclosure claims were &quot;mooted&quot; by defendant Nuance Communications Inc. (&quot;Nuance&quot;).  Serion v. Nuance Communications, No. 21-CV-4701 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2022).  Although the Court found that the lawsuit prompted the company to issue supplemental disclosures, the Court held that the disclosure of this additional information did not confer a &quot;substantial benefit&quot; on shareholders.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Feb 2022 17:03:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Southern-District-Of-New-York-Denies-Application-For-Mootness-Fee</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Applies &quot;Universal Test&quot; To Dismiss Derivative Suit For Failure To Make A Demand
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Universal-Test-To-Dismiss-Derivative-Suit</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 21, 2022, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a derivative lawsuit brought by a stockholder of GrafTech International Ltd. (the &quot;Company&quot;) against the Company&apos;s directors and the Company&apos;s controlling stockholder, Brookfield Asset Management (&quot;Brookfield&quot;), in connection with the Company&apos;s repurchase of shares from Brookfield.  Simons v. Brookfield Asset Mgmt., C.A. No. 2020-0841-KSJM (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 2022).  The Court held that the demand was not excused because five of the nine board members were capable of impartially considering a litigation demand under the recently affirmed Zuckerberg &quot;universal test.&quot;  United Food &amp; Com. Workers Union v. Zuckerberg, 250 A.3d 862 (Del. Ch. 2020).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:52:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Universal-Test-To-Dismiss-Derivative-Suit</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Limits Discovery In Appraisal Proceeding To Materials Available In Books-And-Records Demand
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Limits-Discovery-In-Appraisal-Proceeding-To-Materials-Available-In-Books</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 31, 2022, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery partially granted a protective order brought by Zoox, Inc. (&quot;respondent&quot; or &quot;Zoox&quot;) limiting discovery requests by stockholders in a post-merger appraisal proceeding. Wei v. Zoox, Inc., C.A. No. 2020-1036-KSJM (Del. Ch. Dec. 07, 2020). The Court concluded that the &quot;real purpose&quot; of the discovery was &quot;to facilitate a pre-suit investigation of a fiduciary duty claim,&quot; therefore, discovery would be limited to information petitioners could have obtained in a typical action to inspect a company&apos;s books and records.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Limits-Discovery-In-Appraisal-Proceeding-To-Materials-Available-In-Books</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Transfer Restrictions On Stock Issued In Connection With A De-SPAC Merger Inapplicable To A Legacy Operating Company Stockholder Based On The Language Of The Relevant Bylaw</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Transfer-Restrictions-On-Stock-Issued-In-Connection</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 10, 2022, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will held that shares of defendant Matterport Inc. (&quot;New Company&quot;) issued to plaintiff in connection with the acquisition of Matterport Operating, LLC (&quot;Legacy Company&quot;) by a special purpose acquisition company (&quot;SPAC&quot;) in a &quot;de-SPAC&quot; merger were not subject to a transfer restriction in the New Company&apos;s bylaws.  As part of the transaction, Legacy Company stockholders, including plaintiff, were given the right to receive shares of the New Company.  Prior to closing, the SPAC adopted a bylaw that restricted the transfer by such stockholders of shares &quot;held . . . immediately following the closing&quot; of the transaction.  After a two-day trial, the Court found that plaintiff was not issued shares of the New Company until more than three months after the merger when he executed letters of transmittal to the transfer agent.  Concluding that the &quot;plain language&quot; of the bylaw was &quot;straightforward,&quot; and that plaintiff had not held shares &quot;immediately&quot; following the merger, the Court granted declaratory relief in favor of plaintiff.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Jan 2022 17:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Transfer-Restrictions-On-Stock-Issued-In-Connection</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Claims Challenging Stock Sale Allegedly Based On Adverse Nonpublic Information For Failure To Plead Demand Futility
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Claims-Challenging-Stock-Sale</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 15, 2021, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed stockholder derivative claims for breaches of fiduciary duty asserted on behalf The Kraft Heinz Company (the &quot;Company&quot;) against an investment firm (the &quot;Investment Firm&quot;) that had previously held 24.2% of the Company&apos;s shares, as well as against certain alleged dual fiduciaries of the two entities.  In re Kraft Heinz Company Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2019-0587-LWW (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2021).  Plaintiffs alleged that defendants sold $1.2 billion in Company stock on the basis of nonpublic information that the Company was expected to miss its full-year earnings target by $700 million.  The Court held that plaintiffs failed to establish demand futility because the complaint did not raise a reasonable doubt that a majority of the Company&apos;s board members lacked independence from defendants.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Jan 2022 18:14:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Claims-Challenging-Stock-Sale</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Sustains Class Action Claims For Breaches Of Fiduciary Duties And Aiding And Abetting Arising From Alleged Omissions In SPAC Merger Proxy
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Sustains-Class-Action-Claims-For-Breaches-Of-Fiduciary</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 3, 2022, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery largely denied a motion to dismiss a putative class action brought by the stockholders of Churchill Capital Corp. III, a special purpose acquisition company or &quot;SPAC&quot; (&quot;Churchill&quot;) alleging that the company&apos;s controlling stockholder, officers, and directors (&quot;the Company Defendants&quot;) breached their fiduciary duties and the company&apos;s financial advisor aided and abetted that breach in connection with the SPAC&apos;s acquisition of MultiPlan, Inc. (&quot;MultiPlan&quot;).  In re MultiPlan Corp. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 2021-0300-LWW (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2022).  Plaintiffs alleged that defendants omitted to disclose that a large customer of MultiPlan would soon stop using MultiPlan&apos;s services, allegedly causing stockholders to approve the merger based on faulty information.  Defendants argued that the claim was derivative in nature, rather than one that could be asserted directly, and moved to dismiss for failure to plead demand futility and on the grounds that the business judgment rule applied.  The Court held that plaintiffs&apos; claims were direct, rather than derivative, and that entire fairness applied because of what it found to be inherent conflicts of interest between defendants and the company&apos;s public stockholders.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jan 2022 22:20:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Sustains-Class-Action-Claims-For-Breaches-Of-Fiduciary</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Excused Performance For Breach Of &quot;Ordinary Course&quot; Covenant During Pandemic
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Excused-Performance-for-breach-of-ordinary-course-covenant</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 8, 2021, the Supreme Court of Delaware sitting en banc affirmed a Court of Chancery ruling that excused the buyer of a group of high-end hotel properties (the &quot;Buyer&quot;) from closing on the acquisition from AB Stable VIII LLC (the &quot;Seller&quot;)—an indirect subsidiary of Dajia Insurance Group, Ltd. (&quot;Dajia&quot;), formerly Anbang Insurance Group, Ltd. (&quot;Anbang&quot;)—because the Seller breached its covenant to operate the hotels in the ordinary course between signing and closing.  AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels and Resorts One LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0310 (Del. Dec. 8, 2021).  Because the Court found this issue dispositive, it did not reach any other issues on appeal.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Dec 2021 00:34:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Excused-Performance-for-breach-of-ordinary-course-covenant</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Section 220 Action Initiated Hours After Certificate Of Merger Was Filed With Delaware Secretary Of State
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Section-220-action-initiated-hours-after-certificate-of-merger</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 3, 2021, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss claims to compel inspection of books and records brought by a former stockholder of Houston Wire &amp; Cable Company (the &quot;Company&quot;) in connection with the Company&apos;s all-cash merger into Omni Cable, LLC.  Swift v. Houston Wire &amp; Cable Co., C.A. No. 2021-0525-LWW (Del. Ch. Dec. 3, 2021).  The merger agreement provided that each share of the Company would be cancelled and converted into the right to receive $5.30 in cash at the &quot;Effective Time,&quot; which it explained was &quot;such time as [a] Certificate of Merger&quot; is filed.  Plaintiff filed the action under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;) hours after the Company&apos;s certificate of merger was filed with the Delaware Secretary of State.  The Court held that Section 220 requires a plaintiff to be a current stockholder at the time the litigation is initiated.  The Court found that plaintiff &quot;ceased to own stock&quot; when the certificate of merger was filed and, therefore, lacked standing when the complaint was filed later the same day.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Dec 2021 23:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Section-220-action-initiated-hours-after-certificate-of-merger</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Claims Challenging A Convertible Debt Issuance At The Onset Of The COVID-19 Pandemic For Failure To Plead That Demand Was Excused
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Claims-Challenging-A-Convertible-Debt-Issuance</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 23, 2021, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed stockholder derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the directors of Wayfair, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;).  Equity-League Pension Tr. v. Great Hill Partners, C.A. No. 2020-0992-SG (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2021).  Plaintiff challenged the sale by the Company of $535 million in convertible notes at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic to a consortium of investors allegedly tied to four of the Company&apos;s directors, including the two co-chairmen, one of whom was also the CEO.  There was no dispute that two of the nine board members were disinterested and independent.  As to three others, plaintiff alleged that their service on the audit committee presented a substantial likelihood of liability because it was charged with reviewing conflicted transactions.  Highlighting that the Company&apos;s charter exculpated directors for breaches of the duty of care, however, the Court explained that the complaint must therefore plead bad faith, which it referred to as a &quot;rara avis.&quot;  Although the Court acknowledged that the transaction was not a &quot;model of best practices,&quot; it found that the complaint and the documents incorporated by reference therein did not support an inference of bad faith.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Dec 2021 16:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Claims-Challenging-A-Convertible-Debt-Issuance</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Declines To Dismiss Derivative Claims, Finding Wrongful Refusal Of Demand Adequately Pleaded
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Dismiss-Derivative-Claims-Finding-Wrongful-Refusal</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 29, 2021, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duties brought by stockholders of BioDelivery Sciences International, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;).  Drachman v. BioDelivery Scis. Int&apos;l, Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0728-LWW (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2021).  Plaintiffs alleged that the board improperly adopted two amendments to the Company&apos;s certificate of incorporation.  Plaintiffs made a pre-suit demand on the board requesting that it deem the amendments ineffective and indicating they would otherwise commence litigation.  The board responded by noting that it had determined the demand was &quot;without merit.&quot;  The Court held that plaintiffs adequately pleaded wrongful refusal because the allegations raised a reasonable doubt as to the good faith of the board in &quot;rebuffing&quot; the demand.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Nov 2021 17:24:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Dismiss-Derivative-Claims-Finding-Wrongful-Refusal</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Challenge To Board&apos;s Enforcement Of Advance Notice Bylaw
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Challenge-To-Board-Enforcement</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 13, 2021, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a request for injunctive relief in a stockholder action against the board of CytoDyn (the &quot;Company&quot;).  Rosenbaum v. Cyotodyn Inc., C.A. No. 2021-0728-JRS, 2021 WL 4775140 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2021).  Plaintiffs attempted to nominate a dissident slate of director candidates.  They alleged that the board wrongfully rejected plaintiffs&apos; timely notice of their nominations.  After a trial on a &quot;paper record,&quot; the Court found that plaintiffs&apos; notice did not comply with the Company&apos;s advance notice bylaw—because it omitted information that was required under the bylaw to have been disclosed—and the board was thus &quot;justified in rejecting&quot; the notice.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Oct 2021 16:44:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Challenge-To-Board-Enforcement</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Overrules Gentile  Carve-out, Holding An Improper Transfer Of Economic Value And Voting Power To A Controlling Stockholder Through An Equity Overpayment Is A Derivative Claim
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Overrules-Gentile-Carve-out-Holding-An-Improper-Transfer</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 20, 2021, in a decision authored by Justice Karen L. Valihura, the Delaware Supreme Court sitting en banc reversed the denial of defendants&apos; motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by former stockholders of TerraForm Power, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;).  Brookfield Asset Management, Inc. v. Rosson, No. 406, 2020, 2021 WL 4260639 (Del. Sept. 20, 2021).  As we discussed in our prior post, plaintiffs alleged that a private placement of stock to the Company&apos;s controlling stockholder at a price that undervalued the shares diluted the financial and voting interest of the minority stockholders.  The trial court found that the claims were nearly identical to corporate overpayment claims asserted by former stockholders and upheld as &quot;direct&quot;—rather than &quot;derivative&quot;—by the Delaware Supreme Court in Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006).  Reversing, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the &quot;classic&quot; test for distinguishing stockholder &quot;derivative&quot; claims from &quot;direct&quot; claims established in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin &amp; Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004), and expressly overruled Gentile and its carve-out from Tooley.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Oct 2021 20:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Overrules-Gentile-Carve-out-Holding-An-Improper-Transfer</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Adopts Refined Test For Demand Futility And Holds Exculpated Claims Do Not Excuse Demand
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Adopts-Refined-Test-For-Demand-Futility-And-Holds-Exculpated</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 23, 2021, in a decision authored by Justice Tamika Montgomery-Reeves, the Delaware Supreme Court sitting en banc affirmed the dismissal of a derivative complaint filed by a stockholder of Facebook, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) against the CEO, who is also the founder, controlling stockholder and chairman of the board, as well as certain other directors.  United Food and Commercial Workers Union and Participating Food Industry Employers Tri-State Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg, et al., No. 404, 2020 (Del. Sept. 23, 2021).  Plaintiff asserted that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by improperly approving a stock reclassification allegedly for the benefit of the CEO, which though ultimately abandoned resulted in litigation and settlement costs.  The Court concluded that the Delaware Court of Chancery properly dismissed plaintiff&apos;s complaint for failing to make a pre-suit demand on the board.  In so holding, the Court adopted a refined test for demand futility and also determined that exculpated claims cannot excuse demand because they do not entail a substantial likelihood of liability.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Oct 2021 20:26:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Adopts-Refined-Test-For-Demand-Futility-And-Holds-Exculpated</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Holds That Stockholders&apos; Statutory Appraisal Rights Can Be Waived In A Negotiated Contract
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-That-Stockholders-Statutory-Appraisal-Rights</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 13, 2021, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s decision holding that a corporation may enforce an advance waiver of appraisal rights against its own stockholders.  Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co., Inc., No. 354, 2020, 2021 WL 4165159 (Del. Sept. 13, 2021).  The Delaware Supreme Court held that Delaware law does not prohibit sophisticated and informed stockholders—who were represented by counsel and had bargaining power—from waiving their statutory appraisal rights in exchange for valuable consideration.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Sep 2021 15:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-That-Stockholders-Statutory-Appraisal-Rights</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Upholds Alleged Safety-Related Caremark Claims Against Airplane Manufacturer&apos;s Board
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Upholds-Alleged-Safety-Related-Caremark-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 7, 2021, Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn of the Delaware Court of Chancery largely denied a motion to dismiss a stockholder derivate suit against the directors of The Boeing Company (the &quot;Company&quot;) in the wake of two fatal crashes of an airplane it manufactured.  In re The Boeing Co. Derivative Litigation, No. 2019-0907-MTZ (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2021).  Plaintiffs alleged that the board breached its fiduciary duty of oversight under Caremark by failing to ensure adequate safety and quality control.  The Court found that plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that the board failed to establish board-level reporting systems related to &quot;mission critical&quot; airplane safety and did not adequately respond to red flags, including media reports about the crashes.  Accordingly, the Court held that the complaint demonstrated that the directors faced a substantial likelihood of liability and that pre-suit demand on the board was excused.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Sep 2021 14:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Upholds-Alleged-Safety-Related-Caremark-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Post-Merger Claims For Alleged Violation Of DGCL &amp;sect; 203 And Breach Of Fiduciary Duty
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Post-Merger-Claims-For-Alleged-Violation</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 16, 2021, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed breach of fiduciary duty and other claims brought by a stockholder of Genomic Health, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) in connection with its acquisition by Exact Sciences Corp.  Flannery v. Genomic Health Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2020-0492-JRS (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2021).  The Court held that the transaction did not violate Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;) &amp;sect; 203, entire fairness did not apply because there was no conflicted controlling stockholder, and enhanced scrutiny under Revlon did not apply because the merger was not a change in control transaction.  Accordingly, the Court found that plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Aug 2021 15:53:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Post-Merger-Claims-For-Alleged-Violation</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Declines To Apply Business Judgment Deference To Take-Private Merger Because Of &quot;Deficiencies&quot; In MFW  Protections, Including That The Conditions Were Not Irrevocable
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Apply-Business-Judgment-Deference-To-Take-Private-Merger</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 23, 2021, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied defendants&apos; motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by a putative class of minority stockholders of Empire Resorts, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) challenging the Company&apos;s take-private acquisition by the Company&apos;s majority shareholder.  The MH Haberkorn 2006 Trust v. Empire Resorts, Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0619 (Del. Ch. Jul. 23, 2021) (Transcript).  Plaintiffs alleged that a special committee approved the deal even though it undervalued the Company and asserted claims against officers, directors, the controlling shareholder and certain of their affiliates.  Defendants argued that the transaction complied with the procedural protections necessary for deferential review—under the business judgment standard—of a merger process involving a controller pursuant to Kahn v. M &amp; F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW &quot;).  But the Court found the complaint adequately pleaded &quot;deficiencies&quot; in the MFW conditions, including that they were not &quot;irrevocable.&quot;  Therefore, the Court applied the entire fairness standard and found that defendants did not show &quot;conclusively&quot; at the pleading stage that the transaction was entirely fair.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Aug 2021 18:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Apply-Business-Judgment-Deference-To-Take-Private-Merger</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion To Dismiss Fiduciary Duty Breach Claim Against Derivative Plaintiffs For Failing To Turn Over Derivative Award To The Corporation
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Fiduciary-Duty-Breach-Claim</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 15, 2021, Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion by stockholders of OptimisCorp (the &quot;Company&quot;) to dismiss claims brought by the Company against them for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment for failing to turn over to the Company a derivative arbitration award that they won in their capacity as derivative plaintiffs.  OptimisCorp v. Atkins, C.A. No. 2020-0183-MTZ (Del. Ch. June 1, 2021).  After succeeding in the derivative case against another stockholder—who had been the Company&apos;s outside counsel and a &quot;confederate&quot; of the Company&apos;s CEO—defendants allegedly escrowed the award with intentions to distribute it to certain stockholders but exclude their adversaries.  At an earlier stage in this action, the Court directed defendants to transfer the award to the Company.  In this decision, the Court held that defendants &quot;owed fiduciary duties to the Company and its stockholders with respect to the corporate asset entrusted to them&quot; and the Company adequately alleged that defendants &quot;breached their duty of loyalty by withholding the Award out of animus toward [the CEO] and the Company, and to benefit themselves.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Aug 2021 18:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Fiduciary-Duty-Breach-Claim</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Orders Buyer To Close Acquisition Of Medical Device Company After Finding Reduction In Medicare Reimbursement Rates Was Not A Material Adverse Effect
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Orders-Buyer-To-Close-Acquisition-Of-Medical-Device-Company</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 9, 2021, Vice Chancellor Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery held in a lengthy post-trial opinion that defendant Hill-Rom, Inc. (&quot;Hillrom&quot;) was not excused from closing its acquisition of plaintiff Bardy Diagnostics, Inc. (&quot;Bardy&quot;), a medical device company, due to a Material Adverse Effect (&quot;MAE&quot;).  Bardy Diagnostics, Inc., et al. v. Hill-Rom, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2021-0175-JRS (Del. Ch. July 9, 2021).  Between signing of the merger agreement and closing, Medicare drastically reduced the rates payable for Bardy&apos;s signature medical device.  Hillrom argued that this change constituted an MAE (or, alternatively, frustration of purpose), excusing its obligation to close.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2021 17:40:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Orders-Buyer-To-Close-Acquisition-Of-Medical-Device-Company</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Requires Board To Demonstrate &quot;Compelling Justification&quot; For Stock Sale Primarily Intended To Interfere With Stockholder Voting Rights
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Requires-Board-To-Demonstrate-Compelling-Justification-For-Stock-Sale</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 28, 2021, in an en banc opinion authored by Chief Justice Collins J. Seitz, Jr., the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery, which had upheld a contested stock sale by the board of UIP Companies, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;).  Coster v. UIP Cos., Inc., No. 49, 2020 (Del. June 28, 2021).  Plaintiff was one of the Company&apos;s two equal stockholders.  Plaintiff alleged that defendant, the other stockholder, who was also the board chairman, and the two other directors voted to issue stock to one of them in order to dilute plaintiff&apos;s ownership interest.  The Court of Chancery found that the board approved the stock sale at a fair price and through a fair process.  Reversing and remanding, the Delaware Supreme Court held that—although the sale may have satisfied its entire fairness review—&quot;inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.&quot;  The Delaware Supreme Court further held that, if the board acted for the &quot;primary purpose of thwarting&quot; the stockholder&apos;s vote or reducing her leverage as an equal stockholder—even in good faith—the board must demonstrate a &quot;compelling justification.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jul 2021 13:57:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Requires-Board-To-Demonstrate-Compelling-Justification-For-Stock-Sale</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Caremark Claims For Failure To Plead Demand Futility
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-Claims-For-Failure-To-Plead-Demand-Futility</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 28, 2021, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a derivative lawsuit brought by a stockholder of FedEx Corporation (the &quot;Company&quot;) against the Company&apos;s directors for failure to plead that pre-suit demand on the board would have been futile. Pettry v. Smith, et al., No. 2019-0795-JRS (Del. Ch. June 28, 2021).  Plaintiff primarily alleged that defendants breached their Caremark duties by failing to oversee the Company&apos;s compliance with laws governing the transportation and delivery of cigarettes.  The Court, however, concluded that the complaint did not plead particularized facts demonstrating that a majority of the board faced a substantial likelihood of liability.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 07 Jul 2021 17:37:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-Claims-For-Failure-To-Plead-Demand-Futility</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Certain Officer-Directors Of Acquirer But Upholds A Claim Against A Special Committee Member
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims-Against-Certain-Officer</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 21, 2021, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by stockholders of Oracle Corporation (the &quot;Company&quot;) against two of its officer-directors in connection with its acquisition of NetSuite, Inc., but upheld a claim against the chairperson of the special committee that had been established to evaluate the transaction.  In Re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG (Del. Ch. June 21, 2021).  Plaintiffs alleged that the acquisition was a &quot;controlled self-dealing transaction&quot; in which the Company overpaid for the target to the benefit of the entities&apos; common founder, who allegedly controlled both.  As discussed in a prior post, the Court previously dismissed claims for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty that had been asserted against the target&apos;s CEO and Chairman.  Finding that the complaint failed to plead facts demonstrating gross negligence or disloyalty, the Court dismissed fiduciary-duty breach claims against two officer-directors.  The Court, however, found the complaint adequately alleged that it is &quot;reasonably conceivable&quot; that the director on the special committee was &quot;not independent&quot; of the founder and &quot;actively participated in the formulation&quot; of the transaction to advance the alleged controller&apos;s interest.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jun 2021 17:05:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims-Against-Certain-Officer</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Allows Claim That Purchaser Altered Target&apos;s Business Plan To Avoid Paying Earnout Consideration To Proceed
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Allows-Claim-That-Purchaser-Altered-Target-Business-Plan</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 7, 2021, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim against defendant Albertsons Companies, Inc. brought by a representative of former shareholders of DineInFresh, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) in the wake of its acquisition by defendant.  Shareholder Representative Services LLC v. Albertsons Companies, Inc., No. CV 2020-0710-JRS (Del. Ch. June 7, 2021).  The merger agreement contained an earnout provision whereby the shareholders of the Company would be paid additional consideration contingent upon the Company reaching specified revenue milestones.  The merger agreement provided that defendant had complete discretion over the operation of the Company post-closing, except that it was prohibited from taking any action with the &quot;intent of decreasing or avoiding&quot; the earnout.  Plaintiff alleged that defendant immediately caused the Company to shift its focus away from its revenue-generating e-commerce business.  The Court held that the complaint adequately pleaded that it was &quot;reasonably conceivable that [defendant&apos;s] decision to focus almost exclusively on . . . brick-and-mortar business, despite having knowledge that such a decision would almost certainly cause the company to miss the earnout milestones, was the product of an intent to avoid the earnout.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jun 2021 15:32:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Allows-Claim-That-Purchaser-Altered-Target-Business-Plan</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Company&apos;s Founders Constitute Control Group And That Entire Fairness Applies To Transaction In Which They Obtained Benefits Not Available To Minority Stockholders
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Company-Founders-Constitute-Control-Group</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 1, 2021, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied defendants&apos; motion to dismiss a stockholder derivative action against the founders of Tilray, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) for breach of fiduciary duties in connection with a merger with Privateer Holdings, Inc., a parent entity through which the Company&apos;s founders had maintained their holdings.  In re Tilray, Inc. Reorganization Litig., C.A. No. 2020-0137-KSJM (Del. Ch. June 1, 2021).  The alleged purpose of the merger was to effect a reorganization of the business to mitigate expected federal capital gains tax consequences that the founders would incur in connection with the anticipated divestment of their holdings.  The Court found that the Company&apos;s three founders constituted a control group and that the reorganization constituted a self-dealing transaction subject to entire fairness review.  The Court also found that demand on the board would have been futile as a majority of the board was conflicted.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jun 2021 17:22:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Company-Founders-Constitute-Control-Group</guid>
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					      <title>In A Matter Of First Impression, Delaware Court Of Chancery Allows &quot;Reverse Veil-Piercing&quot; Theory To Proceed In Appraisal Judgment Enforcement Action
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/In-A-Matter-Of-First-Impression-Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Allows</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 25, 2021, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery partially denied a motion to dismiss claims brought by dissenting stockholder plaintiffs in a post-merger action to enforce an appraisal judgment.  Manichaean Capital, LLC v. Exela Technologies Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0601-JRS (Del. Ch. May 25, 2021).  The Court found that plaintiffs had adequately pleaded facts to allow a reasonable inference that the acquirer diverted funds from the acquiree&apos;s subsidiaries in order to deprive the acquiree of funds to satisfy plaintiffs&apos; appraisal judgment.  In what it called a &quot;matter of first impression,&quot; the Court held that plaintiffs&apos; allegations were sufficient to support &quot;reverse veil-piercing&quot; and permit execution of the judgment against the subsidiaries, as well as &quot;traditional veil-piercing&quot; as against the acquirer.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Jun 2021 19:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/In-A-Matter-Of-First-Impression-Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Allows</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Claims Challenging Squeeze-Out Merger Because Special Committee Was Not &quot;Interested&quot; And Stockholder Vote Was Uncoerced
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Claims-Challenging-Squeeze-Out-Merger</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 10, 2021, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment brought by former stockholders of Voltari Corporation, challenging the take-private buyout of the company by its controlling stockholder.  Franchi, et al. v. Firestone, et al., C.A. No. 2020-0503-KSJM (Del. Ch. May 10, 2021).  In an effort to comply with the procedural protections necessary for deferential review of a merger process involving a controller—under Kahn v. M &amp; F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;)—the buyout offer was conditioned on approval by an independent special committee and a fully informed majority of the company&apos;s minority stockholders.  Nevertheless, plaintiffs claimed that the purchase price did not account for the value of the company&apos;s net operating loss carryforwards and therefore the controller and the company&apos;s directors breached their fiduciary duties.  The Court, however, held that defendants were entitled to the benefit of the business judgment rule under MFW because plaintiffs did not adequately plead (i) a lack of independence as to the members of the special committee; (ii) that the committee acted with gross negligence in approving the merger; or (iii) that the proxy in connection with the stockholder vote failed to disclose material facts.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 18 May 2021 17:57:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Claims-Challenging-Squeeze-Out-Merger</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Requires Buyers To Close On Pre-Coronavirus Deal Notwithstanding Impact Of Pandemic On Cake-Decorating Business
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Requires-Buyers-To-Close-On-PreCoronavirus-Deal</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 30, 2021, then-Vice Chancellor Kathaleen S. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted sellers specific performance in a breach of contract action against buyers KCAKE and Kohlberg Funds, arising out of the sale of DecoPac Holdings Inc. (&quot;DecoPac&quot;).  Snow Phipps Group, LLC., et al. v. KCake Acquisition, Inc., et al., 2020-0282-KSJM (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2021).  The Court found that DecoPac had not suffered a Material Adverse Event (&quot;MAE&quot;) and had complied with its ordinary course of business covenant, but that the buyers breached the purchase agreement because they had not used reasonable best efforts to secure the debt financing necessary to close the deal and their actions had caused the debt financing to become unavailable.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 May 2021 15:50:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Requires-Buyers-To-Close-On-PreCoronavirus-Deal</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms No Recovery In Cigna-Anthem Star-Crossed Venture  
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-No-Recovery-In-Cigna</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 3, 2021, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed en banc the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery that neither Cigna Corporation nor Anthem, Inc. was entitled to any damages or fees sought in connection with their failed merger.  Cigna Corp. v. Anthem, Inc., et al., No. 364, 2020 (Del. May 3, 2021).  As we discussed in our prior post, after the Department of Justice (&quot;DOJ&quot;) blocked the merger as anticompetitive, Cigna and Anthem sued each other for expectation damages, and Cigna also sought a reverse termination fee.  But the Court of Chancery rejected both parties&apos; claims and denied all recovery, finding that &quot;[e]ach party must bear the losses it suffered as a result of their star-crossed venture.&quot;  The Court of Chancery held in part that (i) any breach of covenants by Cigna did not result in damages because the DOJ would have enjoined the merger anyway, and (ii) Anthem properly terminated the merger due to the covenants breach and thus the reverse termination fee was not available.  In a concise order, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling in its entirety &quot;on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Court of Chancery.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 May 2021 15:37:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-No-Recovery-In-Cigna</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Claims For Breach Of Earnout Provision
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Claims-For-Breach</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 22, 2021, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III granted a motion to dismiss filed by defendants ID Experts Holdings, Inc. and its acquiror Identity Theft Guard Solutions, Inc. (together, &quot;ID Experts&quot;), dismissing breach of contract claims filed by Plaintiff Obsidian Finance Group, LLC (&quot;Obsidian&quot;) that arose out of a merger earnout provision.  Obsidian Finance Group, LLC. v. Identity Theft Guard Solutions, Inc., No. 2020-0485-JRS (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2021).  Obsidian, which had been a security holder in ID Experts prior to its sale, sought payment on an earnout provision that was contingent upon a six-year extension of a cybersecurity contract with the U.S. government.  In dismissing the case, the Court rejected Obsidian&apos;s argument that they were entitled to the earnout, even though the contract had not been extended for six years, because a regulation prohibited six-year extensions for such contracts. ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 04 May 2021 21:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Claims-For-Breach</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Orders Production Of Formal, Board-Level Materials In 220 Action
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Orders-Production-Of-Formal</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 14, 2021, Vice Chancellor Paul A. Fioravanti granted a shareholder plaintiff&apos;s motion to compel production of certain books and records of a pharmaceutical company.  Melvin Gross v. Biogen Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0096-PAF (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2021).  Citing Pettry v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 2020 WL 6870461 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2020), the Court found that the company&apos;s complete denial of plaintiff&apos;s Section 220 demands followed what the Court described as a recent trend of adopting an &quot;overly aggressive defense strategy&quot; in opposing such requests.  The Court held that plaintiff established a proper purpose and was therefore entitled to certain books and records, but restricted the production to formal, board-level materials and compliance policies.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2021 21:27:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Orders-Production-Of-Formal</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Caremark  And Disclosure Claims Related To Alleged Consumer Protection Law Violations For Failure To Plead Demand Futility
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-And-Disclosure</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 30, 2021, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard dismissed a derivative suit brought by a stockholder of LendingClub Corporation (the &quot;Company&quot;) against certain of the Company&apos;s current and former directors and officers for failure to plead demand futility.  Fisher v. Sanborn, et al., No. 2019-0631-AGB (Del. Ch. March 30, 2020).  Plaintiff asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims against defendants after the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against the Company for allegedly violating certain consumer protection laws by engaging in deceptive and unfair practices in connection with its lending business.  Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendants (i) breached their oversight duties by failing to monitor and oversee the Company&apos;s compliance with consumer protection laws, and (ii) misrepresented the subject of the FTC investigation.  The Court, however, found the complaint did not adequately plead that defendants failed to implement a monitoring system relevant to consumer protection law compliance or consciously disregard indications of noncompliance, as required to be alleged under Caremark.  The Court also found that the complaint did not adequately plead that defendants &quot;deliberately lied to investors.&quot;  The Court therefore held that the complaint did not demonstrate that the directors faced a substantial likelihood of liability and thus pre-suit demand on the board was not excused. 
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2021 21:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-And-Disclosure</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery, Relying On Plain Language Of Purchase Agreement, Rejects Seller&apos;s Attempt To Claw Back Cash Mistakenly Left In Target&apos;s Bank Account
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Relying-On-Plain-Language</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 29, 2021, Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted defendants&apos; motion for judgment on the pleadings in a breach of contract action brought by plaintiff Deluxe Entertainment Services, Inc. in connection with its sale of a wholly-owned subsidiary, Deluxe Media Inc. (&quot;Target&quot;), to defendant, an affiliate of a private equity firm, DLX Acquisition Corporation.  Deluxe Ent. Servs. Inc. v. DLX Acquisition Corp., No. CV 2020-0618-MTZ (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2021).  The dispute arose from a transaction in which plaintiff sold defendant all outstanding shares of Target for approximately $175 million, but failed to sweep nearly $10 million in cash from Target&apos;s bank accounts, as it was allegedly entitled to do in advance of closing.  When defendant refused to return the forgotten funds after closing, plaintiff filed suit and asserted claims for breach of the purchase agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as for reformation of the agreement based on mistake.  Although the Court noted that defendant &quot;does not dispute [that plaintiff] had the right to sweep those funds before closing&quot; and that plaintiff&apos;s failure to do so was &quot;an operations or accounting mistake,&quot; the Court rejected the claims, finding that the &quot;heavily negotiated&quot; agreement did not require defendant to return the disputed cash.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Apr 2021 20:41:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Relying-On-Plain-Language</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Finds D&amp;O Coverage Applies To Fraudulent Conduct
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Finds-DampO-Coverage-Applies-to-Fraudulent-Conduct</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 3, 2021, the Supreme Court of Delaware unanimously affirmed a series of rulings by the Superior Court of Delaware requiring a directors and officers (&quot;D&amp;O&quot;) excess insurer, RSUI Indemnity Co. (&quot;RSUI&quot;), to pay over $12 million towards settlements to resolve claims arising from the conduct of Dole Food Co.&apos;s (&quot;Dole&quot;) CEO, which the Delaware Court of Chancery previously found was fraudulent.  In so holding, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that losses stemming from fraudulent conduct are insurable under Delaware law.  RSUI Indemnity Co. v. David H. Murdock, et al., C.A. No. 154, 2020, opinion (Del. Mar. 3, 2021).  As we discussed in a prior post, the Superior Court applied Delaware law and ordered RSUI to pay the full policy limit plus interest.  The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling in its entirety, finding that, as the state of incorporation, Delaware had the &quot;most significant relationship&quot; with the D&amp;O policy even though Dole was headquartered in California.  The Supreme Court also held that Delaware law did not prohibit D&amp;O coverage for fraudulent conduct, noting that neither the policy nor the state&apos;s corporation laws prohibited defendants from securing D&amp;O insurance for fraudulent conduct by insureds.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2021 00:38:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Finds-DampO-Coverage-Applies-to-Fraudulent-Conduct</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Invalidates Energy Company&apos;s Anti-Activist Poison Pill Adopted At The Outset Of The COVID-19 Pandemic And Amid Global Oil Price War
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Invalidates-Energy-Companys-Anti-Activist-Poison-Pill</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 26, 2021, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of stockholder plaintiffs against the directors of energy corporation The Williams Companies, Inc. and invalidated a stockholder rights plan—or &quot;poison pill&quot;—adopted by the corporation.  In re The Williams Cos. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 2020-0707-KSJM (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2021).  The board adopted the poison pill to deter stockholder activism in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and a global oil price war.  Finding after a trial that the rights plan was not proportional to any legitimate threat identified, the Court held that the directors breached their fiduciary duties, declared the plan unenforceable, and permanently enjoined its operation.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Mar 2021 20:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Invalidates-Energy-Companys-Anti-Activist-Poison-Pill</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Summarily Grants LLC Members&apos; Motion For Summary Judgment For Advancement Of Legal Expenses
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Summarily-Grants-LLC-Members-Motion</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 4, 2021, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion for summary judgment on entitlement to legal fees brought by unitholding members of Benchmark Investments, LLC and Benchmark General, LLC.  Agahi, et al. v. Benchmark Investments, LLC, et al., No. 2020-0784 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2020).  Plaintiffs asserted claims against the companies for advancement of legal expenses incurred in connection with their defense against claims brought by the companies against them in a separate underlying action for alleged tortious interference and breach of contract.  The Court granted plaintiffs&apos; motion for summary judgment without oral argument, finding it &quot;clear from the complaint&quot; in the underlying action that plaintiffs were entitled to advancement of legal fees under the indemnification and advancement rights conferred by the operative LLC agreements.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Mar 2021 21:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Summarily-Grants-LLC-Members-Motion</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court of Chancery Holds That Merger Was Fair And Reasonable Despite Mishandled Conflict Committee Appointment
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Holds-That-Merger-Was-Fair-And-Reasonable</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 15, 2021, Chancellor Andre G.  Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery entered post-trial judgment in favor of the defendant-general partner of Regency Energy Partners LP (&quot;Regency&quot;) in a class action brought by Regency&apos;s limited partners alleging breach of the partnership agreement (&quot;Partnership Agreement&quot;) and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Dieckman v.  Regency GP LP &amp; Regency GP LLC, No.  CV 11130-CB, 2021 WL 537325, (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2021).  The Court held that, notwithstanding inaccurate proxy disclosures about the independence of the conflicts committee, Regency&apos;s merger with Energy Transfer Partners (&quot;ETP&quot;) did not violate the Partnership Agreement&apos;s requirement that the deal be fair and reasonable to the partnership, and that plaintiffs failed to establish bad faith, willful misconduct, or damages.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Mar 2021 21:03:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Holds-That-Merger-Was-Fair-And-Reasonable</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Partially Grants Section 220 Demand For Materials Related To Facebook FTC Settlement
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Partially-Grants-Section-220-Demand</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 10, 2021, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part a stockholder demand to inspect Facebook&apos;s books and records related to its July 2019 settlement with the FTC arising from the unauthorized release of user data to data analytics firm Cambridge Analytica.  Employees&apos; Retirement System of Rhode Island v. Facebook, Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0085-JRS (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2021).  In a post-trial order, the Court directed Facebook to produce electronic communications from board members concerning the FTC settlement but not privileged documents that the stockholder sought.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Feb 2021 16:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Partially-Grants-Section-220-Demand</guid>
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					      <title>Southern District Of New York Permits Contract Termination Based On COVID-19, Construes Pandemic As &quot;Natural Disaster&quot; Within Meaning Of Force Majeure  Provision
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Southern-District-Of-New-York-Permits-Contract-Termination</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 16, 2020, Judge Denise Cote of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed an art dealer&apos;s breach of contract action alleging that the defendant auction house had improperly terminated the parties&apos; agreement.  JN Contemporary Art LLC v. Phillips Auctioneers LLC, - F. Supp. 3d - , 2020 WL 7405262 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020).  Plaintiff contended that the auction house was not permitted to terminate the parties&apos; contract because the pandemic did not constitute a &quot;natural disaster&quot; within the meaning of the agreement&apos;s force majeure clause.  The Court held, applying New York law, that the COVID-19 pandemic is a &quot;natural disaster&quot; and therefore dismissed the action.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2021 21:30:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Southern-District-Of-New-York-Permits-Contract-Termination</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms The Partial Denial Of Books And Records Demand
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-The-Partial-Denial</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 26, 2021, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery rejecting in part the request by a member of a limited liability company (LLC) for the production of certain books and records for inspection pursuant to Section 18-305 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the analog to a Section 220 inspection demand for Delaware corporations).  Durham v. Grapetree, LLC, No. 343, 2019 (Del. Jan. 26, 2021).  The Delaware Supreme Court clarified that plaintiff was entitled pursuant to the requests approved by the trial court to informal records, such as emails, text messages, and phone records, to the extent the company conducted its business without documenting its actions in minutes, board resolutions, or by other formal means.  But the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in denying requests it found overbroad, unrelated to a proper purpose for inspection, or that required the company to create new records.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2021 19:08:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-The-Partial-Denial</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Sustains Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Target&apos;s CEO And Aiding And Abetting Claims Against Target&apos;s Financial Advisor And Buyer
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Sustains-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 29, 2021, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied in part a motion to dismiss class action claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the CEO and Chairman of Presidio, Inc. (&quot;Presidio&quot;), its directors, and its controlling stockholder, as well as aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against its financial advisor and BC Partners Advisors LP (&quot;BCP&quot;).  The suit was brought by a former Presidio stockholder in connection with BCP&apos;s 2019 acquisition of Presidio.  Firefighters&apos; Pension Sys. of the City of Kansas City, Missouri Trust v. Presidio, Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0839-JTL, 2021 WL 298141 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2021).  The Court found that plaintiff adequately alleged that Presidio&apos;s financial advisor and CEO &quot;steered the sale process&quot; toward a bidder who made an inferior offer, but that related claims against the board and controlling stockholder must be dismissed for failure to plead non-exculpated and money damages claims.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Feb 2021 23:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Sustains-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Appraisal Ruling Relying On DCF Analysis To Determine Fair Value
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Appraisal-Ruling-Relaying-On-DCF-Analysis</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 22, 2021, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed en banc the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s decision appraising outsourcing and financial services company SourceHOV Holdings, Inc. based on a discounted cash flow analysis (&quot;DCF&quot;).  SourceHOV Holdings Inc. v. Manichaean Capital LLC, No. 215, 2020 (Del. Jan. 22, 2021).  Petitioners were minority stockholders who filed the appraisal action following the company&apos;s participation in a series of transactions that resulted in a three-party business combination.  In its concise order, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed &quot;on the basis of and for the reasons stated&quot; by the lower court it its opinion.  The Court of Chancery had explained that the circumstances surrounding the business combination that triggered the appraisal rights &quot;disqualif[ied] market evidence as reliable inputs for a fair value analysis,&quot; leaving the court to consider competing expert opinions on a DCF valuation.  Moreover, the Court of Chancery largely adopted petitioners&apos; analysis, which it found more reliable than that of respondent&apos;s expert.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Feb 2021 19:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Appraisal-Ruling-Relaying-On-DCF-Analysis</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Exercises Subject Matter Jurisdiction Appropriate Over Merger Agreement Dispute &quot;Legal&quot; Claim
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Exercises-Subject-Matter</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 8, 2021, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied in part a motion to dismiss a complaint by former stockholders of COR Securities Holdings, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) against the buyers of the Company.  Legent Grp., LLC v. Axos Fin., Inc., No. C.A. No. 2020-0405-KSJM (Del. Ch. Jan. 08, 2021).  Plaintiffs asserted a claim seeking a declaratory judgment that defendants were not entitled to indemnification under the merger agreement.  The Court rejected defendants&apos; contention that it should decline to exercise jurisdiction because it was a &quot;purely legal&quot;—rather than &quot;equitable&quot;—claim.  The Court noted that there was no dispute that it had at least discretionary statutory jurisdiction pursuant to Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;) Section 111(a).  Declining to dismiss the claim, the Court declared it &quot;appropriate&quot; to exercise jurisdiction, even if discretionary, and therefore found it unnecessary to determine whether jurisdiction under the statute is mandatory.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 20 Jan 2021 19:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Exercises-Subject-Matter</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Applies Zapata  To Assess New Board Committee&apos;s Motion To Dismiss Claims Being Pursued By A Previously Established Special Committee
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Zapata-To-Assess-New-Board</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 14, 2020, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard denied a motion to dismiss a lawsuit by a special committee of the board of The We Company (the &quot;Company&quot;) against the Company&apos;s new controlling stockholder and its affiliates (collectively, the &quot;New Controller&quot;).  In Re WeWork Litigation, C.A. No. 2020-0258-AGB (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2020).  After the New Controller acquired control in a multi-step transaction, the Company&apos;s board established a new committee, which determined that the special committee lacked authority to continue the suit and directed management to move to dismiss.  The Court noted that this presented an issue of first impression.  The Court determined to engage in an analysis akin to that developed for assessing special committee motions to dismiss derivative claims under Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).  Zapata entails a two-part assessment (i) testing the independence, good faith and reasonableness of the investigation, and (ii) applying the court&apos;s own independent business judgment as to whether the motion should be granted.  The Court denied the motion because it found (i) the new committee did not establish the reasonableness of its investigation and conclusions, and (ii) the special committee was authorized to pursue the litigation and it would be &quot;fundamentally unfair&quot; to dismiss the claims.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Dec 2020 21:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Zapata-To-Assess-New-Board</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies That A Section 220 Demand Is Not Necessarily Required To Establish That Suspected Wrongdoing Is &quot;Actionable&quot;
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Clarifies-That-A-Section-220</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 10, 2020, in an en banc opinion authored by Justice Gary F. Traynor, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery ordering the production of books and records by AmerisourceBergen Corporation pursuant to a Section 220 inspection demand.  AmerisourceBergen Corporation v. Lebanon County Employees&apos; Retirement Fund, C.A. No. 60, 2020 (Del. Dec. 10, 2020).  Under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, a stockholder may inspect company records for a &quot;proper purpose.&quot;  A stockholder who seeks company records for the purpose of investigating corporate wrongdoing must establish a &quot;credible basis&quot; from which the court can infer that wrongdoing may have occurred.  Affirming the order of the Court of Chancery, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that a stockholder who demonstrates such a credible basis &quot;is not required in all cases to establish that the wrongdoing under investigation is actionable.&quot;
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Dec 2020 20:10:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Clarifies-That-A-Section-220</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rules Inadequate Disclosure And Pandemic-Driven Changes To Hotel Operations Breached Covenants And Excused Closing
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rules-Inadequate-Disclosure-And-Pandemic-Driven</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 30, 2020, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery found that Mirae Asset Global Investments Co. was contractually entitled to terminate its agreement to purchase 15 U.S. hotels from a subsidiary of Dajia Insurance Group (&quot;Seller&quot;).  AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels and Resorts One LLC et al., C.A. No. 2020-0310-JTL (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020).  Mirae refused to close the transaction in April, asserting that Seller had suffered an MAE and failed to satisfy closing covenants for the hotel deal worth $5.8 billion.  Seller sued to force Mirae to close, but the Court determined that even though there was no MAE, Mirae nevertheless had the right to terminate the sale agreement because Seller breached its title insurance and ordinary course closing covenants.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Dec 2020 20:58:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rules-Inadequate-Disclosure-And-Pandemic-Driven</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Claims For Failure To Plead Demand Futility Notwithstanding Unocal Enhanced Scrutiny
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 20, 2020, Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed stockholder derivative claims against the directors of Christopher &amp; Banks Corporation.  Gottlieb v. Duskin, C.A. No. 2019-0639-MTZ (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2020).  Plaintiffs alleged that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by wrongfully enacting defensive measures to rebuff an unsolicited acquisition offer at a substantial premium to the company&apos;s stock price even though the company was in &quot;dire financial condition.&quot;  The Court determined that the complaint pled facts sufficient to trigger enhanced scrutiny of the directors&apos; conduct under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), rather than the deferential business judgment rule.  Nevertheless, the Court held that the complaint did not sufficiently plead that the &quot;directors face a substantial likelihood of bad-faith liability.&quot;  Therefore, the Court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to plead that pre-suit demand on the directors was excused, as required for a derivative action under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Dec 2020 18:29:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds That Former Stockholders Can Pursue Direct Claims For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Arising From Issuance Of Shares To Controlling Stockholder For Allegedly Insufficient Consideration
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Former-Stockholders</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 30, 2020, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by former stockholders of TerraForm Power, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) against its majority stockholder, CEO, and several directors.  In re TerraForm Power, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2019-0757-SG (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2020).  Plaintiffs alleged that the Company engaged in a private placement of stock to the controlling stockholder at a price that undervalued the shares that were issued.  Accordingly, plaintiffs contended that the transaction diluted the financial and voting interest of the minority stockholders.  Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing, arguing that such dilution claims are &quot;quintessential derivative claims&quot; that cannot be asserted by former stockholders.  Vice Chancellor Glasscock, however, denied the motion to dismiss under &quot;controlling precedent&quot; because the Delaware Supreme Court upheld similar claims by former stockholders in Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006).
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2020 18:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Former-Stockholders</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Declines To Dismiss Claims That Officers Tilted Take‑Private Sale Process To Favored Buyer
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Dismiss-Claims-That-Officers-Tilted</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 2, 2020, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen S. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by stockholders of Mindbody, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) against two of its officers in connection with the Company&apos;s $1.9 billion sale to a private equity firm.  In Re Mindbody, Inc., Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 2019-0442-KSJM (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2020).  Plaintiffs asserted that the Company&apos;s founder-CEO/Chairman tilted the sale process toward the favored buyer, motivated by a need for liquidity and the prospect of post-merger employment with the firm.  In particular, plaintiffs alleged that the CEO orchestrated (i) the provision of reduced diligence information in a less timely fashion to other potential bidders, and (ii) the lowering of earnings guidance to depress the stock price and make the Company a more attractive target to the favored firm while enhancing the premium apparent to stockholders.  The Court found the allegations sufficient to support a &quot;paradigmatic Revlon claim&quot; and the determination at the pleading stage that the proxy was materially misleading such that the alleged breach was not cleansed under Corwin.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2020 19:01:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Dismiss-Claims-That-Officers-Tilted</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Suit For Failure To Plead Sufficient Facts Showing Demand Futility
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Suit</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 30, 2020, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard dismissed a derivative suit brought by stockholders of TrueCar, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) against certain of its officers and directors (along with allegedly related entities) asserting breaches of fiduciary duty, insider trading, unjust enrichment, contribution and indemnification, as well as aiding and abetting.  In Re TrueCar, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2019-0672-AGB (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2020).  According to the complaint, the Company operated an internet platform designed to facilitate purchases of cars that allegedly depended on consumer traffic directed to TrueCar by its &quot;affinity partners.&quot;  The gravamen of the claims was that defendants did not disclose in the Company&apos;s SEC filings that an impending redesign of the website of its most significant affinity partner would negatively impact the Company&apos;s business and that certain defendants and their alleged affiliates engaged in stock sales before the public disclosure of this allegedly adverse development.  Dismissing the suit in its entirety, the Court found that plaintiffs failed to plead &quot;particularized facts sufficient to impugn the ability&quot; of any of the directors to consider a pre-suit demand because the allegations did not demonstrate that the directors learned of the development or ignored any red flags before the challenged disclosures and stock sales.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2020 16:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Suit</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Billion-Dollar Damages In Cigna-Anthem Row
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Billion-Dollar-Damages-In-Cigna-Anthem-Row</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 31, 2020, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that neither Cigna Corporation (&quot;Cigna&quot;) nor Anthem, Inc. (&quot;Anthem&quot;) were entitled to the billions of dollars in damages and fees the parties sought in connection with a failed merger between the two companies (the &quot;Merger&quot;).  In Re Anthem-Cigna Merger Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0114-JTL (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2020).  After the Department of Justice (&quot;DOJ&quot;) successfully sued to block the Merger, Cigna and Anthem sued each other for expectation damages, and Cigna claimed that it was entitled to a Reverse Termination Fee (&quot;RTF&quot;).  In a landmark 306-page opinion, the Court rejected both parties&apos; claims and denied all recovery, finding that &quot;[e]ach party must bear the losses it suffered as a result of their star-crossed venture.&quot;
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2020 18:17:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Billion-Dollar-Damages-In-Cigna-Anthem-Row</guid>
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					      <title>Even After Finding Corwin Inapplicable Because Of Alleged Misstatements, Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Post-Merger Damages Claims For Failure To Plead Bad Faith
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Even-After-Finding-Corwin-Inapplicable-Because-Of-Alleged-Misstatements</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 31, 2020, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted against the directors of USG Corporation by former stockholders following its acquisition by a privately held German manufacturer of building materials.  In re USG Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2018-0602-SG (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2020).  Plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to secure maximum value for their shares in connection with the merger and sought damages, including by way of quasi-appraisal.  Even though an overwhelming majority of the disinterested stockholders approved the sale, the Court declined to dismiss the claims based on Corwin cleansing because plaintiffs had adequately pleaded that the proxy was materially misleading.  Nevertheless, the Court granted the motion to dismiss because USG&apos;s corporate charter exculpated the directors, and plaintiffs failed to adequately allege bad faith or disloyalty as required to plead a non-exculpated claim.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2020 18:12:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Even-After-Finding-Corwin-Inapplicable-Because-Of-Alleged-Misstatements</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion To Dismiss Claims Regarding Alleged Controller&apos;s Tender Offer As The &quot;Abstention Principle&quot; Is &quot;Not Absolute&quot; And A De Facto Controller May Obtain Additional Benefits From Mathematical Control
  </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Claims-Regarding-Alleged-Controllers</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 17, 2020, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss claims brought by stockholders of Coty Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) against its directors and affiliates of its alleged controller.  In re Coty, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2019-0336-AGB (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2020).  Plaintiffs claimed that defendants breached their fiduciary duties by initiating and approving a tender offer in which the alleged controller increased its holdings from 40% to 60% allegedly at an unfair price and through an unfair process.  Four of the nine director defendants, who were associated with the alleged controller (the &quot;Controller Directors&quot;), recused themselves from the board vote to recommend the tender offer and approve a related stockholders agreement.  Nevertheless, the Court held that the &quot;abstention defense&quot; is &quot;not absolute and often implicates factual questions that cannot be resolved on the pleadings.&quot;  As to all defendants, the Court upheld the claims even of stockholders that did not tender their shares because a de facto controller may &quot;obtain real benefits from securing mathematical control of a corporation in a transaction and, as a corollary, . . . other stockholders of the corporation potentially may suffer harm as a result of such a transaction.&quot; 
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2020 19:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Claims-Regarding-Alleged-Controllers</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds Stockholder Inspection Rights For Delaware Corporations Are Governed Exclusively By Delaware Law And Are Subject To A Delaware Forum Selection Provision Addressing Internal Affairs
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Stockholder-Inspection-Rights-For-Delaware-Corporations</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 13, 2020, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster held that defendant, a stockholder of plaintiff JUUL Labs, Inc., did not have the right to seek inspection of books and records of the Delaware corporation under any state statutory law other than that of Delaware.  JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Grove, C.A. No. 2020-0005-JTL (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2020).  Therefore, because defendant had only sought inspection under a California statutory provision, the Court rejected the demand and granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff.  The Court also held that a forum selection provision in the certificate of incorporation, providing that the Delaware Court of Chancery is the exclusive forum for actions arising pursuant to the Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;) or asserting claims against the corporation &quot;governed by the internal affairs doctrine,&quot; applies to actions to inspect books and records.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2020 18:17:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Stockholder-Inspection-Rights-For-Delaware-Corporations</guid>
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					      <title>Shareholder Derivative Complaints Allege Lack Of Board And Senior Executive Diversity
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Shareholder-Derivative-Complaints-Allege-Lack-Of-Board-And-Senior-Executive</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
In July 2020, shareholders filed three separate but substantially similar derivative suits in U.S. district courts in California against certain directors and officers of three major technology companies, asserting claims related to alleged failures to uphold commitments to diversity.Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing to ensure diversity in particular at the board and executive levels, as well as violations of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for alleged misrepresentations about the companies&apos; commitments to diversity.In addition to monetary damages, the complaints seek to compel the companies to advance several wide-ranging proposals regarding diversity initiatives for shareholder votes.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Aug 2020 18:38:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Shareholder-Derivative-Complaints-Allege-Lack-Of-Board-And-Senior-Executive</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Post-Merger Stockholder Challenge To Executive Incentive Compensation Stock Awards
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Post-Merger-Stockholder-Challenge</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 26, 2020, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed breach of fiduciary duty claims brought against former officers and directors of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. (&quot;Old Fox&quot;) in connection with a transaction in which it spun off part of its business into a new public company, Fox Corporation (&quot;New Fox&quot;), and sold the rest of its business to The Walt Disney Company in a merger (the &quot;Transaction&quot;).  Brokerage Jamie Goldenberg Komen Rev Tru U/A 06/10/08 Jaime L Komen Tr. for the Benefit of Jamie Goldenberg Komen v. Breyer, No. 2018-0773-AGB (Del. Ch. June 26, 2020).  According to the complaint, the compensation committee of Old Fox approved an incentive compensation program in connection with the Transaction, including an alleged $82.4 million in stock awards granted to Old Fox&apos;s three top executives, who were allegedly the company&apos;s controlling stockholders and collectively owned shares worth over $11.7 billion.  Plaintiff was a stockholder of Old Fox that became a stockholder of New Fox in the Transaction.  Plaintiff alleged that it was unnecessary and wasteful to approve any &quot;incentive&quot; compensation for these alleged controller-executives because they &quot;already were highly incentivized to pursue and implement the transaction given their collective holdings.&quot;  The Court held that plaintiff&apos;s claims were derivative because they challenged a compensation decision by the board of Old Fox and did not adequately plead that the Transaction was &quot;tainted by unfair dealing.&quot;  The Court dismissed plaintiff&apos;s claims for lack of standing because plaintiff was not a stockholder of New Fox at the time of the alleged misconduct and, therefore, could not satisfy the continuous ownership requirement for derivative claims.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2020 18:41:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Post-Merger-Stockholder-Challenge</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Appraisal Ruling Relying On Unaffected Market Price To Determine Fair Value
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Appraisal-Ruling-Relying-On-Unaffected-Market-Price-To-Determine-Fair</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 9, 2020, in an en banc opinion authored by Chief Justice Collins J. Seitz, Jr., the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery, which relied on the unaffected stock price of Jarden Corporation to determine its fair value in a post-merger appraisal action.  Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., No. 454, 2019 (Del. July 9, 2020).  &quot;Although it is not often that a corporation&apos;s unaffected market price alone could support fair value,&quot; explained the Delaware Supreme Court, &quot;there is no long-recognized principle that a corporation&apos;s unaffected stock price cannot equate to fair value.&quot;  Here, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that &quot;Jarden stock traded in a semi-strong efficient market, meaning the market quickly assimilated all publicly available information into Jarden&apos;s stock price&quot; and explained its reasons for rejecting alternative measures of fair value.  Affirming, the Delaware Supreme Court was &quot;satisfied&quot; that the Court of Chancery determined fair value in a manner &quot;grounded in the record before it.&quot;
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2020 18:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Appraisal-Ruling-Relying-On-Unaffected-Market-Price-To-Determine-Fair</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Dismissal Of Merger-Related Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims Regarding Allegedly Undisclosed Conflict Of Interest
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-Merger-Related-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 30, 2020, in an en banc opinion authored by Justice Karen L. Valihura, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s dismissal of a stockholder lawsuit arising out of the merger between Towers Watson &amp; Co. (&quot;Towers&quot;) and Willis Group Holdings Public Limited Company (&quot;Willis&quot;).  City of Fort Myers Gen. Emps.&apos; Pension Fund v. Haley, C.A. 2018-0132-KSJM (Del. June 30, 2020).  As we discussed in our prior post, plaintiffs, who had been stockholders of Towers, alleged that the CEO of Towers breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty by negotiating the merger without adequately disclosing to the rest of the Towers board a compensation proposal he had received from Willis&apos;s second-largest stockholder, whose co-founder and Chief Investment Officer served on the Willis board.  Reversing, the Delaware Supreme Court found that plaintiffs adequately pleaded facts sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2020 18:42:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-Merger-Related-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty</guid>
				    </item>
			
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Grants Motion To Dismiss Holding That Fiduciaries Of Acquired Entity Did Not Aid And Abet Alleged Fiduciary Breaches By Acquirer
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Motion-To-Dismiss-Holding-That-Fiduciaries</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 22, 2020, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss a derivative claim for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty brought by stockholders of Oracle Corporation against the CEO and Chairman of NetSuite, Inc., in connection with alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by Oracle&apos;s directors arising from its acquisition of NetSuite.  In Re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG (Del. Ch. June 22, 2020).  Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had aided and abetted breaches by Oracle&apos;s directors by failing to disclose in NetSuite&apos;s public filings certain aspects of the negotiations that allegedly would have alerted Oracle&apos;s special committee for the merger to the fact that Oracle was overpaying.  The Court acknowledged the &quot;incongruity&quot; of plaintiffs&apos; theory that fiduciaries of a target whose obligation to their stockholders is to &quot;maximize price&quot; could be held liable for aiding and abetting the acquirer&apos;s fiduciaries by not disclosing information that would have led the latter to &quot;scuttle&quot; a deal favoring the target.  The Court suggested that there could be such a case—in the Court&apos;s language, &quot;in the infinite garden of theoretical inequity, such a flower may bloom&quot;—but this is not it.  Instead, the Court held that it was not reasonably conceivable that the difference between what was disclosed and what plaintiffs alleged should have been disclosed constituted &quot;substantial assistance&quot;—a necessary element for aiding and abetting—to the acquirer&apos;s fiduciaries in their alleged breaches.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2020 19:22:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Motion-To-Dismiss-Holding-That-Fiduciaries</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Controlling Investor&apos;s Cash-Accumulation Strategy In Advance Of Preferred Stock Redemption Payments Satisfied Entire Fairness
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Controlling-Inve</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 4, 2020, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled in a post-trial opinion that a controlling investor&apos;s efforts to accumulate cash in anticipation of its preferred stock redemptions were entirely fair.  Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108-VCL (Del. Ch. May 4, 2020).  Plaintiff, a common stockholder of ODN Holding Corporation, alleged that the private equity firm that held a controlling interest—including a majority of the common stock and a series of preferred stock—along with the company&apos;s directors and officers, breached their fiduciary duties by engaging in a cash accumulation strategy, rather than seeking to enhance the company&apos;s long-term growth.  Having previously sustained plaintiff&apos;s claims at the pleadings stage, the Court held that defendants proved at trial that their conduct was entirely fair and entered judgment in favor of defendants.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2020 18:13:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Controlling-Inve</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Grants Motion To Dismiss Finding Demand Was Not Excused In Connection With Alleged Failure To Update Revenue Guidance
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Motion-To-Dismiss-Finding-Demand</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 28, 2020, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III granted a motion to dismiss a derivative action alleging claims of breach of fiduciary duty and improper trading brought by stockholders of GoPro, Inc. against certain of the company&apos;s current and former directors and officers.  In re GoPro, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 018-0784-JRS (Del. Ch. April 28, 2020).  Plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to disclose that the company&apos;s revenue guidance was unachievable in light of emerging problems with a product launch.  Dismissing the claims, the Court held that the complaint did not plead with particularity that a majority of the board faced a substantial risk of liability, and therefore, rejected plaintiffs&apos; contention that pre-suit demand on the board to sue was excused as futile.  Specifically, the Court found that the board presentations incorporated by reference into the complaint revealed that management regularly advised the board that the company was still on track to meet the revenue guidance.  As the Court explained, the board was &quot;under no obligation to disclose what it did not know or did not believe to be true.&quot;
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2020 18:44:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Motion-To-Dismiss-Finding-Demand</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds That A Special Committee Must Be Constituted Ab Initio In Order To Cleanse A Transaction Involving A Conflicted Board Majority
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-A-Special-Committee</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 27, 2020, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III denied a motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by a former stockholder of Intersections, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;), challenging the take-private acquisition of the Company.  Salladay v. Lev, C.A. No. 2019-0048-SG (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2020).  The complaint alleged that the Company was sold at an unfairly depressed price and that insiders influenced the transaction to divert consideration to themselves.   Moreover, plaintiff asserted that the transaction was subject to entire fairness review because at least half the directors were conflicted by virtue of having rolled over substantial portions of their equity into the merger.  Although defendants did not contest that a majority of the board was conflicted, they argued that the claims should be dismissed under the business judgment rule because the deal was negotiated and approved by a special committee of unconflicted directors.  The Court, however, held that &quot;to effectively cleanse a transaction . . . the special committee must be constituted ab initio . . . prior to substantive economic negotiations.&quot;  The Court denied the motion to dismiss because it found that the complaint adequately pleaded the existence of substantive economic negotiations before the special committee was empowered. 
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:52:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-A-Special-Committee</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion To Dismiss Claims Regarding Squeeze-Out Merger Because Special Committee Members Were Allegedly &quot;Interested&quot;
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[

On February 26, 2020, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by former shareholders of AmTrust, Inc., challenging the take-private buyout of the company by its controlling stockholders and a private equity firm.  In re AmTrust Financial Services, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2018-0396-AGB (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2020).  In an effort to comply with the procedural protections necessary for deferential review of a merger process involving a controller—under Kahn v. M &amp; F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;)—the buyout group conditioned its offer on approval by an independent special committee and a fully informed majority of the company&apos;s minority stockholders.  Plaintiffs challenged the independence of three of four members of the special committee because the buyout allegedly was expected to extinguish their potential liability in a pre-existing derivative action.  The Court held that the MFW requirement of &quot;independent&quot; special committee approval &quot;was intended to ensure not only that members of a special committee must be independent in the sense of not being beholden to a controlling stockholder, but also that the committee members must have no disabling personal interest in the transaction at issue.&quot;  Therefore, the Court found the transaction subject to entire fairness rather than business judgment review and denied the motion to dismiss as to the controlling stockholders and their affiliated directors.
 

]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2020 15:55:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Finds Dissident Board Nominees Ineligible Because Of Noncompliance With Bylaws Deadline To Respond To Supplemental Information Request
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Finds-Dissident-Board-Nominees</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 13, 2020, in an opinion authored by Justice Karen L. Valihura, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that defendants—two investment trusts—were permitted to disqualify the board nominees of a plaintiff shareholder for missing a deadline in the trusts&apos; bylaws to respond to board requests for additional information.  Blackrock Credit Allocation Income Trust v. Saba Capital Master Fund Ltd., C.A. No. 2019-0416-MTZ (Del. Jan. 13, 2020).  The Supreme Court&apos;s decision reversed in part a ruling by Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn of the Delaware Court of Chancery that plaintiff&apos;s nominees were improperly excluded.  Even though the requests for information may have exceeded the contemplated scope and plaintiff may have misread the bylaws and believed the deadline was inapplicable, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a rule that would excuse deadline non-compliance could &quot;potentially frustrate the purpose of advance notice bylaws&quot; intended to facilitate orderly meetings and election contests.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jan 2020 17:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Finds-Dissident-Board-Nominees</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal Of Derivative Suit Alleging Board Approved Transaction Involving Unnecessary Litigation Exposure
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Derivative</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 13, 2020, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Collins J. Seitz, Jr., the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the dismissal by Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery of a stockholder derivative suit for lack of pre-suit demand.  McElrath v. Kalanick, et al., C.A. No. 2017-0888 (Del. Jan. 13, 2020).  As discussed in our post on the prior decision, plaintiff alleged that the directors of a technology company had breached fiduciary duties in connection with the approval of an acquisition, in particular as related to purported intellectual property infringement by the target.  Noting that the company had an exculpatory charter provision, the Delaware Supreme Court explained that the directors were insulated from due care violations and could only be liable for bad faith.  Referring to allegations that the board heard a presentation that summarized the transaction, reviewed the risk of litigation, generally discussed due diligence and asked questions, the Court found that the complaint raised an inference of a &quot;functioning board&quot; and did not reasonably suggest the board intentionally ignored relevant risks.  Thus, the Court affirmed the dismissal because a majority of the board was disinterested for purposes of pre-suit demand as it &quot;had no real threat of personal liability.&quot; ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jan 2020 17:07:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Derivative</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Transaction-Related Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims After Board Terminates Merger In Favor Of An Alternative Acquisition
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Transaction-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 30, 2019, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by former stockholders of Essendant Inc. after it was acquired in a tender offer and cash-out merger by a private equity firm.  In re Essendant Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2018-0789-JRS (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2019).  The claims focused on Essendant&apos;s decision to terminate a merger agreement providing for a stock-for-stock merger with Genuine Parts Co. (&quot;GPC&quot;) in favor of an all-cash deal offered by the private equity firm.  Plaintiffs&apos; central allegation was that Essendant&apos;s directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to obtain the maximum value reasonably available.  Highlighting that Essendant&apos;s charter contained an exculpatory provision, as authorized under 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 102(b)(7), the Court explained that the claims against them could only be maintained if the complaint adequately pleaded a breach of the duty of loyalty.  The Court held that plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to show that Essendant&apos;s board was dominated and controlled by the acquiror, or that a majority of the directors had acted in self-interest or bad faith.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jan 2020 21:15:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Transaction-</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Orders Acquiror To Consummate Merger Finding That Misrepresentations Did Not Amount To A Material Adverse Effect
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Orders-Acquiror-To-Consummate-Merger-Finding</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 18, 2019, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that defendant Boston Scientific Corporation was not entitled to terminate its merger agreement with plaintiff Channel Medsystems, Inc. Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., C.A. No. 2018-0673-AGB (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019). After the merger agreement was signed, plaintiff—a pre-approval stage medical device company with one product—discovered that its vice president of quality had falsified various documents as part of a multiyear scheme in which he stole $2.6 million from the company. According to the Court, upon discovery, plaintiff was &quot;transparent&quot; with the FDA and with defendant regarding the fraud finding and &quot;acted with dispatch to address it.&quot; Defendant nevertheless notified plaintiff that it was terminating the merger based on provisions in the agreement that permitted termination for misrepresentations that would be expected to result in a &quot;Material Adverse Effect.&quot; Following trial, the Court found that—notwithstanding plaintiff&apos;s breaches of certain representations, including with respect to the accuracy of its FDA submissions—there was no reasonable expectation of a Material Adverse Effect. The Court emphasized that plaintiff did obtain FDA approval for its medical device, which demonstrated that it was &quot;safe and effective&quot; and undercut defendant&apos;s claim that defendant would need to &quot;remediate and retest&quot; the device at great cost before marketing. The Court thus granted specific performance and directed defendant to close the merger.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jan 2020 22:53:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Orders-Acquiror-To-Consummate-Merger-Finding</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>District Of Maryland Dismisses Post-Merger Securities Class Action, Finding Omission Of Public Information Relating To Financial Advisor&apos;s Analysis Did Not Render Proxy Materially Misleading
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/District-Of-Maryland-Dismisses-Post-Merger-Securiites-Class-Action</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 4, 2019, Judge Ellen L. Hollander of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed with prejudice a stockholder class action suit against Gramercy Property Trust (&quot;Gramercy&quot; or the &quot;Company&quot;), a real estate investment trust (&quot;REIT&quot;), and its financial advisor for failure to state a claim under Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Hurtado v. Gramercy Property Trust, No. ELH-18-2711 (D. Md. Dec. 4, 2019).  Following Gramercy&apos;s August 2018 sale to an affiliate of the Blackstone Group L.P. (&quot;Blackstone&quot;), plaintiff filed suit against the financial advisor (which was represented by Shearman &amp; Sterling), Gramercy, and certain of its officers and directors, alleging that defendants materially misled Gramercy&apos;s stockholders by issuing a proxy statement that omitted information plaintiff claimed was relevant to Gramercy&apos;s market value at the time of the merger.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Dec 2019 19:34:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/District-Of-Maryland-Dismisses-Post-Merger-Securiites-Class-Action</guid>
				    </item>
			
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Demand To Inspect Books And Records Under Section 220 To Aid In Proxy Contest
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Demand-To-Insp</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 14, 2019, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery rejected a demand by stockholders of Occidental Petroleum Corporation under Section 220, 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220, for documents and information relating to the corporation&apos;s acquisition of Anadarko Petroleum and related transactions.  High River Ltd. P&apos;ship, Icahn Partners Master Fund LP, and Icahn Partners LP v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., C.A. No. 2019-0403-JRS (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 2019).  According to the Court, plaintiffs considered the transactions &quot;bad deals&quot; and acknowledged that their primary purpose in seeking the documents was to aid them in their proxy contest to replace certain directors.  In a post-trial decision in favor of the corporation, the Court explained that &quot;an imminent proxy contest is not enough to earn access&quot; to broad sets of documents relating to &quot;substantive business decisions.&quot;
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Nov 2019 18:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Demand-To-Insp</guid>
				    </item>
			
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Certain Safe Harbor Protections Inapplicable To Approval Of Merger With General Partner&apos;s Affiliate
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Certain-Safe-Har</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 29, 2019, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted partial summary judgment to a common unitholder of Regency Energy Partners LP (&quot;Regency&quot;) challenging a merger with an affiliate of Regency&apos;s general partner.  Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, C.A. No. 11130-CB (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2019).  Plaintiff alleged that defendants (Regency&apos;s general partner and its affiliates) breached the limited partnership agreement by approving the merger even though they &quot;did not believe that the [m]erger was in the best interests of Regency.&quot;  Defendants argued that their approval was protected under three &quot;safe harbors&quot; in the agreement:  (i) reasonable reliance upon the opinion of an investment banker; (ii) &quot;special approval&quot; by an independent conflicts committee; and (iii) a majority vote of the common unitholders unaffiliated with the general partner.  Finding a genuine issue of fact as to whether the general partner&apos;s board actually relied on the opinion of the investment banker, the Court denied defendants&apos; motion for summary judgment.  The Court, however, determined plaintiff demonstrated that one of the members of the conflicts committee was not independent.  Accordingly, the Court found the &quot;special approval&quot; safe harbor unavailable and granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff on that point.  Because the proxy provided to common unitholders stated that the conflicts committee was independent, the Court found it misleading and granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff on the unavailability of the unitholder vote safe harbor.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2019 16:05:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Certain-Safe-Har</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Caremark Claims Against Directors After Company Publicly Disclosed Misconduct
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 31, 2019, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen S. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a stockholder derivative suit against the directors of LendingClub Corporation for failure to plead demand futility.  In re LendingClub Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 12984-VCM (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2019).  Plaintiffs asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims against the directors after the company disclosed that it had self-reported certain alleged misconduct by the CEO and others to the SEC, as well as the problems that prompted the company&apos;s internal investigation, the results of that investigation, and the company&apos;s remediation efforts.  Plaintiffs alleged that the board did not adequately implement a system of controls or monitor company operations and &quot;thus disabled itself from being informed of problems requiring its attention.&quot;  Determining that the complaint did not allege facts demonstrating bad faith—as is necessary to prevail on a Caremark claim for violation of oversight duties—and, therefore, that a majority of the directors did not face a substantial risk of liability, the Court concluded that pre-suit demand was not excused.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Nov 2019 18:17:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Second Circuit Affirms Denial Of Certain Claims For Investment Banking Fees
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Second-Circuit-Affirms-Denial-Of-Certain-Claims-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 11, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a decision by District Judge Jesse Furman denying in part breach of contract claims for advisory fees brought by investment bank Stone Key LLC and its affiliate against its former client, Monster Worldwide, Inc.  Stone Key Partners LLC v. Monster Worldwide Inc., No. 18-2804 (2d Cir. October 11, 2019).  As discussed in our prior post, the trial court had denied claims for fees related to a transaction that it found post-dated termination of the advisor&apos;s contract and a claim for an earlier transaction that it found did not qualify as a &quot;partial sale&quot; for which the advisor was entitled to a fee.  Significantly, as we discussed, the trial court also based its denial of the claim related to the earlier transaction on its finding that the partial sale fee provision in the engagement letter amounted to an unenforceable agreement to agree.  By summary order, the Second Circuit affirmed largely for the reasons articulated by the lower court.  However, because the Second Circuit agreed that the earlier transaction did not constitute a &quot;partial sale&quot; under the contract and affirmed the lower court&apos;s denial of the claim on that basis, the Second Circuit &quot;decline[d] to consider whether the compensation provision itself was enforceable.&quot;  Summary orders do not have binding precedential effect.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Oct 2019 16:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Second-Circuit-Affirms-Denial-Of-Certain-Claims-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Applies Entire Fairness Standard To Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claim Arising From Asset Sale That Benefited Senior Preferred Unitholder
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Entire-Fairnes</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 11, 2019, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen S. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed all but one claim arising out of an asset sale by Pro Performance Sports, LLC (&quot;Pro Performance&quot;) to private equity firm Implus Footcare LLC (&quot;Implus&quot;) in which the senior unitholder, venture capital fund Steelpoint Capital Partners, LP (&quot;Steelpoint&quot;), received all of the sale consideration.  JJS Ltd. et al., v. Steelpoint CP Holdings LLC et al., C.A. No. 2019-0072-KSJM (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 2019).  The common unitholders challenged the sale, asserting that the LLC managers breached their fiduciary duties by structuring and approving the transaction and violated the terms of the LLC Agreement because the common unitholders were not permitted to vote as a separate class on approval of the sale.  The Court dismissed the claims based on the LLC Agreement, but sustained the fiduciary duty claim.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Oct 2019 17:59:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Entire-Fairnes</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Allegations Of Personal And Professional Relationships Sufficient To Excuse Pre-Suit Demand
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Allegations-Of-Personal</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 30, 2019, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied defendants&apos; motion to dismiss a stockholder derivative action for breach of fiduciary duties in connection with BGC Partners, Inc.&apos;s (&quot;BGC&quot;) acquisition of Berkeley Point Financial LLC.  In re BGC Partners, Inc. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2018-0722-AGB (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2019).  Plaintiffs alleged that BGC&apos;s CEO and Chairman was a controlling stockholder of both companies who purportedly disproportionately benefited from the transaction.  The Court rejected plaintiffs&apos; argument that demand was &quot;automatically&quot; excused because the transaction was subject to entire fairness review as a result of the allegations regarding a purported controlling stockholder on both sides of the deal.  Nevertheless, based on its &quot;holistic[]&quot; review of the complaint&apos;s allegations of the CEO&apos;s alleged unilateral ability to remove directors, as well as his alleged relationships with a majority of the other directors, the Court held that the complaint adequately pleaded demand futility because the allegations created a reasonable doubt as to the independence of those directors.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Oct 2019 15:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Allegations-Of-Personal</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion To Dismiss Merger Agreement Breach Claims Even Though Defendant Paid The Contractual Termination Fee
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Merger-Agreement-Breach-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 9, 2019, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied Essendant Inc.&apos;s motion to dismiss an action for breach of a merger agreement brought by Genuine Parts Company (&quot;GPC&quot;).  Genuine Parts Co. v. Essendant, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0730-JRS (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2019).  The claims arose after defendant terminated the two office supply companies&apos; merger agreement in favor of an acquisition of defendant by a private equity firm.  The Court held that the complaint adequately pled that defendant had materially breached the merger agreement&apos;s non-solicitation provision and the agreement did not unambiguously limit plaintiff&apos;s possible recovery to the termination fee. ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Sep 2019 18:40:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Merger-Agreement-Breach-Claims</guid>
				    </item>
			
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Grants Shareholder&apos;s Post-Merger Books And Records Demand, Finding &quot;Credible Basis&quot; To Investigate Merger Process
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Shareholders-Post-Merger-Books-And-Records-Demand</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 28, 2019, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen S. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a shareholder&apos;s demand under 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220 to inspect the books and records of defendant GGP Inc. for the purpose of investigating potential mismanagement.  Kosinski v. GGP Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0540 (Del. Ch. Aug. 28, 2019).  Plaintiff&apos;s demand stemmed from a merger in which defendant, a real estate company, was acquired by Brookfield Property Partners L.P., another real estate company that owned approximately one third of defendant&apos;s common stock at the time.  Plaintiff contended that the buyer had been defendant&apos;s de facto controlling shareholder and the procedural protections necessary for deferential review of a merger process involving a controller—under Kahn v. M &amp; F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;)—had not been implemented.  Following trial, the Court granted plaintiff&apos;s Section 220 demand, holding that where procedural protections are absent, &quot;it is possible that the transaction was not at arm&apos;s length,&quot; and finding that plaintiff had demonstrated facts that established a &quot;credible basis&quot; to investigate potential breaches of fiduciary duty.  But the Court noted that it was making an &quot;exceptionally modest point&quot; and not announcing a rule that noncompliance with MFW procedural protections &quot;automatically supplies a credible basis.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Sep 2019 20:18:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Shareholders-Post-Merger-Books-And-Records-Demand</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Stay Sought By Special Litigation Committee Appointed By Conflicted General Partner
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Stay-Sought-By-Special-Litigation-Committee</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 28, 2019, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to stay filed by the special litigation committee formed by defendant Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. (&quot;BBGP&quot;) in connection with a derivative action by limited partners of Blue Bell Creameries, LLP (&quot;Blue Bell&quot; or the &quot;Partnership&quot;) against BBGP, which is the sole general partner of Blue Bell, and others.  Wenske v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0699 (Del. Ch. Aug. 28, 2019).  The Court previously denied a motion to dismiss the derivative action because it determined that BBGP had &quot;a disabling interest for pre-suit demand purposes.&quot;  BBGP then appointed two new directors to its board, who established a special litigation committee consisting of three non-director members empowered to determine the interests of the Partnership in the derivative litigation.  The special litigation committee promptly moved to stay the derivative action to permit its investigation and make a determination.  But the Court denied the motion.  It explained that &quot;[a]ny conflict that disables the principal disables the agent&quot; and &quot;[b]ecause BBGP, as principal, is not fit to decide how to manage the Partnership&apos;s claims against the Defendants (including the claims against BBGP itself), its purported special litigation committee, as agent, is likewise disabled.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Sep 2019 20:15:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Stay-Sought-By-Special-Litigation-Committee</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Fair Value Equal To Deal Price Of Publicly Traded Company In Appraisal Action
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Fair-Value-Equal</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 12, 2019, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled in a post-trial opinion that the fair value of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc. (&quot;Columbia&quot;) was equal to the deal price in an appraisal action arising from Columbia&apos;s acquisition by TransCanada Corporation (&quot;TransCanada&quot;).  In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., Cons. C.A. No. 12736-VCL (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2019).  Relying on the Delaware Supreme Court&apos;s recent decisions in DFC, Dell, and Aruba, the Court found the deal price of $25.50 per share to be Columbia&apos;s fair value as of the closing date.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Aug 2019 21:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Fair-Value-Equal</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies That Section 220 Books And Records Demands Are Not Subject To A Presumption Of Confidentiality
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Clarifies-That-Section-220</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 7, 2019, in a decision authored by Justice Gary F. Traynor, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that books and records produced to a stockholder under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law are not subject to a presumption of confidentiality.  Tiger v. Boast Apparel, Inc., C.A. No. 23, 2019 (Del. Aug. 7, 2019).  In this case, the Delaware Court of Chancery referenced such a presumption when it issued an order requiring the stockholder to keep such records confidential indefinitely.  The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the indefinite confidentiality order as &quot;within the range of reasonableness &amp;hellip; given the facts and circumstances of this case.&quot;  But the Court expressly clarified that there is no such presumption of confidentiality and the Court of Chancery must instead &quot;assess and compare benefits and harms when determining the initial degree and duration of confidentiality&quot; in connection with a Section 220 demand.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Aug 2019 15:50:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Clarifies-That-Section-220</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Caremark Claim, Finding Consumer Class Action Settlement Was Not A &quot;Red Flag&quot; For Consumer Protection Law Violations
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-Cla</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 29, 2019, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a stockholder derivative action asserting breaches of fiduciary duty claims against the directors of J.C. Penney Company, Inc. for failure to make a pre-suit demand on the board.  Rojas v. Ellison, C.A. No. 2018-0755-AGB (Del. Ch. July 29, 2019).  After the Los Angeles City Attorney initiated litigation against the company asserting violations of California&apos;s consumer protection laws, plaintiff filed this derivative action alleging that the company&apos;s directors consciously disregarded their responsibility to oversee the company&apos;s compliance with laws governing price-comparison advertising.  Repeating past statements of the Court about the difficulty of proving director liability for a failure to monitor corporate affairs—known as a Caremark claim—Chancellor Bouchard determined that the complaint failed to plead facts demonstrating that the directors would face a substantial likelihood of personal liability.  In particular, the Court found that a settlement of a consumer class action suit without any admission of liability was not a &quot;red flag&quot; with respect to any ongoing violations of law.  Therefore, the Court concluded that pre-suit demand on the board was not excused. ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Aug 2019 15:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Caremark-Cla</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Stockholder Challenge To Merger For Failure To Rebut Business Judgment Rule
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Stockholder-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 25, 2019, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen S. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a stockholder suit challenging the $18 billion merger of equals between Towers Watson &amp; Co. and Willis Group Holdings plc, finding that plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule.  In Re Towers Watson &amp; Co. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 2018-0132-KSJM (Del. Ch. July 25, 2019).  Asserting claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs, who had been Towers Watson stockholders, argued that the company&apos;s CEO did not properly disclose to the board a compensation proposal he had received from Willis&apos;s second largest stockholder while the CEO was negotiating the merger.  But the Court found that the compensation proposal was ultimately immaterial and that the otherwise independent board members were well aware that the merger would likely lead to increased compensation for the CEO.  Noting that because the transaction was primarily a stock-for-stock merger, the Court explained that there was no dispute that the &quot;business judgment rule presumptively applies,&quot; and concluded that plaintiffs had failed to rebut that presumption. ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Aug 2019 15:09:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Stockholder-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Again Dismisses Aiding And Abetting Claims For Pleading Deficiencies
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Again-Dismisses-Aiding</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 15, 2019, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed an aiding and abetting claim asserted against a private equity buyer and its principals in a stockholder class action involving breach of fiduciary duty claims against the former CEO of a technology company in connection with its take-private sale to the private equity buyer.  In re Xura Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 12698-VCS (Del. Ch. July 12, 2019).  As we discussed in a prior post, Vice Chancellor Slights declined to dismiss a different stockholder&apos;s breach of fiduciary duty claims against the former CEO based on his allegedly self-interested participation in the merger, but the Court dismissed aiding and abetting claims asserted against the buyer and its principals.  In re Xura, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 12698-VCS (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2018).  Ten days after this opinion was issued, a different stockholder filed a &quot;nearly identical&quot; complaint—this time asserting class action claims—raising &quot;the same theories of aiding and abetting&quot; that the Court had dismissed just days earlier.  In a separate summary order, the Court denied the former CEO&apos;s motion to dismiss this new complaint.  In this decision, the Court dismissed the aiding and abetting claims for the same reason it did so in the prior suit—the complaint failed to include &quot;well-pled allegations that [the buyer] &apos;knowingly participated&apos; in the &amp;hellip; alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jul 2019 20:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Again-Dismisses-Aiding</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Approves $3 Million In Attorneys&apos; Fees For Successful Challenge To Forum-Selection Charter Provisions
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Approves-3-Million-In-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 8, 2019, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery awarded $3 million to plaintiffs&apos; lawyers in Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-JTL (Del. Ch. July 8, 2019).  As we discussed in a prior post, Vice Chancellor Laster had previously granted summary judgment to a shareholder challenging the validity of forum-selection charter provisions adopted by three corporations requiring shareholders to litigate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 in federal courts.  Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-JTL (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2018).  Even though the relief awarded—the invalidation of the provisions—was non-monetary and non-quantifiable, plaintiff&apos;s counsel argued that $3 million in aggregate fees was warranted because of the significance of the result achieved.  The Court agreed.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jul 2019 18:17:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Approves-3-Million-In-</guid>
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					      <title>Reversing A Dismissal, The Delaware Supreme Court Finds The Absence Of Board-Level Monitoring Of &quot;Central Compliance Risks&quot; Sufficient To State A Caremark Claim
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Reversing-A-Dismissal-The-Delaware-Supreme-Court-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 18, 2019, in a decision authored by Chief Justice Leo E. Strine Jr., the Delaware Supreme Court en banc reversed the dismissal of a stockholder derivative suit against the directors and officers of Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;).  Marchand v. Barnhill, No. 533, 2018, (Del. June 18, 2019).  After a listeria outbreak at the ice cream manufacturer, the Company purportedly faced a liquidity crisis and accepted a dilutive private equity investment.  Plaintiff alleged that the CEO and vice president of operations breached their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by disregarding contamination risks and that the directors breached their duty of loyalty under In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).  As to the claims against the executives, the Court held that the complaint adequately pleaded demand futility because it alleged facts regarding the personal relationship of an additional director to the CEO sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the director could impartially consider a demand.  Reversing the dismissal of the Caremark claim, the Court found that &quot;the complaint supports an inference that no system of board-level compliance monitoring and reporting existed at [the company].&quot;
 
]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Jun 2019 16:53:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Reversing-A-Dismissal-The-Delaware-Supreme-Court-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion To Dismiss Fiduciary Duty Breach Claims Related To Repricing Of Stock Options
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Fiduciary-Duty-Breach</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 13, 2019, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen S. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery largely denied a motion to dismiss a derivative action for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment against directors and officers of a biosciences company (the &quot;Company&quot;) in connection with the alleged repricing of stock options shortly before the company announced the issuance of a &quot;key&quot; patent to its subsidiary.  Howland  v. Kumar, C.A. No. 2018-0804-KSJM (Del. Ch. June 13, 2019).  Plaintiff, a stockholder in the Company, alleged that the directors and officers were aware of the patent issuance yet delayed the public announcement until after the board&apos;s compensation committee approved the reduction in the strike price of more than 2 million stock options primarily held by defendants.  The Court held that pre-suit demand on the board was excused, because a majority of the board was &quot;interested by virtue of having received the repriced options.&quot;  Applying an &quot;entire fairness&quot; standard of review, the Court found that it was reasonably conceivable from the pleadings that the process and price were unfair and, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss.  ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2019 14:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Fiduciary-Duty-Breach</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Grants Books And Records Request Arising From Caremark Claims Related To Facebook User Privacy
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Books-And-Records-Request-Arising-From-Caremark-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 30, 2019, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a stockholder demand to inspect Facebook&apos;s books and records in connection with their Caremark claims arising from alleged data privacy breaches.  In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig., C.A. No. 2018-0661-JRS (Del. Ch. May 30, 2019).  The Court concluded that, as a matter of law, it would be improper to assess the merits of plaintiffs&apos; Caremark claims in the context of a books-and-records demand and ruled that plaintiffs met the minimum burden of proof under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;Section 220&quot;), noting that this standard was more easily met where, as here, the underlying claims allege the failure to prevent corporate violations of law, rather than challenging routine business operations.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jun 2019 15:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Books-And-Records-Request-Arising-From-Caremark-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds Merger Agreement Preserved Sellers&apos; Ability To Assert Privilege Over Pre-Merger Attorney-Client Communications, Notwithstanding The Transfer Of Those Communications To The Buyer
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Merger-Agreement</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 29, 2019, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen S. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that plaintiff Shareholder Representative Services LLC (&quot;Shareholder Representative&quot;) as the designated representative of Radixx Solutions International, Inc.&apos;s (&quot;Radixx&quot;) selling stockholders, retained the ability to assert privilege over Radixx&apos;s pre-merger attorney-client communications in a post-closing litigation against the acquiring company, RSI Holdco, LLC (&quot;Holdco&quot;).  Shareholder Representative Services LLC v. RSI Holdco, LLC, C.A. No. 2018-0517-KSJM (Del. Ch. May 29, 2019).  Specifically, the Court held that by its plain terms the merger agreement between the parties preserved the privilege, even though the communications were physically transferred to the buyer at closing.  Therefore, the Court granted plaintiff&apos;s request for a protective order and barred Holdco from using or relying on any of Radixx&apos;s pre-merger attorney-client communications.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Jun 2019 17:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Merger-Agreement</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Judgment In Favor Of Defendant On The Basis Of Plaintiffs&apos; Failure To Prove Damages
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Judgment-In-Favor-Of-Defendant-On-The-Basis-Of-Plaintiffs-Failure</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 16, 2019, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed a judgment by Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery in favor of Potomac Capital Partners II, LP on claims by shareholder plaintiffs that the activist investor aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by the board of PLX Technology Inc. in connection with its acquisition by Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc.  In re PLX Technology Inc. S&apos;holders Litig., C.A. No. 571, 2018 (Del. May 16, 2019).  As discussed in our post regarding that decision, the Court of Chancery found in a post-trial opinion that defendant had aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty but also concluded that plaintiffs failed to prove damages because the deal price likely exceeded the standalone value and no higher bidders had emerged.  On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the Court of Chancery erred in deciding the damages issue by importing principles from appraisal jurisprudence to give deference to the deal price.  In a summary order, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery&apos;s &quot;decision that the plaintiff-appellants did not prove that they suffered damages.&quot;  The Court expressly declined to reach defendant&apos;s arguments on cross-appeal that it had not aided and abetted any breaches of fiduciary duty because its affirmance on the damages issue &quot;suffices to affirm the judgment.&quot; ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2019 14:54:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Judgment-In-Favor-Of-Defendant-On-The-Basis-Of-Plaintiffs-Failure</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Finds Limited Liability Companies Can Be Liable For Advancement To Members, Even Under Delaware Corporate Law
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Finds-Limited-Liability-Can-Be-Liable</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 30, 2019, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery held that plaintiff Freeman Family LLC (&quot;Freeman&quot;), a member of Park Avenue Landing LLC (the &quot;Company&quot;), is entitled to advancement pursuant to Delaware corporate case law.  Freeman Family LLC v. Park Avenue Landing LLC, No. C.A. 2018-0683 (Del. Ch. April 30, 2019).  In January 2017, plaintiff was sued by the Company&apos;s managing member in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (the &quot;New Jersey action&quot;).  Thereafter, plaintiff argued the Company must provide advancement of legal fees arising from the New Jersey action because its operating agreement provides that all members shall receive advancement if they are made party to an action as a result of their status as a member.  In granting plaintiff&apos;s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court first found that Delaware corporate case law applied &quot;by analogy&quot; because the advancement provision in the Company&apos;s operating agreement incorporated language from the Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 145.  However, the Court found that plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to advancement because a &quot;causal relationship&quot; existed between the New Jersey action and plaintiff&apos;s official capacity as manager.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2019 19:59:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Finds-Limited-Liability-Can-Be-Liable</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Finds Deal Price Minus Synergies As Fair Value In Aruba Networks Appraisal Appeal, Rather Than Average Preannouncement Stock Price
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Finds-Deal-Price-Minus-Synergies-As-Fair-Value-In-Aruba-Networks-Appraisal</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 16, 2019, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, held that Aruba Networks, Inc.&apos;s (&quot;Aruba&quot;) fair value in an appraisal action was $19.10 per share, reversing the Court of Chancery&apos;s valuation of $17.13 per share.  Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448-VCL (Del. Apr. 16, 2019).  As we discussed in a prior post, the Court of Chancery ruled that the thirty-day average unaffected market price was the best evidence of the fair value of Aruba in connection with its acquisition by Hewlett-Packard Company (&quot;HP&quot;).  In his opinion, Vice Chancellor Laster concluded that he was compelled by recent decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court to disregard other metrics, but expressed reservations about doing so.  Moreover, while the Court of Chancery viewed the deal price minus synergies as compelling evidence of fair value, it indicated that it could not estimate agency cost reductions to exclude from that calculation.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2019 13:57:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Finds-Deal-Price-Minus-Synergies-As-Fair-Value-In-Aruba-Networks-Appraisal</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Revives Stockholder Claims, Finding MFW Protections Were Not In Place Prior To Economic Negotiations
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Revives-Stockholder-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 5, 2019, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part a decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery that had dismissed a stockholder challenge to an all-stock business combination between Earthstone Energy, Inc. (&quot;Earthstone&quot;) and Bold Energy III LLC (&quot;Bold&quot;).  Olenik v. Lodzinski et al., No. 392, 2018 (Del. April 5, 2019).  Plaintiffs claimed that Earthstone&apos;s directors, officers, and Earthstone&apos;s alleged controlling stockholder, Oak Valley Resources, LLC (&quot;Oak Valley&quot;), breached their fiduciary duties by entering into an unfair transaction that benefited Oak Valley and EnCap Investments, L.P. (&quot;EnCap&quot;), a private equity firm with majority stakes in both Bold and Oak Valley, at the expense of Earthstone and its minority stockholders.  As discussed in our prior post on the case, the Court of Chancery dismissed the case after concluding that the transaction was properly structured under Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide, 88 A.2d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;), and the business judgment rule applied.  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, finding that Earthstone initiated economic negotiations before the requisite MFW protections were put in place.  Accordingly, the Court reinstated the breach of fiduciary claim as to the terms of the transaction; the Court sustained dismissal of the disclosure-based claim.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 15:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Revives-Stockholder-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Applies Corwin To Dismiss Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims, Finding Allegations Of A Controlling Stockholder Conflict Inadequately Pleaded
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Corwin-To-Dismiss-Breach</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On March 20, 2019, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed class action claims asserted by former shareholders of NCI, Inc. against its former directors for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the company&apos;s acquisition by affiliates of H.I.G. Capital, LLC in a tender offer followed by a merger.  
English v. Narang, C.A. No. 2018-0221-AGB (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2019).  Plaintiffs alleged that the company&apos;s founder, who held approximately 34% of the shares and controlled about 83.5% of the voting power, orchestrated a sale of the company at a discounted price to address a personal need for liquidity prompted by his retirement as the company&apos;s CEO at age 73.  But the Court found that the complaint &quot;contained no concrete facts from which it reasonably can be inferred that [the founder] had an exigent or immediate need for liquidity.&quot;  Therefore, the Court applied Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), and dismissed the claims because a majority of NCI&apos;s disinterested stockholders tendered their shares in an uncoerced and fully-informed tender offer.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2019 18:05:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Corwin-To-Dismiss-Breach</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Suit Alleging Tech Company Exposed Itself To Unnecessary Litigation Risk With Acquisition
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Suit-Alleging-Tech-Co-Exposed-Itself</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 1, 2019, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed for lack of demand a stockholder derivative suit against directors of Uber Technologies, Inc. (&quot;Uber&quot;) that asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims in connection with Uber&apos;s acquisition of self-driving car startup Ottomotto, LLC (&quot;Otto&quot;).  McElrath v. Kalanick, et al., C.A. No. 2017-0888-SG (Del. Ch. April 1, 2019).  After Uber acquired Otto, which was founded by a former Google employee, Google sued for infringement and Uber paid $245 million to resolve the claims.  Plaintiff in McElrath claimed that the Uber board violated its duties by failing to adequately investigate the Otto transaction.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2019 17:55:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Suit-Alleging-Tech-Co-Exposed-Itself</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Enjoins Stockholder Vote For Inadequate Disclosures
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Enjoins-Stockholder-Vote-For-Inadequate-Disclosures</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 11, 2019, Vice Chancellor Kathaleen S. McCormick enjoined a stockholder vote to approve the proposed combination of Medley Management, Inc. (&quot;Medley Management&quot;) with two affiliates it advised, Medley Capital Corporation (&quot;Medley Capital&quot;) and Sierra Income Corporation (&quot;Sierra&quot;).  Medley Capital stockholders FrontFour Capital Group LLC and FrontFour Master Fund, Ltd. (together, &quot;FrontFour&quot;) sued to suspend the vote until competing offers were solicited and additional proxy disclosures were made.  Plaintiffs alleged that the merger was not entirely fair because the two controlling stockholders of Medley Management controlled the deal process, and the process and the terms were unfair to Medley Capital, and further claimed that the proxy made inadequate disclosures; plaintiffs also asserted an aiding and abetting claim against Sierra.  After expedited litigation and trial, the Court enjoined the vote, ruling that corrective disclosures were necessary but that a go-shop period could not be required because Sierra&apos;s rights under the transaction agreements would be negatively impacted.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2019 14:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Enjoins-Stockholder-Vote-For-Inadequate-Disclosures</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Implicit Consent To Jurisdiction By A Foreign Controlling Stockholder In Connection With The Adoption Of A Delaware Forum-Selection Bylaw At The Time Of An Interested Transaction
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Implicit-Consent-To-Jurisdiction-By-A-Foreign-Controlling-Stockhold</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 15, 2019, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss a derivative suit brought by minority stockholders of Pilgrim&apos;s Pride Corporation (the &quot;Company&quot;) against the Company&apos;s controlling stockholder, JBS S.A. (&quot;Parent&quot;), and five of the Company&apos;s directors affiliated with Parent.  In re Pilgrim&apos;s Pride Corp. Deriv. Litig., No. C.A. 2018-0058 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2019).  Plaintiffs challenged the Company&apos;s $1.3 billion acquisition of one of Parent&apos;s other subsidiaries in a deal that Parent solicited, alleging that the Company did not engage in &quot;true arm&apos;s-length bargaining&quot; and that it paid a price unsupported by the Company&apos;s internal analyses.  Parent, an entity organized under Brazilian law, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The Court held that Parent &quot;consented implicitly&quot; to personal jurisdiction in Delaware &quot;when its representatives on the Board participated in the vote to adopt [a Delaware] Forum-Selection Bylaw.&quot;  The Court also found allegations of participation in the deal sufficient at the pleading stage to preclude dismissal of the claims against each of the Parent-affiliated directors, even though the board had delegated exclusive negotiation and approval authority to a special committee of independent directors.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2019 14:23:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Implicit-Consent-To-Jurisdiction-By-A-Foreign-Controlling-Stockhold</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds Merger Termination Valid After Plaintiffs &quot;Forgot&quot; To Provide A Notice To Extend, But Reserves Decision On Reverse Termination Fee
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Merger-Termination</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 14, 2019, after a two-day trial, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery rejected requests by plaintiff Vintage Capital Management, LLC and its affiliates for a declaration that defendant Rent-A-Center, Inc.&apos;s termination of the parties&apos; merger was ineffective and an order that the parties must proceed with the deal.  Vintage Rodeo Parent, LLC v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0927-SG (Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 2019).  Pursuant to the merger agreement, both parties had a right to provide a notice of extension by the contractual &quot;End Date.&quot;  If neither party elected to extend, then either could terminate the agreement thereafter.  Plaintiffs argued that both parties had been working toward closing the deal and had expressly recognized that the closing could not occur until after the End Date.  On this basis plaintiffs contended that the contractual notice of extension had been effectively provided or waived.  But the Court held that defendant&apos;s termination of the merger agreement after plaintiffs apparently &quot;forgot&quot; to provide a notice of extension by the End Date was valid.  However, the Court reserved judgment on defendant&apos;s counterclaim for a reverse termination fee pending supplemental briefing, noting that it was &quot;dubious whether the parties meant for a reverse breakup fee to apply in this situation.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:12:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Merger-Termination</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds A Circumstantial Connection To Negative Corporate Developments Insufficient To Trigger Inspection Rights Under Section 220
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-A-Circumstantial-connection</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 12, 2019, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a books and records demand of a mattress company&apos;s (the &quot;Company&quot;) stockholder in connection with the termination of the Company&apos;s contract with its largest customer and related litigation. Hoeller v. Tempur Sealy Int&apos;l Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0336-JRS (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2019). Plaintiff sought the records pursuant to Delaware General Corporation Law Section 220, 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220, purportedly to investigate breaches of fiduciary duty by the board. Attempting to articulate his justification, plaintiff relied on what the Court referred to as a &quot;where there&apos;s smoke there&apos;s fire syllogism&quot; in plaintiff&apos;s contention that such a significant customer does not &quot;just leave&quot; in the absence of board culpability. Rejecting the request, the Court held that a &quot;smoke then fire circumstantial connection&quot; does not provide the &quot;credible basis&quot; to suspect wrongdoing that is required to entitle a stockholder to inspect a corporation&apos;s books and records.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Mar 2019 01:41:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-A-Circumstantial-connection</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal Of Misappropriation Claims Against Private Equity Investor That Invested In A Competitor
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Misapppropriation</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 7, 2019, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an order affirming the dismissal of misappropriation claims by Alarm.com Holdings, Inc. against ABS Capital Partners Inc. (and its affiliates), a private equity firm that had a controlling interest in plaintiff and whose partners served on plaintiff&apos;s board, with one as chairman.  Alarm.com Holdings, Inc. v. ABS Capital Partners Inc., No. 360, 2018 (Del. Feb. 7, 2019).  After its subsequent initial public offering, plaintiff alleged that defendant misappropriated its confidential information by investing in a competitor and asserted claims for violation of the Delaware Uniform Trade Secrets Act (&quot;DUTSA&quot;) and common law misappropriation.  The Delaware Court of Chancery found that multiple agreements between defendant and plaintiff made it clear that defendant could invest in competitors and this fact was also evident in plaintiff&apos;s charter of corporation, which included a provision under Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;) Section 122(17) to exempt stockholders and certain directors from any duty not to pursue corporate opportunities that otherwise might arguably belong to plaintiff.  In addition, in the complaint, plaintiff &quot;relies only on [defendant&apos;s] investment in [a competitor],&quot; which was made approximately a year after defendant&apos;s representative left the board, and does not allege specific facts demonstrating the misuse of plaintiff&apos;s confidential information.  Therefore, the Court of Chancery held that the facts &quot;do not support a reasonably conceivable inference of misappropriation.&quot;  In a summary order, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on the same basis.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Feb 2019 19:40:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Misapppropriation</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Grants Stockholder&apos;s Section 220 Demand As To Certain Email, And Grants Requested Exceptions To Jurisdictional Use Restriction
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Grants-Stockholders-Section-220</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 29, 2019, in a decision authored by Chief Justice Leo E. Strine Jr., the Supreme Court of Delaware unanimously granted a stockholder petitioner&apos;s demand under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 220, 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220, to inspect the books and records of respondent Palantir Technologies Inc. for the purpose of investigating potential mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty.  KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., C.A. No. 281-2018 (Del. Jan. 29, 2019).  Previously, the Delaware Court of Chancery had issued a post-trial opinion partially granting petitioner&apos;s demand for books and records, but denying access to email and ruling that information secured in the action could not be used in litigation outside of the Delaware Court of Chancery.  Reversing in part on appeal, the Supreme Court held that respondent—which allegedly conducted board-level business electronically and did not maintain traditional board records—was required to produce certain email and granted petitioner&apos;s request for certain exceptions to the jurisdictional use restriction.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Feb 2019 19:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Grants-Stockholders-Section-220</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court of Chancery Grants Section 220 Demand By Director And Former CEO For Documents Related To His Ouster From The Company
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Grants-Section-220-Dem</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 15, 2019, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a former director&apos;s petition under 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220, demanding that Papa John&apos;s International Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) hand over various documents, including text messages and personal emails among board members, pertaining to plaintiff&apos;s removal as a director and ouster as CEO of the Company.  Schnatter v. Papa John&apos;s Int&apos;l Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0542 (Del. Ch. Jan. 15, 2019).  Following allegedly racially tinged commentary on an earning&apos;s call, plaintiff was asked to step down as CEO and later resigned as chairman of the board and was terminated as spokesman.  In granting the 220 demand, the Court rejected the Company&apos;s arguments that the demand was personally motivated and was not reasonably related to plaintiff&apos;s position as a director of the Company.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2019 18:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Grants-Section-220-Dem</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds That Equitable Defenses To Board Composition Can Be Litigated In A Section 225 Action And Rules Actions By Majority Stockholder Written Consent Effective Even Without Notice To Minority Stockholders
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-That-Equitable-Defenses-To-Board-Composition</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 21, 2018, Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied plaintiff stockholder&apos;s motion for summary judgment in an action to determine the board composition of SPAR Group, Inc. (&quot;SGRP&quot;) under 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 255.  Brown v. Kellar, et al., C.A. No. 2018-0687-MTZ (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2018).  Plaintiff claimed that written consents delivered to the SGRP board by plaintiff and a fellow majority stockholder removed and replaced an incumbent director.  The defendant directors asserted that the consents were ineffective for two reasons:  (i) the majority stockholders were engaged in an inequitable scheme to divert corporate opportunities and entrench themselves as directors, and (ii) the company had not given notice of the written consents to minority stockholders.  The Court rejected plaintiff&apos;s assertion that Delaware law prohibited the Court from considering the alleged inequitable conduct because it fell outside the proper scope of a &amp;sect; 225 action.  The Court also found, however, that the consents were effective upon delivery (unless inequitable conduct precluded replacement of the director) and ordered that trial proceed with respect to the equitable defenses raised by defendants.  
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 2019 17:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-That-Equitable-Defenses-To-Board-Composition</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Forum-Selection Charter Provision For Federal Securities Law Claims
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Forum-Selection-Charter-Provision-For-Federal-Securities-Law</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 19, 2018, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted summary judgment to a shareholder challenging the validity of forum-selection charter provisions requiring shareholders to litigate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 (the &quot;Securities Act&quot;) in federal courts.  Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-JTL (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2018).  The case involved three corporations that adopted federal forum-selection provisions for Securities Act claims in their respective certificates of incorporation prior to their initial public offerings.  Plaintiff had purchased shares of common stock in the initial public offerings (or shortly thereafter), and therefore, according to the Court, &quot;could sue under Section 11 of the [Securities] Act to address any material misstatements or omissions in the registration statements.&quot;  Without actually asserting claims for violations of the Securities Act, however, plaintiff challenged the forum-selection provisions in a declaratory judgment suit.  Reasoning that &quot;[t]he constitutive documents of a Delaware corporation cannot bind a plaintiff to a particular forum when the claim does not involve rights or relationships that were established by or under Delaware&apos;s corporate law,&quot; the Court held that the federal forum-selection provisions are &quot;ineffective and invalid.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 2019 17:38:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Forum-Selection-Charter-Provision-For-Federal-Securities-Law</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion To Dismiss Breach Of Contract Claim For Failure To Use &quot;Commercially Reasonable Efforts&quot; To Obtain Regulatory Approval For Pharmaceuticals
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Breach-of-Contract-Claim-For-Failure-To-Use-Comm</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 28, 2018, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss a breach of contract claim brought by former stockholders of Ception Therapeutics, Inc. (&quot;Ception&quot;) against pharmaceutical company Cephalon, Inc. (&quot;Cephalon&quot;), which acquired Ception, alleging violations of an earn-out provision in their merger agreement.  Himawan v. Cephalon, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0075-SG (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 2018).  Ception claimed that Cephalon failed to use &quot;commercially reasonable efforts,&quot; as defined in the merger agreement, to obtain FDA approval for an antibody as treatment for a specific medical condition.  The Court found that because the agreement defined the standard for &quot;commercially reasonable efforts&quot; objectively, with reference to the effort that would have been expended by other companies similarly situated, the question of what constituted &quot;commercially reasonable efforts&quot; could not be decided on the pleadings.  The Court also dismissed an implied covenant claim against Cephalon and tortious interference claims against Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. and its affiliates (together, &quot;Teva&quot;), which acquired Cephalon after the Cephalon-Ception merger. ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 2019 16:54:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss-Breach-of-Contract-Claim-For-Failure-To-Use-Comm</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds That Concurrent Appraisal Action Does Not Preclude Post-Closing Fiduciary Duty Breach Claims
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Concurrent</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 11, 2018, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims against the former CEO of a technology company (the &quot;Company&quot;) in connection with its take-private sale to a private equity firm.  In re Xura, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 12698-VCS (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2018).  Plaintiff alleged that the CEO was conflicted by self-interest while he steered the Company into the transaction.  As a stockholder at the time of the transaction, plaintiff simultaneously pursued appraisal of its shares of the Company.  Defendant argued that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims in light of the pending appraisal petition and, in any event, the approval by the majority of the stockholders cleansed the transaction under Corwin v. KKR Fin. Hldgs. LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).  The Court, however, held that a plaintiff seeking appraisal can nevertheless maintain breach of fiduciary duty claims related to the same transaction and that the alleged omission from the proxy of various information material to the stockholder vote precluded the application of the Corwin doctrine at the pleading stage.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Dec 2018 20:19:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Concurrent</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Demand-Refused Derivative Litigation, Notwithstanding Allegations Of Board Misrepresentations In Advance Of Demand
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Demand-Refused</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 14, 2018, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss a stockholder derivative suit asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against certain directors of Richardson Electronics (the &quot;Company&quot;).  Busch v. Richardson Electronics, Ltd., C.A. No. 2017-0868-AGB (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 2018).  The claims were based on allegations that the board improperly refused plaintiff&apos;s demand to take action to unwind certain allegedly improper related-party transactions.  Plaintiff also asserted he was misled by the board about its involvement in the underlying transactions before he issued the litigation demand.  Therefore, according to plaintiff, the motion to dismiss should have been evaluated under the test applicable when demand is excused, as articulated in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), which does not entail the same broad deference to a board&apos;s decision whether to bring claims as the standard typically applicable in demand-refused cases under Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767 (Del. 1990).  The Court rejected the argument that the Zapata standard applied but concluded that under either test plaintiff&apos;s claims were subject to dismissal. ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Dec 2018 21:10:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Demand-Refused</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Landmark Decision That Found MAE Justified Termination Of Deal
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Landmark-Decision</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 7, 2018, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s landmark ruling that Fresenius SE &amp; Co. KGaA (&quot;Fresenius&quot;) properly terminated its $4.3 billion agreement to acquire Akorn, Inc. (&quot;Akorn&quot;).  Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL (Del. Dec. 7, 2018).  As discussed in our post on the Court of Chancery&apos;s decision, Akorn sued for specific performance after Fresenius walked away from the deal citing the discovery of various regulatory compliance problems, which Fresenius asserted amounted to a material adverse effect (&quot;MAE&quot;).  The Court of Chancery concluded that Akorn violated not only multiple representations and covenants in the merger agreement but also the general MAE provision, ruling that an MAE had occurred and termination of the deal was justified.  Concluding that the factual record adequately supported the determination that Akorn&apos;s breach of its regulatory representations and warranties gave rise to an MAE and that Akorn had suffered a general MAE, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Akorn&apos;s claims.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Dec 2018 19:42:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Landmark-Decision</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Declines To Dismiss Fiduciary Duty Breach Claims In Connection With Take-Private Acquisition Of Recently Delisted Company
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Dismiss-Fiduciary-Duty-Breach-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 20, 2018, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a putative class action asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought by former stockholders of Tangoe, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) against former members of its board of directors in connection with the take-private acquisition of the Company by a private equity buyer group in June 2017.  In Re Tangoe, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0650-JRS (Del Ch. Nov. 20, 2018).  Plaintiffs alleged that defendants recommended an ill-advised and self-interested sale while a restatement of audited financials was pending and following the NASDAQ delisting of the Company.  Defendants contended that they were entitled to business judgment rule deference under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015)—because a majority of stockholders tendered their shares—and that dismissal was also required because of an exculpatory charter provision pursuant to 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 102(b)(7).  But the Court concluded that the alleged failures to provide adequate company financial information and to disclose the status of the restatement efforts precluded dismissal under Corwin.  The Court also found that plaintiffs adequately pled a non-exculpated claim for breach of the duty of loyalty, given the timing and structure of certain director compensation adjustments, which allegedly incentivized a change in control and supported an inference that defendants acted out of material self-interest.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Nov 2018 16:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Dismiss-Fiduciary-Duty-Breach-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>New York Appellate Court Reverses Dismissal Of Derivative Claims Involving U.K. Company
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Appellate-Court-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-Derivative-Claims-Involving-UK-Company</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 14, 2018, the New York State Appellate Division Second Judicial Department reversed the dismissal of a shareholder derivative suit against directors and officers of a U.K. company and certain of its affiliates asserting claims for breaches of fiduciary duties in connection with the companies&apos; conduct underlying penalties and settlement agreements related to alleged sanctions violations.  Michael Mason-Mahon v. Douglas J. Flint, 602052/14 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 14, 2018).  ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Nov 2018 17:56:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Appellate-Court-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-Derivative-Claims-Involving-UK-Company</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds Alleged Breaches Of Representations Do Not Excuse Buyers&apos; Noncompliance With Post-Closing Obligations Where Buyers Seek To Enforce Claims For Indemnification
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Alleged-Breaches-Representations-not-excuse-noncompliance</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 29, 2018, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery entered final judgment on counterclaims seeking to enforce covenants in a stock purchase agreement requiring the buyers to remit certain tax refunds and insurance proceeds. Post Holdings, Inc. and Michael Foods of Delaware, Inc. v. NPE Seller Rep LLC, C.A. No. 2017-0772 AGB (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2018). National Pasteurized Eggs, Inc. (&quot;NPE&quot;) was sold pursuant to a stock purchase agreement. Thereafter, the buyers initiated an action asserting claims for fraud and breaches of representations and warranties, seeking indemnification under the agreement. The sellers filed counterclaims to enforce covenants in the agreement requiring the buyers to remit certain tax refunds and insurance proceeds. The buyers argued that their obligation to remit such proceeds &quot;should be excused&quot; because of the sellers&apos; alleged prior material breach. Granting judgment on the pleadings to the buyers, the Court held that &quot;buyers cannot continue to accept the benefits of the contract—as they seek to do in this action through their claim for indemnification—while disclaiming their contractual obligation to remit the tax refunds and insurance proceeds to the sellers promptly after they were received.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Nov 2018 15:59:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Alleged-Breaches-Representations-not-excuse-noncompliance</guid>
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					      <title>Finding Insufficient Proof Of Damages, Delaware Court Of Chancery Enters Judgment In Favor Of Defendant Despite Finding Fiduciary Duty Breaches
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-Insufficient-Proof-Of-Damages-Delaware-Court-of-chancery-enters-judgment-in-favor-of-defenda</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 16, 2018, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery found in a post-trial opinion that Potomac Capital Partners II, LP (&quot;Potomac&quot;), an activist investor, aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by the board of PLX Technology Inc. (&quot;PLX&quot;) in connection with its acquisition by Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc. (&quot;Avago&quot;), but entered judgment in favor of Potomac because plaintiffs failed to show causally related damages.  In re PLX Technology Inc. S&apos;holders Litig., C.A. No. 9880-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018).  After the deal closed, plaintiffs alleged that the sale process was unreasonably influenced by Potomac&apos;s managing member, who became a director of PLX and chaired the special committee charged with exploring strategic alternatives for the company.  As discussed in our prior post, see Shearman &amp; Sterling LLP, Declining To Find Enhanced Scrutiny Inapplicable To Post-Closing Damages Actions, Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion For Summary Judgment, Need-to-Know Litigation Weekly, Feb. 21, 2018, https://www.lit-ma.shearman.com/declining-to-find-enhanced-scrutiny-inapplicable-, the Court previously denied a summary judgment motion filed by Potomac, finding that the PLX board&apos;s actions in connection with the sale were subject to enhanced scrutiny and disputes of material fact existed as to whether the sale process was reasonable.  Following trial, the Court concluded that although Potomac aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by PLX&apos;s board, plaintiffs had failed to prove damages because the deal price likely exceeded the standalone value and no higher bidders had emerged.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Oct 2018 14:41:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-Insufficient-Proof-Of-Damages-Delaware-Court-of-chancery-enters-judgment-in-favor-of-defenda</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Holds That Business Judgment Rule Applies To Controller Transactions As Long As MFW Conditions Are In Place Prior To Economic Negotiation
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-That-Business-Judgment</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 9, 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissing a lawsuit brought by stockholders of Synutra International Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) challenging a controlling stockholder&apos;s takeover of the Company.  Flood v. Synutra Int&apos;l, Inc., No. 101, 2018 (Del. Oct. 9, 2018).  Plaintiffs asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims and argued that the transaction did not meet the requirements of Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;) for business judgment review because the controller group&apos;s initial proposal did not contain the MFW conditions—recommendation by a special committee and approval by a majority of the disinterested stockholders—although they were added later.  As discussed in our prior post on this case, the Court of Chancery applied business judgment review (rather than entire fairness review) and dismissed the complaint because the controller announced the conditions before any negotiations took place.  Affirming, the Delaware Supreme Court confirmed that MFW does not require that the conditions be included in the controller&apos;s first offer, but instead that the controller condition its offer on the two key procedural protections &quot;early in the process—i.e., before any substantive economic negotiations begin.&quot;  The Court also clarified that the sufficiency of the price is not subject to evaluation under the business judgment standard and affirmed the Court of Chancery&apos;s finding that plaintiffs failed to allege that the Company&apos;s special committee acted with gross negligence with respect to the negotiations.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Oct 2018 15:58:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-That-Business-Judgment</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rules For The First Time That MAE Justifies Termination Of Deal
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rules-For-The-First-Time</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
In a first-of-its-kind ruling, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled post-trial that Fresenius SE &amp; Co. KGaA (&quot;Fresenius&quot;) properly terminated its $4.3 billion agreement to acquire Akorn, Inc. (&quot;Akorn&quot;).  Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, Quercus Acquisition, Inc., and Fresenius SE &amp; Co. KGaA, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018).  Fresenius walked away from the deal after discovering various data integrity and regulatory compliance problems, asserting that the issues were so serious that they amounted to a material adverse effect (&quot;MAE&quot;).  Akorn sued for specific performance, alleging that Fresenius was merely suffering from buyer&apos;s remorse.  Vice Chancellor Laster concluded that Akorn violated not only multiple representations and covenants in the merger agreement but also the general MAE provision, ruling that an MAE had occurred.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Oct 2018 14:37:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rules-For-The-First-Time</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion To Exclude Post-Signing Evidence
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Exclude</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 7, 2018, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to exclude certain documents relating to Jarden Corporation&apos;s (&quot;Jarden&quot;) post-signing financial performance offered as evidence during a statutory appraisal trial.  In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, C.A. No. 12456-VCS (Del. Ch. Sep. 7, 2018).  Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. (&quot;Newell&quot;) acquired Jarden pursuant to a merger agreement executed on December 13, 2015, in a deal that closed on April 15, 2016.  Petitioners filed for appraisal on June 14, 2016.  At trial, petitioners objected to the admission of certain documents relating to Jarden&apos;s post-signing financial performance.  Rejecting petitioners&apos; relevancy objection, the Court determined that &quot;[t]he post-signing financial documents address the condition of Jarden during a timeframe relevant to the &apos;fair value&apos; determination.&quot;  In making the relevancy determination, the Court relied on prior cases indicating that a change in value between signing and closing should be addressed in an appraisal analysis because &quot;fair value&quot; must be measured by the &quot;operative reality&quot; of the corporation at the effective time of the merger.  However, the Court highlighted that it had not yet determined &quot;[w]hat weight, if any, the evidence will be given in the Court&apos;s deliberations.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Oct 2018 18:58:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Exclude</guid>
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					      <title>Finding That The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Could Not Import Revlon-Type Duties, Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal Of Breach Claim
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-That-The-Implied-Covenant-Of-Good-Faith-and-Fair-Dealing-Could-Not-Import-Revlon-Type-Duties</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 20, 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing brought against the controlling unitholder and its affiliates on the board of a company that provides services to children with disabilities in connection with the sale of that company.  Miller v. HCP Trumpet Investments, LLC, No. 107, 2018 (Del. Sept. 20, 2018).  Pursuant to a waterfall set forth in the company&apos;s operating agreement (the &quot;OA&quot;), the controlling investor was entitled to nearly all of the first $30 million in proceeds in the event of a sale.  The OA, which included an explicit waiver of fiduciary duties, provided that the board could approve a sale of the company to an independent third party and &quot;determine in its sole discretion the manner in which [such sale] shall occur, whether as a sale of assets, merger, transfer of [m]embership [i]nterests or otherwise.&quot;  After the company was sold for $43 million, minority members sued for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, arguing that it imposed an obligation to conduct an &quot;open-market&quot; sale process to ensure maximum value for all members.  Although the Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s holding that the implied covenant did not apply to the sale, the Court affirmed the dismissal on the basis that the implied covenant did not imply Revlon-type sale requirements.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Sep 2018 15:48:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-That-The-Implied-Covenant-Of-Good-Faith-and-Fair-Dealing-Could-Not-Import-Revlon-Type-Duties</guid>
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					      <title>District Of Delaware Finds Successful Section 220 Action Tolled Claims For Alleged Mismanagement
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/District-Of-Delaware-Finds-Successful-Section-220-Action-Tolled</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 4, 2018, Judge Leonard P. Stark of the United States District Court for District of Delaware ruled that a shareholder&apos;s separate Section 220 action for books and records tolled claims against the managing shareholder.  Norman v. Elkin, C.A. No. 06-005-LPS (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2018).  Plaintiff, the only minority shareholder of U.S. Mobilecomm, Inc. (&quot;USM&quot;), brought various contract, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty claims against USM&apos;s majority shareholder—who managed the affairs of the company—in connection with the sale of company assets and the subsequent distributions of the proceeds.  Explaining that there is &quot;no hard and fast rule&quot; under Delaware law for determining whether a Section 220 action tolls a statute of limitations, the Court considered various factors and held that plaintiff met its burden to demonstrate that tolling should apply.  In particular, the Court highlighted that the Section 220 action sought to investigate possible mismanagement related to the asset sales and distributions of proceeds and the claims subsequently advanced &quot;were related to that information.&quot;]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2018 15:14:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/District-Of-Delaware-Finds-Successful-Section-220-Action-Tolled</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion To Dismiss LPA Breach Claims, Including Aiding And Abetting Claim Against Financial Advisor
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 29, 2018, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied defendants&apos; motions to dismiss an amended complaint in a long-running lawsuit arising from a sale of an interest in a pipeline by a general partner to a master limited partnership in which it held a controlling interest.  Mesirov v. Enbridge Energy Co. Inc., C.A. No. 11314 (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2018).  Plaintiff, a common unitholder of a Delaware master limited partnership (the &quot;MLP&quot;), brought claims for breach of the MLP&apos;s Limited Partnership Agreement (&quot;LPA&quot;) against the general partner (the &quot;GP&quot;), its parent, and other affiliates.  Plaintiff alleged that the GP acted in bad faith by purportedly selling the interest for $1 billion even though it had previously acquired the same interest from the MLP five years earlier for $800 million and earnings metrics had declined over the period by 20%.  As discussed in our previous post, Vice Chancellor Slights originally dismissed this suit in April 2016, but the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded in March 2017, holding that bad faith was sufficiently pleaded.  Here, Vice Chancellor Slights denied the GP&apos;s motion to dismiss claims for breach of the LPA, finding them to be duplicative of the claims in the motion rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2017.  Vice Chancellor Slights also declined to dismiss new claims for aiding and abetting against the GP&apos;s financial advisor, which had delivered a fairness opinion regarding the transaction.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 05 Sep 2018 17:10:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Motion-To-Dismiss</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Validates Ratification Of Defective Corporate Acts Impacting Merger And Declines To Expand Universe Of Claims Classified As Both Direct And Derivative
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Validates-Ratification</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 17, 2018, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied all of plaintiffs&apos; claims challenging a series of transactions culminating in the acquisition of defendant Design Within Reach, Inc. (&quot;DWR&quot;) by Herman Miller, Inc. (&quot;HM&quot;) in July 2014.  Charles Almond as Trustee for the Almond Family 2001 Trust v. Glenhill Advisors LLC, C.A. No. 10477-CB (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2018).  The claims related in large part to the documentation of a reverse stock split by DWR in 2010 that had the unintended effect of diluting the number of shares of common stock into which preferred stock could be converted by a factor of 50.  As this went unnoticed until after the merger, the preferred stock was converted into common stock as if there had been no error.  Plaintiffs, who were pre-merger minority stockholders of DWR, asserted various claims that defendants, including DWR&apos;s controlling stockholder, thus improperly benefited from a greater percentage of equity and merger consideration than that to which they were legally entitled.  HM ratified the correction of the conversion factor (pursuant to 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 204) and asserted a counterclaim for judicial validation of the defective corporate acts (under 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 205).  Finding all relevant factors weighed &quot;overwhelmingly in favor of judicial validation&quot; the Court granted defendants&apos; request to validate the defective corporate acts and rejected plaintiffs&apos; claims.  Separately, the Court rejected breach of fiduciary duty claims unrelated to the merger.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Aug 2018 16:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Validates-Ratification</guid>
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					      <title>Finding Merger Agreement Provisions Regarding Milestone Payments Ambiguous, Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Dismissal Of Post-Merger Breach Claims
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-Merger-Agreement-Provisions-Regarding-Milestone-Payments-Ambiguous</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 10, 2018, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss breach of contract claims stemming from a merger agreement pursuant to which defendant, Stora Enso AB, acquired non-party, Virdia, Inc.  Fortis Advisors LLC v. Stora Enso Ab, C.A. No. 12291-VCS (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2018).  Plaintiff, Fortis Advisors LLC, as shareholder representative of Virdia&apos;s pre-merger equity holders, asserted that Stora Enso breached the merger agreement in connection with its failure to achieve certain post-closing milestones obligating it to make certain contingent milestone payments.  Finding competing interpretations of the merger agreement both reasonable, the Court declined to dismiss the breach claims. ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Aug 2018 18:59:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-Merger-Agreement-Provisions-Regarding-Milestone-Payments-Ambiguous</guid>
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					      <title>Southern District Of New York Denies Claims For Investment Banking Fees, Holding That The Engagement Terminated And The &quot;Agreement To Agree&quot; Was Unenforceable
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Southern-District-Of-New-York-Denies-Claims-For-Investment-Banking-Fees</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 10, 2018, Judge Jesse Furman of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied claims for advisory fees brought by investment bank Stone Key Partners LLC (together with Stone Key Securities LLC, &quot;Stone Key&quot;) against its former client, Monster Worldwide, Inc. (&quot;Monster&quot;).  Stone Key Partners LLC v. Monster Worldwide, Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-3851-JMF (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2018).  Monster engaged Stone Key in April 2012 to assist in a &quot;review of strategic alternatives,&quot; including a possible sale, and agreed to compensate Stone Key if it entered into certain transactions within 12 months of any termination of the engagement; Monster engaged another financial institution as a co-advisor.  The engagement letter with Stone Key did not clearly require written notice of termination and provided that Stone Key would be paid 55% of a fee that &quot;shall be mutually acceptable . . . and consistent with compensation agreements customarily agreed to by&quot; investment banks for similar transactions in connection with any &quot;partial sale&quot; transaction within the tail period.  The Court found that the engagement ended in August 2013, when it was clear (in the eyes of the Court) that the sale exploration process was over, and thus denied claims for transactions completed in 2015 and 2016.  The Court also rejected as unenforceable the partial sale fee provision, finding it to be an unenforceable agreement to agree.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Aug 2018 18:58:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Southern-District-Of-New-York-Denies-Claims-For-Investment-Banking-Fees</guid>
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					      <title>Applying Dell  and DFC, Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds &quot;Fair Value&quot; Is Deal Price Less Synergies In Appraisal Action
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Applying-Dell-And-DFC-Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 30, 2018, Chancellor Andre Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery determined that the deal price minus synergies was the best evidence of the fair value of Solera Holdings, Inc. (&quot;Solera&quot;) in an appraisal action arising from the acquisition of Solera by Vista Equity Partners.  In re Solera Holdings Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 12080-CB (Del Ch. July 30, 2018).  Applying recent guidance from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Court found that the deal price should be afforded &quot;dispositive&quot; weight because the transaction process was characterized by &quot;objective indicia of reliability,&quot; including a robust sales process directed by an independent special committee and an efficient market for Solera shares.  Accordingly, the Court found petitioners were entitled to $53.95 per share, consisting of the deal price ($55.85 per share) less the value of merger synergies ($1.90 per share).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Aug 2018 18:47:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Applying-Dell-And-DFC-Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Grants Minority Stockholder&apos;s Section 220 Demand As To Emails But Denies Access To Merger-Related Drafts
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Minority-Stockholders</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 30, 2018, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery partially granted a Section 220 demand for the books and records of Globalstar, Inc. brought by the company&apos;s largest minority stockholder, Mudrick Capital Management, L.P.  Mudrick Cap. Mgmt, L.P. v. Globalstar, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0351-TMR (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018).  The demand arose in the context of a pending merger between Globalstar and Thermo Acquisitions, Inc., an entity controlled by Globalstar&apos;s CEO and controlling stockholder.  The parties did not dispute that Mudrick Capital&apos;s demand was based on several proper purposes in connection with evaluating certain aspects of the merger and Globalstar agreed to produce various categories of documents.  Resolving remaining disputes about the scope of the production, however, the Court held that emails were subject to production, but denied the demand for draft board minutes and other draft materials.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Aug 2018 18:18:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Minority-Stockholders</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Applies MFW  To Stockholder Challenge To An All-Stock Transaction With Allegedly Controlling Stockholder
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-MFW-To-Stockholder</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 20, 2018, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a stockholder challenge to an all-stock business combination between Earthstone Energy, Inc. (&quot;Earthstone&quot;) and Bold Energy III LLC (&quot;Bold&quot;).  Olenik v. Lodzinski, et al., C.A. No. 2017-0414 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2018).  Plaintiffs claimed that Earthstone&apos;s directors, officers, and an allegedly controlling stockholder, Oak Valley Resources, LLC (&quot;Oak Valley&quot;), breached their fiduciary duties by entering into an unfair transaction that benefited Oak Valley and EnCap Investments, L.P. (&quot;EnCap&quot;), a private equity firm with majority stakes in both Bold and Oak Valley, at the expense of Earthstone and its minority stockholders.  Plaintiffs argued that, because EnCap was a majority stockholder in Oak Valley, and thus also a beneficial controlling stockholder in Earthstone, as well as a majority stockholder in Bold, Oak Valley and EnCap stood on both sides of the transaction, making it unfair.  The Court dismissed plaintiffs&apos; claims, concluding that, because Earthstone structured the transaction in the manner prescribed by Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;), the business judgment rule standard of review applied.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jul 2018 15:37:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-MFW-To-Stockholder</guid>
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					      <title>Finding Disclosures Inadequate To Merit Application Of Corwin, Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Court of Chancery Dismissal Of Post-Closing Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-Disclosures-Inadequate-To-Merit-Application</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 9, 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery to dismiss stockholder class claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought against the former directors of The Fresh Market (TFM) after its acquisition in a two-step take-private merger by affiliates of Apollo Global Management, LLC (&quot;Apollo&quot;).  Morrison v. Berry, No. 445, 2017 (Del. July 9, 2018).  As discussed in our prior post on this case, the Court of Chancery dismissed claims that the sale process undertaken by TFM was a &quot;sham&quot; designed by TFM&apos;s founder to deliver the company into the hands of a favored suitor.  Specifically, the Court of Chancery concluded that the facts regarding the involvement of TFM&apos;s founder with Apollo were adequately disclosed in connection with the tender offer—in which 68.2% of shares were tendered—and the deal was therefore subject to the deferential business judgment rule under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).  Finding that the complaint adequately alleged several &quot;materially incomplete and misleading&quot; disclosures, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jul 2018 18:08:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-Disclosures-Inadequate-To-Merit-Application</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Allegations Of A Controlling Stockholder Group Sufficient To Preclude Dismissal Of Merger-Related Fiduciary Duty Breach Claims</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Allegations</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On June 18, 2018, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss claims of breach of fiduciary duty brought by a putative class of minority stockholders of Hansen Medical Inc. (&quot;Hansen&quot;) against an alleged group of controlling stockholders, in connection with the squeeze-out merger of Hansen into Auris Surgical Robotics, Inc. (&quot;Auris&quot;). In re Hansen Medical, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 12316-VCMR (Del. Ch. June 18, 2018).]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Jun 2018 19:20:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Allegations</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Court Of Chancery, Finding That General Partner Complied With Obligations Under Limited Partnership Agreement</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Court-Of-Chancery</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[On June 8, 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s dismissal of a putative class action challenging the merger of El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P. (the &quot;MLP&quot;) with a subsidiary of its general partner, El Paso Pipeline GP Company, L.L.C. (the &quot;GP&quot;), all of which were controlled by defendant Kinder Morgan, Inc.

Read more.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Jun 2018 16:55:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Court-Of-Chancery</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Appraisal Rights For Stockholders Of Merger Parent, Even When Transaction Results In Sale Of Control Over The Surviving Corporation.</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Appraisal-Rights</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 25, 2018, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard dismissed a class action lawsuit brought by stockholders of Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. (&quot;Dr. Pepper&quot;) against the company and its directors asserting that the merger with Maple Parent Holdings Corp. (&quot;Maple Parent&quot;), the parent company of Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., deprived them of their statutory appraisal rights.  City of North Miami Beach General Employee&apos;s Retirement Plan v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0227-AGB (Del. Ch. June 1, 2018).  Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Pepper&apos;s directors breached their fiduciary duties, and the corporation violated Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, when Dr. Pepper filed a proxy statement that informed stockholders that they were not entitled to appraisal rights in connection with the proposed merger.

Read more.]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:27:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Appraisal-Rights</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies Standard For Contract Formation, Reversing And Remanding Court Of Chancery Decision On Enforceability
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Clarifies-Standard-For-Contract</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 24, 2018, in an opinion by Justice Karen L. Valihura, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissing breach of contract and related claims.  Eagle Force Holdings, LLC, et al. v. Campbell, C.A. No. 10803-VCMR (Del. May 24, 2018).  As discussed in our prior post on this case, the Court of Chancery found that a limited liability company agreement and associated contribution agreement under which plaintiff-appellant purported to bring claims were not binding because they lacked several &quot;essential&quot; terms.  Reversing, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the agreements &quot;sufficiently address[ed] all issues identified by the trial court as material to the parties.&quot;  But the Court remanded for reconsideration of the evidence to make a finding on the parties&apos; &quot;intent to be bound.&quot;

Read more]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Jun 2018 19:02:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Clarifies-Standard-For-Contract</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Reaffirms Decision That &quot;Fair Value&quot; For Appraisal Was The Unaffected Market Price, Based On Dell And DFC
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Reaffirms-Decision-That</link>
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On May 21, 2018, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery reaffirmed the Court&apos;s earlier ruling that the best evidence of the fair value of Aruba Networks, Inc. (&quot;Aruba&quot;) for purposes of appraisal in connection with its acquisition by Hewlett-Packard Company (&quot;HP&quot;) was Aruba&apos;s 30-day average unaffected market price ($17.13 per share), notwithstanding the deal price ($24.67 per share).  Verition v. Aruba Networks, C.A. No. 11448-VCL (Del. Ch. May 21, 2018).  As we discussed in our post regarding the prior decision, the Court made that determination by applying the efficient market hypothesis espoused by the Delaware Supreme Court in Dell and DFC, but seemed to express reservations about doing so.  Petitioners moved for reargument, contending the Court misapprehended the law and facts, in part due to &quot;frustration&quot; with the Delaware Supreme Court&apos;s recent pronouncements on appraisal in those two cases.  In this new decision denying the motion for reargument, the Court explained that it viewed &quot;the Delaware Supreme Court&apos;s endorsement of the efficient capital markets hypothesis and its emphasis on market indicators over the subjective views of knowledgeable insiders as altering the decisional landscape and authorizing greater reliance on market value.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Wed, 30 May 2018 18:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Court Of Chancery Appraisal Determination At Nearly 60% Discount To Deal Price
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Court-Of-Chancery-</link>
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On April 23, 2018, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed a decision by Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery appraising the shares of Clearwire Corporation at $2.13 per share, notwithstanding that Clearwire was acquired for $5.00 per share.  ACP Master, Ltd., et al. v. Sprint Corporation, et al. &amp; ACP Master, Ltd., et al. v. Clearwire Corporation, C.A. No. 8508-VCL, C.A. No. 9042-VCL (Del. Apr. 23, 2018).  As discussed in our post regarding that decision, stockholder petitioners had challenged the merger of Clearwire with Sprint Nextel Corporation, alleging that Sprint had been a controlling shareholder of Clearwire prior to the transaction and had breached its fiduciary duties during merger negotiations.  Petitioners also sought appraisal, asserting that the $5.00 deal price substantially undervalued their shares.  As we highlighted previously, the Court of Chancery found no breach of fiduciary duties even under an entire fairness standard and determined that fair value of the shares amounted to $2.13, even though that price reflected nearly a 60% discount to the deal price.  With regard to the breach claims, the Court of Chancery concluded that instances of unfair dealing in an early phase of the process were &quot;render[ed] immaterial&quot; in light of subsequent arm&apos;s-length negotiations and &quot;overwhelming evidence&quot; that the final deal price was fair.   As to the appraisal finding, the Court of Chancery explained that the appraisal statute requires the exclusion of &quot;any synergies present in the deal price&quot; and was persuaded by the discounted cash flow analysis offered by defendants&apos; expert.  The Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed without issuing an opinion.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2018 15:03:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>New York Supreme Court Dismisses Derivate Suit, Finding That Shareholder&apos;s Letter Constituted A Demand And Business Judgment Rule Applied
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Supreme-Court-Dismisses-Derivate-Suit-Finding</link>
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On March 23, 2018, Justice Charles E. Ramos of the Commercial Division of the New York Supreme Court dismissed with prejudice a purported derivative suit alleging that the board of Intercept Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (&quot;Intercept&quot;) breached their duty of loyalty and good faith and squandered corporate assets by approving, without a stockholder vote, a non-employee director compensation policy.  Solak v. Fundaro, No. 655205 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 2018).  Though plaintiff sent a letter to Intercept prior to filing suit, demanding that the company take &quot;all action necessary&quot; to remedy the waste allegedly caused by the directors&apos; compensation policy, plaintiff argued that the letter was not a demand within the meaning of Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, and that demand would have been futile because self-compensation decisions are inherently conflicted transactions.  The Court held that plaintiff&apos;s letter fulfilled all the requirements of a demand under Delaware law and that the board&apos;s investigation of and response to the demand was sound under the business judgment rule.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Apr 2018 19:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Corwin Motion To Dismiss, Finding Allegations Of Control Adequately Pleaded As To 22% Stockholder
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Corwin-Motion-To</link>
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On March 28, 2018, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss several derivative and class action claims brought by stockholders of Tesla, Inc. (&quot;Tesla&quot;) asserting that its directors breached their fiduciary duties in connection with its acquisition of SolarCity.  In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 12711-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018).  Plaintiffs claimed the acquisition was an effort to rescue a distressed SolarCity to the detriment of Tesla stockholders, allegedly at the direction of Elon Musk, Tesla&apos;s Chairman and CEO, who held 22.1% of Tesla&apos;s common stock and was also SolarCity&apos;s Chairman and largest stockholder.  Defendants contended that the claims were subject to dismissal pursuant to Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), in light of the approval of the deal by a majority of Tesla&apos;s disinterested stockholders.  Plaintiffs argued that Corwin was inapplicable because the acquisition allegedly involved a conflicted controlling stockholder.  Declining to dismiss the claims, the Court explained that, notwithstanding his minority stake, the allegations demonstrated &quot;extraordinary influence&quot; and the complaint adequately pleaded that Musk &quot;exercised his influence as a controlling stockholder with respect to the [a]cquisition.&quot; 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Apr 2018 18:59:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Superior Court Of Delaware Rules That Delaware Public Policy Does Not Prohibit Indemnification For Breach Of Duty Of Loyalty Based On Fraud
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Superior-Court-Of-Delaware-Rules-That-Delaware-Public</link>
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On March 1, 2018, Judge Eric M. Davis of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware denied in part and granted in part the summary judgment motion brought by plaintiff-insurers, which provided directors and officers liability insurance coverage to Dole Food Company, Inc. (&quot;Dole&quot;) and sought a declaratory judgment that they were not obligated to fund the settlement of fiduciary duty claims against the defendant-insureds.  Arch Ins. Co. v. Murdock, No. N16C-01-104 EMD CCLD (Del. Super. Mar. 1, 2018).  The Court rejected the insurers&apos; argument that Delaware public policy prohibited indemnification for liability resulting from breaches of fiduciary duty based on fraudulent conduct, the basis of the claims against the insureds (including David Murdock, Dole&apos;s former CEO who took the company private in 2013, and Michael Charter, Dole&apos;s former COO) litigated in the Delaware Court of Chancery in In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litigation., C.A. No. 8703-VCL, 2015 WL 5052214 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (&quot;In re Dole&quot;).  The Superior Court also found that the parties were collaterally estopped from re-litigating factual matters decided in In re Dole, declined to rule on plaintiffs&apos; breach of contract defenses and defendants&apos; bad faith counterclaims, and dismissed defendants&apos; fraudulent inducement claims. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2018 21:05:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Relies On Corwin To Dismiss Post-Closing Fiduciary Duty Claims After Finding Acquiror Was Not A Controlling Stockholder
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Relies-On-Corwin-To-Dismiss</link>
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On March 9, 2018, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III, of the Delaware Court of Chancery, dismissed a stockholder class action complaint seeking damages for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by directors of Rouse Properties Inc. (&quot;Rouse&quot;) and its 33.5% stockholder, Brookfield Asset Management, Inc. (&quot;Brookfield&quot;), arising out of Rouse&apos;s merger with Brookfield in 2016. In Re Rouse Properties, Inc. Fiduciary Litigation, C.A. No. 12194-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018). Plaintiffs, pre-merger stockholders of Rouse, alleged that breaches of fiduciary duty by a special committee of the Rouse board that negotiated the deal, and Brookfield, as an alleged controlling stockholder, led to a transaction that grossly undervalued Rouse. The Court found that the complaint did not come even &quot;remotely close&quot; to pleading that Brookfield exercised the &quot;managerial clout and retributive power to infer actual control.&quot; Concluding that Brookfield was not a controlling stockholder, the Court dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claims against Brookfield and, in light of the approval of the deal by a majority of the disinterested stockholders, applied the business judgment rule in accordance with Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), to dismiss the claims against the special committee directors as well.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2018 17:29:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Delaware Court Of Chancery&apos;s Dismissal Of Fiduciary Duty Breach Claims, Finding Non-Exculpated Claim Inadequately Pled 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismissal</link>
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On March 15, 2018, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s dismissal of a putative stockholder class action asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty and quasi-appraisal against the directors of Kreisler Manufacturing Corporation (&quot;Kreisler&quot;) in connection with Kreisler&apos;s sale to Arlington Capital Partners (&quot;Arlington&quot;). Kahn v. Stern, No. 393, 2017 (Del. March 15, 2018). As discussed in our post regarding that decision, plaintiffs argued that merger consideration was improperly diverted into payments for two management directors. In a short order, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on the basis that the pled facts did not support a rational inference that these payments were improperly diverted. Kahn v. Stern, C.A. No. 12498-VCG (Del. Ch. Aug. 28, 2017). However, the Supreme Court expressed its disagreement with the Court of Chancery&apos;s opinion &quot;to the extent&quot; that it &quot;suggests that it is an invariable requirement that a plaintiff plead facts suggesting that a majority of the board committed a non-exculpated breach of its fiduciary duties in cases where Revlon duties are applicable, but the transaction has closed and the plaintiff seeks post-closing damages.&quot; The Court noted that Revlon duties remain applicable notwithstanding an exculpatory charter provision even though directors may only be held liable for a non-exculpated breach of those duties.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2018 17:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Stay Of Columbia Pipeline Appraisal, Finding That Pendency Of An Appeal Of Aruba Networks Did Not Warrant A Stay
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Stay-Of-Columbia</link>
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On March 7, 2018, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to stay or extend discovery filed by an appraisal petitioner in light of Vice Chancellor Laster&apos;s recent ruling in Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc. (the subject of a prior post).  In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., C.A. No. 12736-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2018).  Vice Chancellor Laster rejected petitioners&apos; assertion that Aruba Networks created a &quot;cloud of uncertainty&quot; about the evidence considered and standards applied in Delaware appraisal proceedings, and held that the Court&apos;s reliance on unaffected market price to determine fair value was in line with the Delaware Supreme Court&apos;s decisions in DFC and Dell.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Mar 2018 20:07:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Challenge To Books And Records Demand, Holding That Evidence From Qui Tam Action Demonstrated &quot;Credible Basis&quot; From Which To Infer Wrongdoing
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Challenge-To-Books</link>
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On February 28, 2018, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted stockholders&apos; Section 220 demand to inspect the books and records of UnitedHealth Group Inc. (&quot;UnitedHealth&quot;) in order to investigate allegedly fraudulent Medicare billing practices.  In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. Sec. 220 Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0681-TMR (Del. Ch. Feb. 28 2018).  The Court held that plaintiffs could rely on evidence cited by the government in a qui tam complaint against UnitedHealth to demonstrate a &quot;credible basis&quot; from which to infer wrongdoing or mismanagement so as to justify authorizing the Section 220 demand in part. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Mar 2018 19:42:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims In Connection With Publication Of Non-Final Drug Trial Results For Lack Of Demand Futility
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-Breach</link>
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On February 28, 2018, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed claims against the directors of Orexigen Therapeutics Inc. (&quot;Orexigen&quot;) for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the company&apos;s clinical drug trials.  Orexigen Therapeutics Inc. v. Michael A. Narachi, et al., C.A. No. 12412-VCMR (De. Ch. Feb. 28, 2018).  Plaintiffs asserted that the directors violated the law because they failed to follow best practices with respect to clinical trials; consequently, plaintiffs argued that demand was futile because a majority of the board faced substantial risk of liability.  The Court dismissed these claims, finding that the Company&apos;s actions were not &quot;so egregious or irrational&quot; as to violate the business judgment rule and, accordingly, demand futility had not been adequately pleaded.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Mar 2018 18:48:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Uses DCF Analysis To Arrive At Fair Value Below Deal Price, Even Though Deal Process Was Not &quot;Dell Compliant&quot;
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Uses-DCF-Analysis-To-Arrive</link>
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​On February 23, 2018, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled, based on his own discounted cash flow (&quot;DCF&quot;) analysis, that the fair value of AOL Inc. (&quot;AOL&quot;) was below the deal price paid by Verizon Communications Inc. (&quot;Verizon&quot;) to acquire it.  In re: Appraisal of AOL Inc., C.A. 11204-VCG.  The Court reached this conclusion after finding that the deal process was not &quot;Dell Compliant&quot;—a newly coined phrase—because various deal protections and statements by AOL&apos;s CEO may have discouraged other potential buyers who would have paid more to acquire AOL.  Accordingly, the Court afforded no weight to the deal price in its valuation of AOL but rather used that price as a &quot;check&quot; on his DCF analysis.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Mar 2018 18:40:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Reinstating A Post-Closing Merger Challenge, Delaware Supreme Court Holds Views Expressed By Directors In Connection With A Transaction Vote Are Not Per Se Immaterial 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Reinstating-A-Post-Closing-Merger-Challenge-Delaware</link>
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On February 20, 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., reversed the dismissal of a suit brought by former stockholders of Diamond Resorts International (&quot;Diamond&quot;) challenging the company&apos;s two-step cash-out merger.  Appel v. Berkman, No. 316, 2017 (Del. Feb. 20, 2018).  As discussed in our prior post on this case, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed plaintiffs&apos; breach of fiduciary duty claims because the disinterested stockholders of Diamond, who were &quot;fully informed,&quot; overwhelmingly accepted the tender offer.  In reaching that decision, the Court of Chancery found it immaterial that the proxy did not disclose that Diamond&apos;s chairman—who abstained from the board vote on the deal—had expressed disappointment with the price and indicated that &quot;it was not the right time to sell.&quot;  Reversing and remanding, the Delaware Supreme Court held that when a board discloses its reasons for recommending a transaction, &quot;the contrary view of an individual board member may be material.&quot;  In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded, the chairman&apos;s expressed views regarding the wisdom of the sale were material and the omission rendered the proxy misleadingly incomplete.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Feb 2018 21:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Reinstating-A-Post-Closing-Merger-Challenge-Delaware</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Applies Dell And DFC To Find &quot;Fair Value&quot; Of Widely Traded Company With No Controlling Stockholder Is Equal To Unaffected Market Price
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-Dell-And-DFC-To-Find</link>
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On February 15, 2018, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled in a post-trial opinion that the thirty-day average unaffected market price was the best evidence of the fair value of Aruba Networks, Inc. (&quot;Aruba&quot;) in an appraisal action arising from the acquisition of Aruba by Hewlett-Packard Company (&quot;HP&quot;).  Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448-VCL (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018).  The Court reached this conclusion by applying the efficient market hypothesis espoused by the Delaware Supreme Court in Dell but expressed reservations about doing so.  Though facially helpful for defendants in appraisal actions, the decision effectively invites the Supreme Court to revisit Dell and DFC, suggesting that those decisions compelled the trial court to ignore evidence of a less-than-robust deal process and undervaluation of Aruba by stock market analysts.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Feb 2018 19:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Declining To Find Enhanced Scrutiny Inapplicable To Post-Closing Damages Actions, Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Motion For Summary Judgment
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Declining-To-Find-Enhanced-Scrutiny-Inapplicable-</link>
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On February 6, 2018, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a summary judgment motion by defendant Potomac Capital Partners II, LP (&quot;Potomac&quot;) in an action by stockholders challenging the sale of PLX Technology, Inc. (&quot;PLX&quot;) to Avago Wireless, Inc.  In re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 9880-VCL (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2018).  Plaintiffs alleged Potomac, which was PLX&apos;s largest shareholder, aided and abetted members of the PLX board in committing breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the sale.  In its concise order holding that the case would need to go to trial, the Court rejected Potomac&apos;s contention that the business judgment rule, rather than the enhanced scrutiny test, was the operative standard by which to review the deal.  The Court further determined that—under the enhanced scrutiny standard—there existed disputes of material fact regarding the PLX board&apos;s actions.

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						      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 2018 17:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>New York Court Denies Approval Of Disclosure-Only Settlement, Finding Supplemental Disclosures &quot;Useless&quot;
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Court-Denies-Approval-Of-Disclosure-Only</link>
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On February 8, 2018, Justice Shirley Werner Kornreich of the New York Supreme Court denied a motion for final approval of a disclosure-only settlement in a class action suit brought by shareholders of Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. (&quot;MMM&quot;) regarding its acquisition of Texas Industries, Inc. (&quot;TXI&quot;).  City Trading Fund v. Nye, 2018 WL 792283 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. 8, 2018).  Plaintiff, which owned only ten shares in MMM, asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims and sought to enjoin the merger on the ground of inadequate disclosures in the proxy provided to shareholders.  The parties, however, reached a settlement, which required defendants to make certain &quot;supplemental disclosures&quot; and provided for the payment of $500,000 in attorneys&apos; fees to plaintiff&apos;s counsel.  Justice Kornreich previously denied approval of the settlement, but that decision was reversed by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division and remanded for a fairness hearing.  City Trading Fund v. Nye, 144 A.D.3d 595, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).  Moreover, in the interim, the Appellate Division, in Gordon v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 148 A.D.3d 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017), adopted a more lenient approval standard for disclosure-only settlements than that followed recently by courts in Delaware and elsewhere.  Nevertheless, Justice Kornreich found the supplemental disclosures &quot;utterly useless to the shareholders&quot; and, therefore, declined to approve the settlement.

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						      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 2018 17:05:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds That Addition Of MFW Protections Following Initial Controller Proposal But Before Negotiations Meets MFW Conditions
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Addition-Of</link>
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On February 2, 2018, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a stockholder challenge to the buyout of Synutra International Inc. (&quot;Synutra&quot;) in a squeeze-out merger by a controlling stockholder group.  In re Synutra International Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0032 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2018).  Plaintiffs asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims against the controller group and the special committee of the Synutra board.  They alleged that the transaction did not satisfy the ab initio requirement under Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;), because the controller group did not initially condition the proposed transaction on recommendation by a special committee and approval by a majority of the disinterested stockholders, features added weeks after the controller&apos;s initial proposal letter and after the Synutra board had already met and formed a special committee.  Finding that &quot;the controller announce[d] the conditions before any negotiations took place,&quot; the Court held the ab initio requirement was satisfied and dismissed the complaint under MFW. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Feb 2018 19:50:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Invalidates Written Consent Of The Majority Of Common Stockholders Purporting To Remove And Replace CEO 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Invalidates-Written-Co</link>
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On January 10, 2018, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings to plaintiffs, the CEO and another director of TradingScreen Inc., invalidating a written consent of the majority of common stockholders purporting to remove and replace the CEO and effect other changes to the board.  The Court explained that Delaware law provides for the selection of officers as prescribed by a company&apos;s bylaws or determined by the board and found that TradingScreen&apos;s bylaws provide for the board to elect and remove officers.  Therefore, the Court held the written consent was &quot;ineffective.&quot;      

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Feb 2018 17:02:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal Of Stockholder Derivative Claims On Issue Preclusion Grounds Based On A Demand-Futility Dismissal Of A Prior Derivative Suit, Holding That The Application Of Issue Preclusion Does Not Violate Federal Due Process 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Stock</link>
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​On January 25, 2018, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled that the Court of Chancery&apos;s  dismissal on issue preclusion grounds of the derivative claims of stockholder plaintiffs against the directors of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (&quot;Wal-Mart&quot;)—after a parallel derivative suit in federal court was dismissed for failure to allege demand futility—did not violate plaintiffs&apos; due process rights.  In re Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Del. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 7455-CB (Del. Jan. 25, 2018).  In affirming the dismissal, the Delaware Supreme Court declined to adopt the recommendation of the Delaware Court of Chancery to adopt a rule refusing to give preclusive effect to other courts&apos; decisions on demand futility on federal due process grounds.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jan 2018 18:13:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Declines To Compel Production Under The Garner Privilege Exception 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Declines-To-Compel-Pro</link>
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On January 10, 2018, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to compel the production of attorney-client privileged documents under the Garner doctrine in the context of direct breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by former minority shareholders of R.L. Polk &amp; Co. Inc. (&quot;Polk&quot;) against its controlling shareholders in connection with a self-tender.  Buttonwood Tree Value Partners, L.P., et al. v. R.L. Polk &amp; Co., Inc., et al., C.A. No. 9250-VCG (Jan. 10, 2018).  As discussed in our post regarding a prior decision, the Court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint, which alleges that the self-tender was a self-dealing transaction by the controlling shareholders &quot;as part of an overall scheme to later sell the Company for three times the [s]elf-[t]ender valuation.&quot;  In the subsequent course of discovery, plaintiffs moved to compel the production of documents relating to legal advice Polk sought in connection with the sale of the company, the self-tender, and various restructuring options that were considered at the time.  The Court declined to compel the production because plaintiffs failed to establish that &quot;the information contained in the privileged documents is both necessary and unavailable from other sources.&quot; 

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						      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jan 2018 18:50:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Grants Books And Records Demand, Holding That Corwin Is Irrelevant To Section 220 Proceedings
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Grants-Books-And-Recor</link>
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On December 29, 2017, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a stockholder&apos;s demand to inspect books and records related to the acquisition of West Corporation (&quot;West&quot;)  by Apollo Global Management (&quot;Apollo&quot;), pursuant to 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220.  Lavin v. West Corp., C.A. No. 2017-0547-JRS (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2017).  The Court found that plaintiff established a valid primary purpose for seeking inspection of the materials:  to investigate whether West&apos;s directors and officers breached their fiduciary duties under Revlon by approving the sale of West to Apollo when other bids indicated that a sale of West&apos;s various business segments to different purchasers may have yielded greater value for West stockholders.  Plaintiff alleged that the Apollo transaction was preferred because West&apos;s CEO, directors, and financial advisor would receive greater compensation for a whole-company sale than a segmented sale.  Importantly, the Court rejected West&apos;s argument that Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), precluded a &amp;sect; 220 demand because any possible breaches of fiduciary duties that plaintiff sought to investigate were cleansed by stockholder approval of the Apollo acquisition.  

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						      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jan 2018 18:55:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Upholds Shareholder&apos;s Disclosure Claim In Connection With Tender Offer, But Indicates Relief, If Any, Will Likely Be Limited To Nominal Damages
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Upholds-Shareholderrsq</link>
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On December 22, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss a direct breach of fiduciary duty claim brought by a shareholder plaintiff against directors and officers of casino company Twin River Worldwide Holdings, Inc. (&quot;Twin River&quot;) for allegedly misleading disclosures in an offer-to-purchase circular in connection with a tender offer.  Chatham Asset Mgmt. LLC, et al. v. Papanier, et al., C.A. No. 2017-0088-AGB (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2017).  Plaintiff, which sold a portion of its shares in the tender offer, alleged that the circular stated that defendants &quot;may&quot; sell shares &quot;from time to time,&quot; but the &quot;true intent&quot; of defendants was to increase the price of Twin River stock and sell their shares shortly after the tender offer closed (even though they ultimately did not).  Plaintiff, however, acknowledged that it participated in the tender offer only because of a regulatory requirement that capped its ownership position.  The Court found that the complaint stated a disclosure claim because &quot;stating an outcome as a possibility&quot; when in fact there was a &quot;firm intention by defendants to sell their shares&quot; is misleading.  But the Court noted that the &quot;recourse appears to be limited&quot; to nominal damages because plaintiff&apos;s allegations &quot;suggest that it likely will be unable to establish reliance and causation.&quot;    

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						      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jan 2018 18:54:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Upholds-Shareholderrsq</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Decision That Well-Pled Unocal Claim Does Not Automatically Excuse Pre-Suit Demand
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Decision-That-Well-Pled</link>
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On December 18, 2017, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s dismissal of a shareholder derivative action asserting that the directors of The Williams Companies, Inc. (&quot;Williams&quot;) breached their fiduciary duties in connection with its entry into, and subsequent cancellation of, an agreement to acquire the remaining interest in its affiliate, Williams Partners L.P. (&quot;WPZ&quot;).  Ryan v. Armstrong, No. 230, 2017 (Del. Dec. 18, 2017).  As discussed in our post regarding that decision, plaintiff alleged that the directors sought to entrench themselves by approving the WPZ transaction while Williams was the subject of acquisition overtures from another company.  Ryan v. Armstrong, C.A. No. 12717-VCG (Del. Ch. May 15, 2017).  The Court of Chancery held that even a &quot;well-pled&quot; claim under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)—which applies enhanced scrutiny to certain takeover defensive measures—is not, standing alone, sufficient to excuse a pre-suit demand on the board under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 where plaintiff failed to plead sufficient &quot;particularized facts to imply a substantial likelihood of liability for damages . . . on the part of a majority of the directors.&quot;  In its short order, the Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of the Court of Chancery&apos;s opinion.

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						      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jan 2018 18:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Reverses And Remands Dell MBO Appraisal Decision, Finding The Trial Court Erroneously Disregarded The Deal Price
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-And-Remands-Dell-</link>
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On December 14, 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Karen L. Valihura, reversed and remanded an appraisal ruling by the Court of Chancery that had determined that the management-led buyout (&quot;MBO&quot;) of Dell, Inc. (&quot;Dell&quot;) by its CEO and founder, Michael Dell, and affiliates of a private equity firm, Silver Lake Partners (&quot;Silver Lake&quot;), at $13.75 per share significantly undervalued the stock of Dell.  In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 565, 2016 (Del. Dec. 14, 2017).  After a trial, the Court of Chancery had disregarded the deal price and instead applied its own discounted cash flow (&quot;DCF&quot;) analysis, arriving at a valuation of $17.62 per share reflecting an approximate 28% premium.  The Delaware Supreme Court, however, found that the evidence suggested that the market for Dell shares was efficient and that features of an MBO that might render a resulting deal price unreliable were largely absent here.  Therefore, the Court concluded that &quot;the deal price deserved heavy, if not dispositive, weight.&quot;  The Court thus reversed and remanded with instructions to give such weight to the deal price, and explain the weight given to each factor considered, or—at the Court of Chancery&apos;s discretion—to enter judgment at the deal price without further proceedings.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Dec 2017 20:12:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-And-Remands-Dell-</guid>
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					      <title>Reversing A Dismissal, Delaware Supreme Court Declines To Apply Ratification Defense For Discretionary Compensation Awards Under Stockholder-Approved Equity Incentive Plan
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Reversing-A-Dismissal-Delaware-Supreme-Court-Decl</link>
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On December 13, 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery&apos;s dismissal of fiduciary duty breach claims brought derivatively by stockholders of Investors Bancorp, Inc. against its directors in connection with the directors&apos; decision to grant themselves restricted stock and stock options under an equity compensation plan previously approved by a stockholder vote. In re Inv&apos;rs Bancorp, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 12327-VCS (Del. Ch. December 13, 2017).  As discussed in our post regarding that decision, the Court of Chancery dismissed the claims, finding that the stockholder approval constituted ratification of the awards, rendering them subject to the presumption of protection under the business judgment rule.  In an opinion by Justice Collins J. Seitz, Jr., however, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that defendants must demonstrate the entire fairness of their equity awards, because plaintiffs adequately alleged that the directors &quot;inequitably exercised [their] discretion&quot; under the compensation plan&apos;s &quot;general parameters,&quot; notwithstanding stockholder approval.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Dec 2017 20:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Reversing-A-Dismissal-Delaware-Supreme-Court-Decl</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Applies MFW Protections To Stock Reclassification That Allegedly Preserved Controlling Stockholder&apos;s Control Of Company
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-MFW-Protection</link>
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On December 11, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a putative stockholder suit asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against NRG Energy, Inc. (&quot;NRG&quot;), the controlling stockholder of NRG Yield, Inc. (&quot;Yield&quot;), and the Yield directors in connection with a reclassification of Yield&apos;s shares.  IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. David Crane, et al., Consol. C.A. No. 12742-CB (Dec. 11, 2017).  Plaintiff claimed that the reclassification enabled NRG to maintain its control over Yield and that this qualified as a &quot;non-ratable&quot; benefit that was not shared with Yield&apos;s minority stockholders.  The Court agreed that plaintiff adequately pleaded that the reclassification was a conflicted transaction such that the entire fairness standard would apply but ultimately dismissed the case after finding that the transaction met the requirements for application of the business judgment rule under Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;).

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Dec 2017 20:09:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Applies-MFW-Protection</guid>
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					      <title>Finding No Credible Basis For Inferring Wrongdoing, Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Demand for Books And Records Concerning Alleged Related-Party Transactions
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-No-Credible-Basis-For-Inferring-Wrongdoin</link>
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On December 5, 2017, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion for reargument concerning the Court&apos;s rejection of a shareholder&apos;s demand to inspect documents pertaining to alleged related-party transactions pursuant to 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220.  Silverberg v. ATC Healthcare, Inc. C.A. No. 2017-0242-JRS (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 2017).  After a trial, the Court had rejected the request of plaintiff—a shareholder in ATC Healthcare, Inc. (&quot;ATC&quot;)—for books and records from ATC concerning alleged related-party transactions with Travel Healthcare Solutions, LLC (&quot;Travel Healthcare&quot;), an entity allegedly affiliated with ATC&apos;s controlling shareholders.  Denying plaintiff&apos;s motion to reargue, the Court held that a change in contractual terms favorable to the related party &quot;is not enough on its own to establish a credible basis of wrongdoing; something more is needed.&quot; 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Dec 2017 18:30:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-No-Credible-Basis-For-Inferring-Wrongdoin</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims In Connection With Two-Step Merger, Despite Finding Corwin Inapplicable
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Fi</link>
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​On November 30, 2017, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed breach of fiduciary duty claims against the board of Opower, Inc. (&quot;Opower&quot;) in connection with Opower&apos;s acquisition by Oracle Corporation (&quot;Oracle&quot;).  Van der Fluit v. Yates, C.A. No. 12553-VCMR (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017).  The Court found that the failure to disclose that certain executives who received transaction-related benefits were the primary negotiators of the transaction constituted a material disclosure violation.  Therefore, the Court declined to rely on stockholder approval to cleanse the transaction under the doctrine of Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), because the tender was not fully informed.  Nevertheless, the Court granted defendants&apos; motion to dismiss, concluding that plaintiff had failed to plead a non-exculpated claim for breach of the duty of loyalty. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Dec 2017 18:24:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Fi</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Finding Of Failure To Allege Demand Futility Based On Board Composition Days After Complaint Was Filed
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Finding-Of-Failure</link>
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On November 27, 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissing a stockholder derivative complaint against certain directors and officers of BioScrip, Inc. for failing to allege that a demand on BioScrip&apos;s board of directors to bring the litigation would have been futile.  Park Employees&apos; and Retirement Bd. Employees&apos; Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago v. Smith, No. 198 (Del. Nov. 27, 2017).  As discussed in our post regarding that decision, the Court of Chancery departed from its usual practice of assessing plaintiff&apos;s allegations of demand futility based on the composition of the board on the date the complaint was filed.  Park Employees&apos; and Retirement Bd. Employees&apos; Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago v. Smith, C.A. No. 11000-VCG (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).  Instead, the Court of Chancery made an &quot;equitable&quot; exception to that rule and dismissed the complaint for failing to establish demand futility based on the board as it existed four days later based on &quot;unique facts,&quot; including that it was publicly known that those board changes were imminent prior to the filing of the complaint and that the new board was in place by the time defendants had received service of the complaint.  In its short order, the Supreme Court affirmed without further elaboration. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Dec 2017 18:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Finding-Of-Failure</guid>
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					      <title>New York Court Of Appeals Reverses Dismissal Of Derivative Claims Involving Cayman Islands Company, Finding Cayman Islands Gatekeeping Rule Inapplicable
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Court-Of-Appeals-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-D</link>
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On November 20, 2017, the New York State Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of derivative claims brought by a shareholder of Scottish Re Group, Limited (&quot;Scottish Re&quot;)—a Cayman Islands company—against the company, its directors, and various other entities.  Davis v. Scottish Re Grp. Ltd., No. 111 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 2017).  The New York State Appellate Division had previously affirmed the dismissal of those derivative claims for lack of standing because plaintiff had not sought leave of the Cayman Islands Grand Court to commence a derivative action, as required under Rule 12A of the Rules of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands.  Reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeals held that &quot;Rule 12A is procedural, and therefore does not apply where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to litigate his derivative claims in New York.&quot; 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Nov 2017 18:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Ruling Provides Guidance On Attorney-Client Privilege Protection For Draft Stockholder Communications 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Ruling-Provides-Guidan</link>
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​At a recent hearing, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery provided guidance on the application of the attorney-client privilege to draft stockholder communications in the context of a stockholder class action involving claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the directors of Windstream Holdings, Inc. (&quot;Windstream&quot;).  Doppelt v. Windstream Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 10629-VCS (Del. Ch. September 11, 2017) (Transcript).  During discovery, plaintiffs moved to compel the production of drafts of various documents related to communications with stockholders—including talking points, FAQs, and mailings drafted by the company in conjunction with proxy communication firms—which were withheld by defendants on the grounds of attorney-client privilege.  The Court determined that such drafts were not likely to be privileged in their entirety, but could be redacted to the extent they reflect legal advice from counsel, such as comments intended &quot;to ensure that the company is complying with its legal obligations.&quot;   

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Nov 2017 18:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Rejects Books-And-Records Demand Driven By Entrepreneurial Counsel 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Rejects-Books-And-Reco</link>
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On November 13, 2017, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery rejected a stockholder&apos;s demand to inspect books and records of A. Shulman, Inc. (the &quot;Company&quot;) under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 220.  Wilkinson v. A Schulman, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0138-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2017).  The Court explained that a stockholder who lacks a &quot;proper purpose&quot; and has &quot;only minor and non-substantive involvement&quot; in the demand process is not entitled to inspect books and records.  

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Nov 2017 19:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Action, Finding Demand Unexcused Because Plaintiff Did Not Plead Non-Exculpated Claims Against A Majority Of Directors
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-A</link>
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On November 7, 2017, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss a derivative and putative class action brought by a minority stockholder of Erin Energy Corporation (&quot;Erin&quot;), challenging a series of transactions involving Erin, Allied Energy PLC (&quot;Allied&quot;)—an entity affiliated with Kase Lukman Lawal, Erin&apos;s chairman, CEO, and controlling stockholder—and another party, Public Investment Corporation Limited (&quot;PIC&quot;).  Lenois v. Lawal, C.A. No. 11963 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 2017).  Plaintiff alleged that the CEO—who together with an affiliated entity (Allied&apos;s parent company) controlled nearly 60% of Erin&apos;s shares—effectively stood on all sides of the challenged transactions and negotiated in his own self-interest.  Plaintiff asserted derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the CEO and the remaining directors.  The Court found that plaintiff adequately pleaded that the CEO acted in bad faith, but dismissed the derivative claims because the complaint &quot;failed to plead non-exculpated claims against a majority of the Erin Board&quot; and, thus, demand on the board was not excused.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Nov 2017 19:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Derivative-A</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Delaware Court Of Chancery&apos;s Use Of Its Own DCF Method To Determine Fair Value After Controller-Directed Cash-Out Merger
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Delaware-Court-Of-</link>
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On October 30, 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery determining the fair value of ISN Software Corp. (&quot;ISN&quot;) in an appraisal action brought by minority stockholders following the cash-out merger of ISN with its wholly-owned subsidiary, at the direction of its controlling stockholder.  In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig., C.A. No. 8388-VCG (Del. Oct. 30, 2017).  As discussed in our post regarding the Court of Chancery&apos;s August 11, 2016 decision, the Court rejected the various methodologies advanced by the parties&apos; competing experts and, instead, conducted its own discounted cash flow analysis to arrive at the &quot;fair value&quot; of ISN, which Vice Chancellor Glasscock determined was $357 million, more than double the consideration paid in the merger but significantly less than the valuations sought by plaintiffs.  (See Shearman &amp; Sterling LLP, Delaware Chancery Court Utilizes DCF Method To Determine Fair Value Of ISN Software Corp., August 22, 2016 Need-to-Know Litigation Weekly, http://www.lit-ma.shearman.com/delaware-chancery-court-utilizes-dcf-method-to-de).  The short order from the Delaware Supreme Court states that the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery &quot;should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned&quot; in the lower court&apos;s opinion.  

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Nov 2017 17:56:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Post-Merger Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Alleged Controller 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Post-Merger-</link>
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On October 24, 2017, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss a putative class action by former stockholders of Morgans Hotel Group Co. (&quot;Morgans&quot;), challenging its $794 million merger with an affiliate of SBEEG Holdings LLC.  In re Morgans Hotel Group Co. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 12433 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2017).  Plaintiffs asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment against an alleged controlling stockholder, Ron Burkle, and his affiliated entities, The Yucaipa Companies LLC and affiliates (collectively, &quot;Yucaipa&quot;).  Plaintiffs claimed that Yucaipa (i) owed fiduciary duties—even though it only owned a minority stake in Morgans—because it had contractual blocking rights that gave it effective control; and (ii) breached those duties by causing Morgans to enter into the merger, which allegedly &quot;enriched&quot; Yucaipa.  The Court rejected these arguments and held that the exercise of contractual blocking rights—without more—is insufficient to impose fiduciary duties on a minority stockholder.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Oct 2017 17:23:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Texas Federal District Court Invalidates IRS Regulations Limiting Inversion Transactions  
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On September 29, 2017, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Texas Association of Business, holding that the Internal Revenue Service (&quot;IRS&quot;) and U.S. Treasury Department violated the Administrative Procedures Act (&quot;APA&quot;) when they promulgated an anti-inversion rule that ultimately inhibited the merger of Allergan PLC and Pfizer Inc.  Chamber of Com. of the U.S., et al. v. Internal Revenue Service, et al., No. 1:16-CV-944-LY (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2017) (Amended Order).  Specifically, the Court found that the government agency defendants were required—but failed—to provide the public and affected parties adequate notice and an opportunity to comment on the proposed anti-inversion rule before enacting it.  The ruling, which also held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the rule (and that the government agencies had authority to implement it), creates an opening for other companies considering a possible inversion transaction. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Oct 2017 19:23:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Texas-Federal-District-Court-Invalidates-IRS-Regu</guid>
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					      <title>Finding Complaint Did Not Adequately Plead Claims For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty, Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Court Of Chancery Decision In GAMCO
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-Complaint-Did-Not-Adequately-Plead-Claims</link>
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On October 12, 2017, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed a decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims against the directors of Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings, Inc. (&quot;CCOH&quot;) in connection with (i) a debt offering and asset sales allegedly undertaken in order to fund special dividends for the purpose of enabling its controlling stockholder to address liquidity needs, and (ii) the alleged failure of CCOH to extricate itself from unfavorable intercompany agreements with the controlling stockholder as its financial condition deteriorated.  GAMCO Asset Management Inc. v iHeartMedia Inc., et al., C.A. No. 12312-VCS (Del. Oct. 12, 2017).  As discussed in our post regarding that decision, as to the debt offering and asset sales, the Court of Chancery applied the business judgment rule because the allegations regarding the debt offering and asset sales did not fall within the &quot;very narrow circumstances&quot; in which &quot;a controlling stockholder&apos;s immediate need for liquidity could constitute a disabling conflict of interest irrespective of pro rata treatment.&quot;  In its short order, the Supreme Court affirmed without further elaboration.  As to the intercompany agreements, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach the Court of Chancery&apos;s determination that the claims were barred by a settlement agreement and res judicata because &quot;the Court of Chancery properly found that under the pled circumstances, which included the board acting within the framework established by a forward-looking settlement agreement and the company&apos;s binding contractual obligations . . . the complaint failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.&quot;  

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Oct 2017 19:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-Complaint-Did-Not-Adequately-Plead-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Imposes Incorporation-By-Reference Condition On Section 220 Production, Consistent With Other Recent Decisions
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Imposes-Incorporation-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 12, 2017, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery agreed to impose an &quot;incorporation-by-reference&quot; condition on any production by Universal Health Services, Inc. (&quot;UHS&quot;) in response to a books-and-records demand under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 220.  City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Universal Health Serv., Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0322-SG (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2017).  In so disposing of the action to compel production brought by the UHS stockholder who made the Section 220 demand (The City of Cambridge Retirement System (&quot;City of Cambridge&quot;)), the Court explained that the interests of judicial and litigants&apos; economy outweighed whatever concern might exist that a company would manipulate &quot;the universe of documents produced&quot; to attempt to frustrate a later-filed derivative action. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2017 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Imposes-Incorporation-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Demand Futility As To Fiduciary Duty Breach Claims Arising From Costly Loan Approved By Interested Directors And Allegedly Illegal Conduct Known To The Board
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Demand-Futility-As-To</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 29, 2017, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the board of foreign exchange broker FXCM Inc. (&quot;FXCM&quot;), sustaining two grounds for breach after finding that demand would have been futile.  Kandell v. Dror Niv et al., C.A. No. 11812 (Del. Ch. September 29, 2017).  Specifically, the Court held that demand was excused with respect to (i) the board&apos;s approval of a hastily procured loan in the wake of the &quot;flash crash&quot; generated by the 2015 decoupling of the Swiss franc from the euro, and (ii) FXCM&apos;s alleged violations regulations prohibiting foreign exchange (or FX) brokers from limiting losses on behalf of customers (a feature of FXCM&apos;s business).  The Court dismissed plaintiff&apos;s other claims, including as to a stockholder rights plan and an employee bonus plan, finding that the complaint lacked particularized facts necessary to excuse demand.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Oct 2017 17:48:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Finding Disclosures Were Adequate, Delaware Court Of Chancery Applies Corwin And Volcano To Dismiss Post-Closing Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-Disclosures-Were-Adequate-Delaware-Court-</link>
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On September 28, 2017, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed stockholder class claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought against the former directors of The Fresh Market (&quot;TFM&quot;) after its acquisition in a two-step merger by affiliates of Apollo Global Management, LLC (&quot;Apollo&quot;).  Morrison v. Berry, et al., C.A. No. 12808-VCG (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2017).  Among other allegations, plaintiff had alleged that the auction process in which the company had engaged was a &quot;sham&quot; designed by TFM&apos;s founder to deliver the company into the hands of a favored suitor.  The Court, however, dismissed the claims because plaintiff did not satisfy its burden, under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), and In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litigation, 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. 2016), &quot;to plead facts from which it is reasonably conceivable that the potentially ratifying tender was materially uninformed.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Oct 2017 23:52:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Finding-Disclosures-Were-Adequate-Delaware-Court-</guid>
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					      <title>New Jersey Federal Court Extends Coverage of Merged Bank&apos;s D&amp;O Liability Insurance Policy To Surviving Bank 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-Jersey-Federal-Court-Extends-Coverage-of-Merg</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 18, 2017, Judge John Michael Vazquez of the U.S. District Court of New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs BCB Bancorp, Inc. (&quot;BCB&quot;) and the former directors and officers of Pamrapo Bancorp, Inc. (&quot;Pamrapo&quot;), finding that insurer Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. (&quot;Progressive&quot;) was obligated to indemnify BCB for the legal expenses incurred in defending the Pamrapo directors and officers in shareholder litigation arising from the merger of BCB and Pamrapo.  In so holding, the Court agreed with plaintiffs that the surviving bank, BCB, had inherited Pamrapo&apos;s D&amp;O policy following the merger in accordance with the New Jersey Business Corporation Act (&quot;NJBCA&quot;).    

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Sep 2017 18:44:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-Jersey-Federal-Court-Extends-Coverage-of-Merg</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Orders Specific Performance, Finding Plaintiff Did Not Breach Its Contractual Obligation To &quot;Reasonably Cooperate&quot;
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Orders-Specific-Perfor</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 11, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery ordered defendant, Comdata, Inc. (&quot;Comdata&quot;), to specifically perform under, and pay damages for its termination of, its merchant agreement with plaintiff, TA Operating LLC (&quot;TA&quot;).  TA Operating LLC v. Comdata, Inc., C.A. No. 12954-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2017).  Specifically, the Court held that defendant&apos;s termination of the merchant agreement could not be excused because plaintiff had not materially breached its obligation to &quot;reasonably cooperate&quot; with defendant to implement new technology &quot;as soon as reasonably practical.&quot;  In making this determination, the Court engaged in a &quot;fact-specific inquiry&quot; and relied in part on the parties&apos; &quot;course of conduct,&quot; finding that plaintiff had &quot;made good progress&quot; before encountering technological issues that caused delays and highlighting that defendant stayed &quot;silen[t]&quot; until it purported to terminate the agreement.
 ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Sep 2017 17:20:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Orders-Specific-Perfor</guid>
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					      <title>In A Post-Trial Opinion, Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Breach Of Contract And Fiduciary Duty Claims For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/In-A-Post-Trial-Opinion-Delaware-Court-Of-Chancer</link>
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On September 1, 2017, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed claims for breaches of contract and fiduciary duty brought by plaintiffs against a prospective business partner, finding that the forum selection clause in which defendant consented to personal jurisdiction in Delaware was part of an unenforceable contract.  Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, C.A. No. 10803-VCMR (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2017).  Specifically, the Court found that a limited liability company agreement and associated contribution agreement (the &quot;Transaction Documents&quot;) under which plaintiffs purported to bring claims were not binding because they lacked several &quot;essential&quot; terms.  Absent agreement on these critical points, the Court held that the parties &quot;did not intend to bind themselves to the written terms of the Transaction Documents.&quot;  Finding no other grounds for personal jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the action.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Sep 2017 22:34:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/In-A-Post-Trial-Opinion-Delaware-Court-Of-Chancer</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Post-Closing Stockholder Suit Asserting Fiduciary Duty Breach Claims And Also Seeking Quasi-Appraisal Remedy
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Post-Closing</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 28, 2017, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a putative stockholder class action against the directors of Kreisler Manufacturing Corporation (&quot;Kreisler&quot;), rejecting plaintiff&apos;s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and quasi-appraisal in connection with the sale of Kreisler to Arlington Capital Partners (&quot;Arlington&quot;) as inadequately pleaded.  Kahn v. Stern, C.A. No. 12498-VCG (Del. Ch. Aug. 28, 2017).  Plaintiff alleged that the directors conditioned the merger on &quot;side deals&quot; that benefited themselves at the stockholders&apos; expense and that misstatements and omissions in the information statement disseminated to stockholders following the execution of a stockholder support agreement that bound more than 50% of outstanding stock in favor of the merger prevented stockholders from exercising their appraisal rights.  The Court found that the complaint failed to plead that the directors acted in bad faith, and thus dismissed the claims, notwithstanding that certain of the allegedly inadequate disclosures—if raised in a pre-closing suit—likely would have warranted injunctive relief pending corrective disclosures.  

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						      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Sep 2017 17:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Post-Closing</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Extends MFW Protections To One-Sided Controller Transactions 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Extends-MFW-Protection</link>
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On August 18, 2017, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a putative shareholder suit asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Martha Stewart, the controlling stockholder of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (&quot;MSLO&quot;), and aiding and abetting claims against third-party acquirer Sequential Brands Group Inc. (&quot;Sequential&quot;) in connection with Sequential&apos;s strategic merger with MSLO.  In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Stockholders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 11202-VCS (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2017).  Plaintiffs asserted that the sale was conflicted because Stewart negotiated for greater consideration for herself than for other stockholders and that the transaction did not meet the standards for application of the business judgment rule.  The Court found that plaintiffs failed to plead that the transaction was conflicted and that, even if it were, the protections afforded to stockholders through the establishment of an independent special committee and imposition of a majority-of-the-minority approval requirement warranted dismissal under the business judgment rule, in accordance with the standards set forth in Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;).  

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Aug 2017 20:07:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Extends-MFW-Protection</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Post-Closing Fiduciary Duty Claims, Finding The Complaint Failed To Plead Bad Faith
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Post-Closing-Fiduciary</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 17, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a shareholder suit asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against the directors of MeadWestvaco Corporation (&quot;MW&quot;) in connection with MW&apos;s strategic stock-for-stock merger with Rock-Tenn Company (&quot;RockTenn&quot;).  In re MeadWestvaco S&apos;holders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 10617-CB (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2017).  Plaintiffs&apos; central contention was that MW&apos;s directors had entered into the merger in bad faith in reaction to a threatened proxy contest by an activist investor, leaving behind $3 billion of additional value.  The Court ruled that plaintiffs&apos; own pleadings suggested the board had been &quot;actively engaged&quot; in the merger process, and that plaintiffs&apos; contention that the board acted in bad faith was &quot;simply not credible.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Aug 2017 18:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Post-Closing-Fiduciary</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Reverses And Remands Appraisal Award But Rejects Bright-Line Presumption In Favor Of Deal Price
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-And-Remands-Appra</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 1, 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., reversed and remanded an appraisal ruling that had determined the buyout of DFC Global Corporation (&quot;DFC&quot;) by private equity investor Lone Star at $9.50 per share significantly undervalued the stock of DFC.  DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., No. 518, 2016 (Del. Aug. 1, 2017).  The Court of Chancery had calculated a fair value of $10.30 per share, 8.4% higher than the deal price of $9.50 per share, by giving equal weight to:  (1) the deal price, (2) a comparable companies analysis, and (3) a discounted cash flow analysis.  The Delaware Supreme Court found that the Court of Chancery&apos;s valuation methods were unsupported by the record, which revealed (a) a fair, non-conflicted sale process with a robust market check, (b) debt markets expressing bearish views of DFC&apos;s prospects, and (c) that DFC failed to meet its projections before the deal closed, all of which suggested that the deal price was likely the &quot;most reliable indication of fair value.&quot;  The Court, however, expressly rejected the approach urged by DFC:  a blanket presumption in favor of the deal price for arm&apos;s-length transactions that were subjected to a robust market check.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Aug 2017 18:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-And-Remands-Appra</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Recommends Limiting The Preclusive Effect Of Prior Decisions On Demand Futility In Derivative Lawsuits 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Recommends-Limiting-Th</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 25, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a supplemental opinion, responding to a remand order from the Delaware Supreme Court, in which Chancellor Bouchard recommended that the Delaware Supreme Court adopt a new preclusion threshold to determine whether collateral estoppel precludes a new plaintiff from pursuing derivative claims that have already been dismissed.  In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Del. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 7455-CB (Del. Ch. July 25, 2017).  Chancellor Bouchard originally dismissed the Delaware suit (&quot;Wal-Mart I&quot;) after finding that the plaintiff was barred from relitigating demand futility, which the federal court in the District of Arkansas found was inadequately pleaded in an earlier-filed federal suit.  While the Delaware plaintiffs spent the three years litigating a books and records demand under 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220, the plaintiffs in the federal suit filed suit (in what Chancellor Bouchard described as a race to the courthouse) without making a Section 220 demand.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Aug 2017 17:57:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Finds Demand Futility Where Plaintiff Adequately Alleged That Board&apos;s Approval Of Challenged Transactions Was Grossly Negligent And Board Was Not Adequately Informed
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Finds-Demand-Futility-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
​On August 1, 2017, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a stockholder complaint asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors and executives of AGNC Investment Corp. (the &quot;Company&quot;) in connection with the renewals of investment management agreements with American Capital Mortgage Management, LLC (the &quot;Manager&quot;) and the Company&apos;s subsequent acquisition of the Manager.  H&amp;N Mgmt. Group, Inc. &amp; Aff Cos Frozen Money Purchase Plan v. Couch, C.A. No. 12847-VCMR (Del. Ch. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017).  The Court concluded that the complaint pleaded particularized facts sufficient to establish demand futility and to allege that the board was grossly negligent in approving the transactions, a non-exculpated breach under the company&apos;s charter. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2017 18:34:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Holds Garner Fiduciary Exception Does Not Justify Compelled Production Of Privileged Documents Relevant To A Derivative Litigation In Response To A Section 220 Demand Brought By The Same Plaintiffs
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Holds-Garner-Fiduciary-Ex</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 27, 2017, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery found that stockholder plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden of showing &quot;good cause&quot; under the Garner fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege doctrine to require defendant Genworth Financial, Inc. (&quot;Genworth&quot;) to produce privileged communications in response to a books and records demand.  Salberg v. Genworth Fin., Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0018-JRS (Del. Ch. July 27, 2017).  The demand under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220, sought documents relating to the same plaintiffs&apos; claims in a separate derivative action against Genworth&apos;s directors and officers.  The Court held that the Garner exception did not require Genworth to produce the privileged communications during the pendency of the derivative action, because the communications related to the &quot;bona fides&quot; of plaintiffs&apos; claims in that action.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2017 17:05:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Upholds Fiduciary Duty Breach Claims Regarding Self-Tender Against Controlling Stockholder Group And Affiliated Directors, But Dismisses Claims Against Independent Directors And Financial And Legal Advisors
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Upholds-Fiduciary-Duty-Br</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 24, 2017, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss former stockholders&apos; claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought in connection with a self-tender by R. L. Polk and Co., Inc. (&quot;Polk&quot;) against the family that held approximately 90% of Polk shares (the &quot;Controlling Family&quot;) and affiliated directors, but dismissed related claims against the company&apos;s independent directors and its financial and legal advisors on the transaction.  Buttonwood Tree Value Partners, L.P. v. R.L. Polk &amp; Co., C.A. No. 9250-VCG (Del. Ch. Ct. July 24, 2017).  The Court concluded that plaintiffs pled facts sufficient to allege that the self-tender was &quot;a self-dealing transaction&quot; by a controlling group of stockholders &quot;as part of an overall scheme to later sell the Company for three times the [s]elf-[t]ender valuation.&quot;  Therefore, the Court held that an &quot;entire fairness&quot; standard of review was applicable and declined to dismiss the claims against the Controlling Family and their affiliated directors.  The Court nevertheless dismissed fiduciary duty breach claims against the independent directors, finding bad faith inadequately pleaded.  The Court also dismissed aiding and abetting claims against the outside advisors, finding the complaint inadequate &quot;to support an inference of scienter or knowing participation in a breach&quot; (emphasis in original). ]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Aug 2017 18:34:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Finds No Fiduciary Duty Breach, Notwithstanding Entire Fairness Review, And Determines Appraisal Value To Be Well Below Deal Price
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Finds-No-Fiduciary-Duty-Breach</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 21, 2017, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery (i) entered judgment in favor of defendants Sprint Nextel Corporation (&quot;Sprint&quot;) and Softbank Corp. (&quot;Softbank&quot;) on claims of breaches of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting, respectively, in connection with Sprint&apos;s merger with Clearwire Corporation (&quot;Clearwire&quot;); and (ii) appraised the fair value of Clearwire&apos;s stock at the time of the merger, awarding the dissenting stockholder petitioners $2.13 per share, notwithstanding that the transaction closed at $5.00 per share.  ACP Master, Ltd., et al. v. Sprint Corporation, et al. &amp; ACP Master, Ltd., et al. v. Clearwire Corporation, C.A. No. 8508-VCL, C.A. No. 9042-VCL (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017).  Stockholder petitioners had challenged the merger, alleging that Sprint was a controlling stockholder of Clearwire and allegedly breached its fiduciary duties during negotiations leading to a deal price that substantially undervalued Clearwire.  Applying an entire fairness standard of review, the Court found that Sprint did not breach any fiduciary duties.  Noting that the appraisal statute requires the exclusion of &quot;any synergies present in the deal price,&quot; the Court evaluated the competing discounted cash flow (&quot;DCF&quot;) analyses offered by the parties and adopted the $2.13 per share value determined by the approach offered by Sprint, even though it amounted to less than half of the $5.00 per share deal price. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Jul 2017 16:13:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Post-Closing Challenge To Two-Step Merger Under Corwin Finding Tendering Stockholders Were Fully Informed 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Post-Closing-Ch</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 13, 2017, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a former stockholder&apos;s breach of fiduciary duty claims against the former directors of Diamond Resorts International (&quot;Diamond&quot;) and an aiding and abetting claim against Diamond&apos;s financial advisor in connection with Apollo Global Management LLC&apos;s (&quot;Apollo&quot;) acquisition of Diamond in a two-step merger under Section 251(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 251(h).  Appel v. Berkman, C.A. No. 12844-VCMR (Del. Ch. July 13, 2017).  Relying on Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) and In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litigation, 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. 2016), the Court held the merger was &quot;cleanse[d]&quot; because &quot;the disinterested stockholders of Diamond were fully informed and uncoerced when they overwhelmingly accepted the tender offer.&quot; 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jul 2017 18:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Third Circuit Holds That Statutes Of Limitation May Be Tolled By Books-And-Records Demands Under Delaware Law Despite Inquiry Notice To Plaintiff Of Wrongdoing
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Third-Circuit-Holds-That-Statutes-Of-Limitation-M</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 13, 2017, Chief Judge Smith of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed in part the District Court&apos;s dismissal of claims for breach of contract as untimely.  Norman v. Elkin, No. 16-1924 (3d Cir. June 13, 2017).  The Third Circuit found that plaintiff&apos;s argument that his books-and-records demand tolled the relevant statute of limitations was not categorically barred by a finding that plaintiff had &quot;inquiry notice&quot; of defendant&apos;s wrongdoing at the time he filed the demand.  The Court vacated dismissal of the contract claims and remanded them to the District Court with instructions to determine whether plaintiff&apos;s books-and-records demand tolled the statute of limitations and, if so, whether the claims were timely. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jul 2017 16:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Issues Opinion Offering Rare Interpretation Of Stock Transfer Restriction Provision, Delaware General Corporation Law Section 202   
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Issues-Opinion-Offering-R</link>
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On July 10, 2017, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery found plaintiff was not bound by stock transfer restrictions under which the company had sought to revoke his ownership and was therefore entitled to inspect the books and records of a company in which he held stock.  Henry v. Phixios Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 12504-VCMR (Del. Ch. Jul. 10, 2017).  The opinion is one of few offering substantive guidance regarding Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;) Section 202, 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 202, a provision governing stock transfer restrictions.  Applying the statute, the Court held that &quot;in order for a stockholder to be bound by stock transfer restrictions that are not &apos;noted conspicuously on the certificate or certificates representing the security,&apos; he must have actual knowledge of the restrictions before he acquires the stock&quot; or &quot;affirmatively assent[] to the restrictions, either by voting to approve the restrictions or by agreeing to the restrictions.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jul 2017 16:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Declines To Dismiss Challenges To Director Option Grants And Outside Investor Voting Agreement
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Declines-To-Dismiss-Chall</link>
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On June 28, 2017, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss purported derivative and direct stockholder claims for breaches of fiduciary duty against the directors of Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc. (&quot;Sorrento&quot;) regarding the directors&apos; decisions to grant themselves stock options in several subsidiaries and their decision to condition a private placement investor&apos;s acquisition of newly issued shares on a voting agreement requiring the investor to vote the shares as the board directs.  Williams v. Ji, C.A. No. 12729-VCMR (Del. Ch. June 28, 2017).  Declining to dismiss the complaint, the Court determined that the options grants to the directors themselves &quot;are subject to the same entire fairness review as any other interested transaction.&quot;  As to the voting agreement, the Court held that defendants must establish that &quot;the agreement is intrinsically fair and not designed to disenfranchise Sorrento stockholders.&quot;     

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jul 2017 20:52:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal Of Disclosure Claim Based On Subsequent Employment Of Special Committee Chair By Legal Counsel That Advised Committee
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Discl</link>
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On June 15, 2017, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed dismissal of a putative stockholder class action alleging breach of fiduciary duty by the directors of Blount International, Inc. (&quot;Blount&quot;) and aiding and abetting claims against other defendants, including Blount&apos;s financial advisor, following Blount&apos;s acquisition by a buyout group consisting of Blount&apos;s CEO and COO, who are also board members, and several entities.  Chester Cty. Ret. Sys. v. Collins, No. 603, 2016 (Del. June 15, 2017).  Plaintiffs claimed that the proxy statement was materially misleading because it failed to disclose inter alia that the special committee chairman would become a partner at the law firm advising the committee shortly after closing.  Although Chief Justice Strine, writing for the Court, observed that &quot;prudence would seem to have counseled for bringing [] to light earlier&quot; the chairman&apos;s impending partnership, the Court agreed with the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery in Chester Cty. Ret. Sys. v. Collins, 2016 WL 7117924 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 2016), that this and the other omissions were immaterial and affirmed the dismissal. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Jun 2017 18:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal Of &quot;Demand-Refused&quot; Derivative Suit Regarding Alleged Misconduct In Foreign Exchange Business 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-ldquo</link>
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On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the dismissal of a shareholder derivative suit against the board of directors of The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (&quot;BNYM&quot;) in which plaintiff had asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim regarding certain alleged misconduct in the bank&apos;s foreign currency exchange business.  Zucker v. Hassell, C.A. No. 11625-VCG (Del. June 19, 2017).  Without further elaboration, the Delaware Supreme Court&apos;s brief order provides that the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery &quot;should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned&quot; in its opinion (see Zucker v. Hassell, C.A. No. 11625-VCG (Del. Ch. Ct. Nov. 30, 2016)).  As discussed in our post regarding that decision, the Chancery Court found that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead that BNYM&apos;s board of directors wrongfully refused the demand to sue, after the board had formed a special committee of independent directors, which hired competent and unconflicted outside counsel, to conduct an investigation and evaluate the demand.    

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Jun 2017 17:17:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Caremark Claim For Failure To Adequately Allege That The Board Consciously Disregarded FCPA Violation Red Flags
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Caremark-Claim-For-Failure</link>
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On June 16, 2017, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed breach of fiduciary duty and other claims brought derivatively against the directors and former chief financial officer of Qualcomm, Inc. (&quot;Qualcomm&quot;) for failure to plead demand futility, finding that the complaint did not adequately demonstrate that the directors faced a substantial likelihood of personal liability.  In re Qualcomm Inc. FCPA Stockholder Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 11152-VCMR (Del. Ch. June 16, 2017) (letter).  The stockholder plaintiffs&apos; derivative complaint alleged that Qualcomm&apos;s board ignored red flags that resulted in alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (&quot;FCPA&quot;) and a March 2016 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (&quot;SEC&quot;) cease-and-desist order.  The Court found, however, that the complaint did not adequately allege that &quot;the board consciously disregarded the [alleged] red flags&quot; and dismissed the claims.  

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Jun 2017 16:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Caremark-Claim-For-Failure</guid>
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					      <title>After Settlement By Director Defendants Of Merger-Related Fiduciary Duty Breach Claims, Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Financial Advisor&apos;s Bid To Invoke Settlement Consent Provision To Stay Trial On Aiding-And-Abetting Claims 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/After-Settlement-By-Director-Defendants-Of-Merger</link>
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On May 26, 2017, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted plaintiffs&apos; request to sever and stay fiduciary duty breach claims settled with directors of Good Technology Corporation (&quot;Good&quot;) and other defendants, notwithstanding the opposition of the sole remaining defendant, a financial advisor to Good, in connection with the acquisition of Good by BlackBerry Ltd. (&quot;BlackBerry&quot;), alleged to have aided and abetted those breaches.  In re Good Tech. Corp. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11580-VCL (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (Transcript).  Stockholder plaintiffs reached agreement on preliminary settlement terms with defendants other than the financial advisor weeks before a scheduled trial and sought to sever and stay those settled claims.  The financial advisor opposed the severance and sought a continuance of the trial, arguing that the settlement contravened the settlement consent and indemnification provisions in its engagement letter with Good—drafted in the wake of In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014)—intended to protect against just such an eventuality.  Noting that neither plaintiffs nor the settling defendants were parties to the engagement letter, and concluding that the advisor could recover money damages were it subsequently determined that the provisions were breached, Vice Chancellor Laster granted the severance request, denied the continuance request, and ordered the claims against the financial advisor to proceed to trial as previously scheduled.  Shortly thereafter, according to a transcript of a June 1, 2017 settlement conference, the advisor settled the claims against it for $35 million, to be funded pursuant to the indemnification agreement. 

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						      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Jun 2017 18:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/After-Settlement-By-Director-Defendants-Of-Merger</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Declines To Dismiss Claims Under Corwin, Finding The Complaint Adequately Pleaded That The Shareholder Vote Was Structurally Coercive
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Declines-To-Dismiss-Claim</link>
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On May 31, 2017, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss purported derivative and direct stockholder claims for breaches of fiduciary duty against the directors of Charter Communications, Inc. (&quot;Charter&quot;) regarding share issuances to, and a voting proxy agreement with, its largest stockholder, Liberty Broadband Corporation (&quot;Liberty&quot;), in connection with Charter&apos;s recent acquisition of Bright House Networks, LLC (&quot;Bright House&quot;) and merger with Time Warner Cable (&quot;TWC&quot;) (the &quot;Acquisitions&quot;).  Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., C.A. No. 11418-VCG (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017).  The Court found that, while plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that Liberty controlled Charter, plaintiff did adequately plead that the stockholder vote approving the share issuances and voting proxy agreement suffered from &quot;structural coercion,&quot; and therefore failed to ratify the transactions under the doctrine established by Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).  Because it found the briefing insufficient to efficiently analyze whether plaintiff&apos;s claims were direct or derivative, however, the Court reserved decision on the motion to dismiss and requested supplemental briefing on the issue. 

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						      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:49:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Two Recent Delaware Appraisal Decisions, Though Unlikely To Squelch Plaintiffs&apos; Enthusiasm For Appraisal Actions, Give Companies Some Comfort That Loss Is Not Guaranteed
 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Two-Recent-Delaware-Appraisal-Decisions-Though-Un</link>
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Recent rulings issued by the Delaware Chancery Court in two appraisal cases handed wins to the defendant companies, reflecting at least some degree of temperance within the Delaware Chancery and potentially stemming the tide of decisions that favored appraisal petitioners.  These decisions, issued while the Dell and DFC Global appraisal decisions (in which the Chancery Court found that the statutory &quot;fair value&quot; of the stocks significantly exceeded the deal price) are before the Delaware Supreme Court, represent significant victories for the defendant companies and a warning to stockholders willing to gamble on a costly appraisal action.
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						      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Jun 2017 17:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Two-Recent-Delaware-Appraisal-Decisions-Though-Un</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal Of Challenge To Controlling Stockholder Take‑Private Deal
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Chall</link>
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On May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the dismissal of a breach of fiduciary duty action against the directors of Books-A-Million, Inc. and other defendants following a &quot;squeeze-out&quot; merger by the company&apos;s controlling stockholders.  In re Books-A-Million, Inc. Stockholders Litigation v. Anderson, Consol. C.A. No. 11343-VCL.  Without further elaboration, the Supreme Court&apos;s brief order provides that the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery &quot;should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned&quot; in its opinion (citing In re Books-A-Million, Inc., C.A. No. 11343 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016)).  As discussed in our post on the Chancery Court&apos;s decision, the lower court found—based on the complaint and the proxy filed by the company in connection with the merger—that the transaction followed the framework established by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).  Under that framework, a controlling stockholder transaction that is approved by both an independent special committee of the board—with access to its own advisors and the ability to definitively reject the deal—and an informed, uncoerced vote of the majority of minority (i.e., non-controlling) stockholders will be reviewed under the deferential &quot;business judgment rule,&quot; as opposed to the entire fairness standard typically applied to controlling stockholder transactions.

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						      <pubDate>Wed, 31 May 2017 20:57:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Holds That Well-Pled Unocal Claim Does Not Automatically Excuse Pre-Suit Demand
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Holds-That-Well-Pled-Unoc</link>
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On May 15, 2017, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed a shareholder derivative action asserting that the directors of The Williams Companies, Inc. (&quot;Williams&quot;) breached their duty of loyalty in connection with its entry into, and subsequent cancellation of, an agreement to acquire the remaining interest in its affiliate, Williams Partners L.P. (&quot;WPZ&quot;).  Ryan v. Armstrong, C.A. No. 12717-VCG (Del. Ch. May 15, 2017).  Plaintiff, a Williams shareholder, alleged that Williams&apos; directors were &quot;motivated . . . by a desire . . . to entrench themselves&quot; when they approved the WPZ acquisition in the context of &quot;acquisition overtures&quot; made toward Williams by another company, Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. (&quot;ETE&quot;).  The Court held that allegations of &quot;defensive measures&quot;—even if sufficient to trigger enhanced scrutiny under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)—do not result in &quot;automatic demand excusal.&quot;  Therefore, because demand futility was not otherwise adequately pleaded, the Court granted dismissal under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 for plaintiff&apos;s failure to make a pre-suit demand on the Williams board to pursue the litigation.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 23 May 2017 16:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Breach Of Fiduciary Duty And Quasi-Appraisal Claims Under Corwin 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty</link>
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On May 11, 2017, Chancellor Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed with prejudice a putative class action brought by stockholders of networking solutions company Cyan, Inc. (&quot;Cyan&quot;) against Cyan&apos;s board, asserting a breach of fiduciary duty and &quot;quasi-appraisal&quot; claim in connection with Cyan&apos;s merger with Ciena Corporation in a cash and stock transaction. In re Cyan, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 11714-CB (Del. Ch. May 11, 2017).  Plaintiffs claimed that the board failed to disclose material information in the proxy statement, which allegedly prevented Cyan&apos;s shareholders from determining whether to pursue appraisal rights.  The Court dismissed the claims, finding that:  (i) the business judgment rule applied because the merger consideration primarily consisted of stock in a publicly traded company and plaintiffs failed to plead a breach of the duty of loyalty; and (ii) in any event the proxy disclosures were sufficient to infer that the 98% stockholder approval of the merger was a fully informed vote, thereby precluding post-closing litigation under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308-09 (Del. 2015).  The Court dismissed plaintiffs&apos; &quot;quasi-appraisal&quot; claim on the same grounds, observing that quasi-appraisal was merely a remedy for a disclosure claim and not a distinct cause of action.  

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 16 May 2017 18:38:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Declines To Dismiss Acquiror&apos;s Post-Closing Indemnification Claims In Light Of Contractual Ambiguity In Stock Purchase Agreement
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Declines-To-Dismiss-Acqui</link>
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On May 3, 2017, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss a lawsuit brought by the buyer of EMSI Holding Company (&quot;EMSI&quot;) asserting post-closing claims for indemnification against the sellers—the company&apos;s former investors—for allegedly fraudulent representations made by EMSI in the Stock Purchase Agreement (&quot;SPA&quot;).  EMSI Acquisition, Inc. v. Contrarian Funds, LLC, et al., C.A. No. 12648-VCS (Del. Ch. May 3, 2017).  Specifically, the Court concluded that extrinsic evidence is required to resolve an ambiguity in the SPA as to whether plaintiff&apos;s indemnification claims were subject to contractual limitations on recovery.  Significantly, the Court also declined to import a heightened pleading standard from federal securities fraud cases to assess whether the complaint adequately pleaded that the representations were fraudulent.  Separately, the Court dismissed plaintiff&apos;s additional claim for the &quot;confirmation&quot; under the Delaware Arbitration Act of an auditor&apos;s post-closing determination—pursuant to the SPA—of purchase price adjustments, because the SPA &quot;explicitly provide[d]&quot; that the auditor was &quot;acting as an expert and not an arbitrator.&quot;   

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 16 May 2017 18:03:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claims By Minority Stockholder Of Subsidiary In Relation To Acquisition Of Parent Company 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Breach-Of-Fiduc</link>
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On May 2, 2017, Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a purportedly derivative and putative class action brought by a minority stockholder of software company VMware, Inc. (&quot;VMware&quot;), a subsidiary of controlling stockholder EMC Corporation (&quot;EMC&quot;), in connection with EMC&apos;s acquisition by Denali Holding Inc. (&quot;Denali&quot;).  Ford v. VMware, Inc., C.A. No. 11714-VCL (Del. Ch. May 2, 2017).  Plaintiff asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims against EMC, the dual directors of both EMC and VMware, and Denali, and brought aiding and abetting claims against Denali its affiliates.  The alleged breaches included (i) failing to spin off VMware to activist EMC stockholder Elliot Associates, (ii) selling VMware to a &quot;known looter,&quot; (iii) restricting VMware&apos;s operations under the merger agreement and (iv) Denali&apos;s issuance of so-called &quot;tracking stock.&quot;  The Court found that none of these theories sustained a viable breach of fiduciary duty claim and dismissed the action in its entirety. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 09 May 2017 18:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Holds That Former Stockholders Lack Post-Merger Standing To Bring Mismanagement Claims
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Holds-That-Former-Stockholders</link>
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On May 4, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed for lack of post-merger standing an action by former stockholders of Massey Energy Company (&quot;Massey&quot;) against its former officers and directors for their alleged failure to act in good faith to ensure that Massey complied with mine safety regulations.  In re Massey Energy Company Derivative and Class Action Litigation, C.A. No. 5430-CB (Del. Ch. May 4, 2017).  The plaintiffs, who were divested of their shares in connection with a merger of Massey while the litigation was pending, purported to assert two claims:  (i) a breach of fiduciary duty derivative claim and (ii) &quot;inseparable fraud,&quot; styled as a &quot;direct&quot; claim.  As to &quot;inseparable fraud,&quot; plaintiffs were relying on what Chancellor Bouchard described as &quot;dictum&quot; in the Delaware Supreme Court&apos;s decision in Arkansas Teacher Retirement System v. Caiafa, 996 A.2d 321, 322-32 (Del. 2010), which stated that &quot;Delaware law recognizes a single, inseparable fraud when directors cover massive wrongdoing with an otherwise permissible merger.&quot;  But Chancellor Bouchard found that the misconduct alleged could only constitute a derivative claim, because the allegations &quot;implicated&quot; the directors&apos; &quot;normal duty&quot; to the corporation to manage its affairs and the allegations of harm—including the &quot;prospect of . . . fines, penalties . . . and the like&quot;—are &quot;prototypical examples of corporate harm that can be pursued only derivatively.&quot;  The Court also concluded that plaintiffs&apos; allegations that the merger was &quot;necessitated&quot; by the misconduct were unavailing, because &quot;inseparable fraud&quot; is not an exception to the &quot;continuous ownership rule for maintaining derivative standing.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 09 May 2017 16:18:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal Of Shareholder Suit, Finding Subject Matter Jurisdiction Was Properly Exercised, Equity Dilution Claim Was Derivative, And Demand Futility Was Inadequately Pleaded
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Second-Circuit-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Shareholder-S</link>
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​On April 26, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by a shareholder of Star Bulk Carriers Corp. (&quot;Star Bulk&quot;) against its directors and entities affiliated with the director defendants.  F5 Capital v. Pappas, No. 16-530 (2d Cir. April 26, 2017).  Challenging various transactions in which Star Bulk had engaged, plaintiff asserted derivative claims for breaches of fiduciary duty and waste, as well as a purported direct class-action claim for wrongful equity dilution.  Affirming the dismissal of all claims, the Second Circuit held that (1) the equity dilution claim was not within the &quot;limited circumstances involving controlling stockholders&quot; to enable it to be considered a direct (rather than derivative) claim; (2) the district court nevertheless had and properly retained subject matter jurisdiction; and (3) plaintiff failed to plead demand futility, as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 to maintain shareholder derivative claims.  

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2017 16:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Former CEO Granted Right To Inspect Books And Records Of Company After Demonstrating At Trial A &quot;Credible Basis&quot; To Infer Potential Wrongdoing By Board Chairman
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Former-CEO-Granted-Right-To-Inspect-Books-And-Rec</link>
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On April 17, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled, in a post-trial decision, that defendant Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (&quot;Cypress&quot;) must allow plaintiff and former Cypress CEO, T.J. Rodgers, to inspect certain books and records of Cypress pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220.  Rodgers v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., C.A. No. 0070-AGB (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2017).  Chancellor Bouchard found that Rodgers, who made the demand in his capacity as a stockholder, sufficiently established a valid primary purpose for seeking inspection of the materials:  to investigate potential wrongdoing by Ray Bingham, the Executive Chairman of the Board.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Apr 2017 18:44:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Applies Corwin To Dismiss Post-Merger Fiduciary Duty Claim After Finding A Royalty Agreement Did Not Constitute An Unreasonable Deal Protection Device
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Applies-Corwin-To-Dismiss</link>
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On April 13, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a shareholder derivative suit alleging a breach of fiduciary duty against the directors of Paramount Gold and Silver Corp. (&quot;Paramount&quot;) in connection with Paramount&apos;s merger with Coeur Mining, Inc. (&quot;Coeur&quot;).  In re Paramount Gold and Silver Corp. Stockholders Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 10499-CB (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2017).  In doing so, the Court (i) rejected plaintiffs&apos; contention that certain consent rights in a royalty agreement entered into by the parties at the time of the merger agreement constituted an unreasonable deal protection device, and (ii) found that plaintiffs had failed to identify any material deficiencies in the company&apos;s disclosures in advance of a shareholder vote on the merger.  Chancellor Bouchard, therefore, relied on the doctrine set forth in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), and applied the business judgment rule to the directors&apos; decision &quot;because the [m]erger was approved by a fully informed and uncoerced vote of a majority of Paramount&apos;s disinterested stockholders.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Declines To Dismiss Fiduciary Duty Claims In Shareholder-Approved Merger, Finding That Shareholders Alleged Sufficient Facts To Negate Application Of Corwin
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Declines-To-Dismiss-Fiduc</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 31, 2017, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss a shareholder claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the board of directors (the &quot;Board&quot;) of Saba Software, Inc. (&quot;Saba&quot;) in connection with Saba&apos;s shareholder-approved all-cash merger with affiliates of private equity group Vector Capital Management, L.P. (&quot;Vector&quot;).  In re Saba Software, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 10697-VCS (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2017).  The Court held that plaintiff&apos;s allegations, if taken as true, &quot;allow a reasonable inference that the stockholder vote approving the transaction was neither fully informed nor uncoerced.&quot;   Therefore, notwithstanding the stockholder approval, the Court declined to apply the business judgment rule (as would ordinarily apply under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015)) and declined to dismiss the claims against the Board.  The Court did dismiss the aiding and abetting claims against Vector, finding that plaintiffs failed to allege that Vector knowingly participated in the Board&apos;s alleged breach.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Apr 2017 18:41:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Declines-To-Dismiss-Fiduc</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Suit Challenging Board Compensation Awards Under A Stockholder-Approved Compensation Plan
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Suit-Challengin</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On April 5, 2017, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted defendants&apos; motion to dismiss a stockholder derivative suit against the directors of Investors Bancorp, Inc., which had asserted a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the directors&apos; decision to grant themselves restricted stock and stock options under an equity compensation plan previously approved by a stockholder vote.  In re Investors Bancorp, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 12327-VCS (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2017).  Plaintiffs, Investors Bancorp stockholders, had challenged the awards as &quot;grossly excessive compensation&quot; and also alleged that stockholder approval of the equity compensation plan was ineffective because the plan did not contain &quot;meaningful limits&quot; and, in any event, the disclosures in connection with the vote were materially misleading.  But the Court found that the plan—even as alleged—did contain &quot;director-specific limits&quot; on equity compensation, the awards were within those limits, and the stockholder vote was fully informed.  Therefore, the Court held that the stockholder approval constituted &quot;ratification of the awards,&quot; rendering them subject to the &quot;business judgment rule&apos;s presumptive protection&quot; and reviewable only as &quot;waste,&quot; which plaintiffs did not plead.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Apr 2017 16:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Suit-Challengin</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Determines &quot;Reasonable Best Efforts&quot; Provisions Impose Affirmative Obligations, But Affirms Chancery Court&apos;s Refusal To Enjoin Merger Termination
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Determines-ldquoReasonable</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 23, 2017, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery&apos;s denial of an injunction sought by plaintiff The Williams Companies, Inc. to prevent defendant Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. from terminating a merger of the two energy companies.  The Williams Companies., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., C.A. Nos. 12168 &amp; 12337 (Del. Mar. 23, 2017).  The 4-1 decision authored by Justice James T. Vaughn, Jr. determined that the Chancery Court erred by &quot;adopt[ing] an unduly narrow view of the obligations imposed&quot; by defendant&apos;s covenants in the merger agreement to use &quot;reasonable best efforts&quot; to consummate the deal and &quot;commercially reasonable efforts&quot; to secure an opinion from its outside tax counsel—a condition precedent to the merger—that the transaction qualified for tax-free treatment.  According to the Delaware Supreme Court, those provisions &quot;placed an affirmative obligation on the parties to take all reasonable steps to obtain the [tax-free] opinion and otherwise complete the transaction.&quot;  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the injunction because the Chancery Court found that defendant&apos;s conduct (or lack thereof) did not &quot;materially contribute&quot; to outside tax counsel&apos;s decision not to issue the tax-free opinion. 

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Apr 2017 17:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Determines-ldquoReasonable</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Preliminarily Enjoins Merger-Related Stockholder Meeting Until Financial Advisor&apos;s Fees For Merger-Related Financing Are Disclosed   
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Preliminarily-Enjoins-Merger-Re</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 22, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery preliminarily enjoined a stockholder vote on the proposed acquisition by Consolidated Communications Holdings, Inc. (&quot;Consolidated&quot;) of FairPoint Communications, Inc. (&quot;FairPoint&quot;).  Vento v. Curry, C.A. No. 2017-0157-AGB (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2017).  Plaintiff, a Consolidated stockholder, alleged that the Consolidated board of directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to adequately disclose the financial interests of Consolidated&apos;s financial advisor in the transaction and sought to enjoin the vote pending distribution of corrected disclosures.  The Court agreed that the disclosure was inadequate and delayed the vote until five days after Consolidated disclosed the amount of the advisor&apos;s fees.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Mar 2017 18:40:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Preliminarily-Enjoins-Merger-Re</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Dismissal Of LPA Breach Claims, Holding General Exculpatory Provisions Did Not Preclude Claims For Breaches Of Specific Provisions And Easing The Standard For Pleading Bad Faith
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-LPA-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 20, 2017, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery&apos;s dismissal of a lawsuit challenging a transaction between affiliated entities.  Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., No. 273, 2016 (Del. Mar. 20, 2017).  Plaintiff, a common unitholder of a Delaware master limited partnership, Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (the &quot;MLP&quot;), brought suit against several defendants, including the general partner Enbridge Energy Co. (&quot;EEP GP&quot;); its controlling parent, Enbridge, Inc. (&quot;Enbridge&quot;); another affiliate of each; and certain directors and officers of these entities.  Plaintiff alleged that defendants approved a transaction involving conflicts of interest in bad faith and in violation of certain provisions of the MLP&apos;s Limited Partnership Agreement (&quot;LPA&quot;).  In reversing the dismissal, the Court held that (1) &quot;good faith&quot; and other provisions in the LPA exculpating the general partner from monetary damages can replace default fiduciary duties with a contractual good faith standard, but do not preclude equitable relief or alter the affirmative obligations under the LPA; and (2) bad faith was sufficiently alleged under the LPA &quot;if the plaintiff pleads facts supporting an inference that [the general partner] did not reasonably believe it was acting in the best interest of the [MLP].&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Mar 2017 16:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-LPA-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Focuses On Negotiation History In Denying Former Securityholders A Milestone Payment Based On The Interpretation Of An Ambiguous Merger Agreement
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Focuses-On-Negotiation-Hi</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 15, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery decided, post-trial, that a biopharmaceutical company was not required to pay a $50 million &quot;milestone payment&quot; under the terms of a merger agreement.  Shareholder Representative Services LLC v. Gilead Sciences Inc. et al., C.A. No. 10537-CB (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2017).  As noted by the Court, this case turned on the interpretation of one word—&quot;indication&quot;—as it was used in a merger agreement.  Finding the term &quot;ambiguous when construed within the four corners of the merger agreement,&quot; the Court relied on extrinsic evidence—primarily related to the negotiation history—to determine that the limited approval of a drug to treat a narrow subpopulation of blood cancer patients did not constitute the requisite approval for a specified &quot;indication&quot; that would trigger the contractual milestone payment.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Mar 2017 20:55:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Focuses-On-Negotiation-Hi</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal Of Caremark Action For Failure To Plead Bad Faith With Particularity 
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Carem</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 3, 2017, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the dismissal of &quot;Caremark&quot; claims for alleged bad-faith failure of oversight brought derivatively by a stockholder against the directors of Qualcomm, Inc. in the context of international antitrust enforcement and other actions against the company.  Melbourne Mun. Firefighters&apos; Pension Trust Fund v. Paul E. Jacobs et al. C.A. No. 10872-VCM (Del. Mar. 3, 2017).  Without further elaboration, the Court&apos;s brief order provides:  &quot;it appears to the Court that the judgment of the Court of Chancery should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned in its memorandum opinion dated August 1, 2016.&quot;  Id. at *1 (citing Melbourne Mun. Firefighters&apos; Pension Trust v. Paul E. Jacobs, et al. and Qualcomm, Inc., C.A. No. 10872, 2016 WL 4076369 (Del. Ch. Aug 1, 2016)).  As discussed in our post regarding that decision, the Chancery Court dismissed the complaint for failure to plead that demand on the board was futile, because the complaint failed to set forth particularized allegations showing that the directors acted in bad faith by consciously disregarding their oversight duties and thus did not demonstrate that the directors faced a substantial likelihood of liability.  

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Mar 2017 16:41:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-Carem</guid>
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					      <title>Massachusetts Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal Of Shareholder Class Action And Clarifies That Directors Generally Owe Fiduciary Duties To The Corporation, And Not Its Shareholders  
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Massachusetts-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On March 6, 2017, in a decision authored by Justice Margot Botsford, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of an action for breach of fiduciary duty brought by former shareholders of EMC Corporation against its directors in connection with its merger with Dell Inc., finding that the claims could only have been brought derivatively.  Int&apos;l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Loc. No. 129 Benefit Fund v. Tucci, SJC-12137 (Mass. Mar. 6, 2017).  In its decision, the Court clarified that &quot;the general rule of Massachusetts corporate law is that a director of a Massachusetts corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation itself, and not its shareholders.&quot;  Further, the Court found that the injury alleged—the undervaluation of EMC in the transaction—&quot;qualifies as a direct injury to the corporation&quot; and &quot;fit[s] squarely within the framework of a derivative action,&quot; which plaintiffs as former shareholders did not—and could not—bring.   

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Mar 2017 16:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Massachusetts-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-Of-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Holds That Former Stockholder Lacks Standing To Bring Section 220 Action For Inspection Of Books And Records
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Holds-That-Former-Stockho</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 27, 2017, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed for lack of standing a lawsuit for inspection of corporate books and records brought by a former stockholder squeezed out in a two-step merger.  Weingarten v. Monster Worldwide Inc., C.A. No. 12931-VCG, 2017 WL 752179 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2017).  As noted by the Court, this case presented an issue of first impression:  whether a plaintiff seeking corporate records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 220, must be a stockholder at the time the complaint is filed.  Based on the language of the statute, the Court held that the former stockholder lacked standing to bring a Section 220 action because he no longer owned shares following the merger.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Mar 2017 17:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Holds-That-Former-Stockho</guid>
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					      <title>Vermont District Court Dismisses Shareholder Lawsuit Asserting Section 14 Claims Premised On Forward-Looking Projections 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Vermont-District-Court-Dismisses-Shareholder-Laws</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 16, 2017, Judge Geoffrey W. Crawford of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont dismissed a putative shareholder class action against Keurig Green Mountain, Inc. (&quot;Keurig&quot;), Keurig&apos;s former CEO and directors and corporate investors that acquired Keurig, alleging that the proxy disseminated to Keurig shareholders in connection with the buyout was materially false and misleading in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.  Montanio v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., Case No. 5:16-cv-19.  The Court concluded that plaintiff&apos;s primary allegation—that the board knowingly relied on depressed projections from management to justify accepting a low-value offer—failed to state a claim because plaintiff could not plead that the projections were objectively false.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2017 17:23:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Vermont-District-Court-Dismisses-Shareholder-Laws</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Approves Modification To Plan Of Allocation 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Approves-Modification-To-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 15, 2017, Vice Chancellor Laster approved a modification to a plan of allocation of settlement consideration in In re Dole Food Co., Inc., S&apos;holder Lit., C.A. No. 8703-VCL (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017).  The Court found the original plan was too administratively difficult and costly to implement due to a discrepancy between the number of class shares stipulated to in the prior settlement and the number of facially valid shares claimants submitted after the settlement.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Feb 2017 17:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Approves-Modification-To-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Holding That Business Judgment Rule Applies When Informed Majority Of Stockholders Tenders Shares In A Two-Step Merger
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Holding-That-Busin</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 9, 2017, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the dismissal of a breach of fiduciary duty action brought by former shareholders of Volcano Corporation in connection with the acquisition of Volcano in a two-step all-cash tender offer and merger pursuant to Delaware General Corporation Law Section 251(h).  In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 10485-VCM (Del. Feb. 9, 2017).  Without further elaboration, the Court&apos;s brief order provides:  &quot;it appears to the Court that the judgment of the Court of Chancery should be affirmed for the reasons stated in its decision.&quot;  Id. at *1 (citing In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. 2016)).  As discussed in our post regarding that decision, the Chancery Court had held that because a fully informed, uncoerced majority of stockholders had tendered their shares during the first step of the two-step merger, the business judgment rule irrebuttably applied to the board&apos;s decision to approve the merger.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2017 19:45:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Holding-That-Busin</guid>
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					      <title> New York Appellate Division Refines The Colt Standard For Nonmonetary Settlements Of Merger-Related Class Action Suits 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/nbspNew-York-Appellate-Division-Refines-The-Colt-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On February 2, 2017, in Gordon v. Verizon Communications, Inc., No. 653084/13 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 2, 2017) (&quot;Gordon&quot;), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department reversed the decision of the trial court and approved a proposed nonmonetary settlement of a putative shareholders&apos; class action challenging the acquisition by Verizon Communications, Inc. (&quot;Verizon&quot;) of the 45% interest in Verizon Wireless held by subsidiaries of Vodafone Group PLC.  In doing so, the Appellate Division added to the five-factor Colt standard of review—and focused on—two additional factors for the evaluation of proposed nonmonetary class action settlements:  &quot;whether the proposed settlement is in the best interests of the putative settlement class as a whole, and whether the settlement is in the best interest of the corporation.&quot;  Id. at *21; see also In re Colt Indus. S&apos;holder Litig., 155 A.D.2d 154 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), aff&apos;d as modified sub nom. Colt Indus. S&apos;holder Litig. v. Colt Indus. Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 185 (1991).

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2017 19:44:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/nbspNew-York-Appellate-Division-Refines-The-Colt-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Post-Closing Merger Challenge Based On Shareholder Approval, Notwithstanding Alleged Presence Of Controlling Shareholder
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Post-Closing-Me</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 30, 2017, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a shareholder suit for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the directors of Merge Healthcare, Inc. (&quot;Merge&quot;) in connection with its acquisition by IBM.  In re Merge Healthcare Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 11388-VCG (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2017).  Specifically, the Court found that &quot;a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the [c]ompany&apos;s disinterested stockholders cleansed the [m]erger here, resulting in the application of the business judgment rule.&quot;  The Court applied this analysis even though it assumed (without finding) that the chairman of the board was a controlling stockholder because the Court found that the chairman &quot;did not extract any personal benefits because his interests were fully aligned with the other common stockholders.&quot;            

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Feb 2017 19:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Post-Closing-Me</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Caremark Claim Highlighting That Unsupported Inferences Do Not Demonstrate Demand Futility
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Caremark-Claim-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 19, 2017, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a shareholder derivative suit claiming a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors of United Parcel Service, Inc. (&quot;UPS&quot;) for an alleged failure of oversight in connection with UPS&apos;s compliance with laws governing the transportation and delivery of cigarettes.  Horman v. Abney, C.A. No. 12290-VCS (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017).  Specifically, the Court found that plaintiffs failed to plead adequately that making a demand on UPS&apos;s board to pursue the claims would have been futile because the complaint did not contain factual allegations sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the director defendants faced a substantial likelihood of personal liability.  

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Jan 2017 19:48:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Holds That Corporations Cannot Enact Bylaws To Circumvent Simple Majority Vote Requirement For Shareholder Removal Of Directors
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Holds-That-Corporations-C</link>
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On January 24, 2017, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, a shareholder of Nutrisystem, Inc., who sued Nutrisystem and its directors for declaratory judgment to invalidate a provision in Nutrisystem&apos;s bylaws purporting to require a vote of two-thirds of the company&apos;s shares before a director could be removed from the board.  Frechter v. Zier, C.A. No. 12038-VCG (Del. Ch. Ct. Jan. 24, 2017).  Specifically, the Court held that the supermajority requirement violated Section 141(k) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;), which permits removal of a director by a simple majority vote of shares.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Jan 2017 19:47:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Derivative Claims For Failure To Allege Wrongful Demand Refusal With Particularity
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Derivative-Clai</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 19, 2017, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a derivative suit brought by a shareholder of Mattel, Inc. (&quot;Mattel&quot;), after its board of directors declined to sue management to recover payments made to its former CEO under severance and consulting agreements.  Andersen v. Mattel, Inc., C.A. No. 11816-VCMR (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017).  Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves found that plaintiff failed to plead sufficiently particularized facts alleging gross negligence or bad faith, where the board made its decision after an investigation of the underlying events and also considered the potential consequences of the contemplated litigation.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jan 2017 19:48:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Derivative-Clai</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Post-Closing Challenge To Merger Approved By Disinterested Stockholders In Fully-Informed And Uncoerced Vote
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Rejects-Post-Closing-Chal</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 5, 2017, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a breach of fiduciary duty suit brought by a former shareholder against the eight members of the board of directors of Solera Holdings, Inc. (&quot;Solera&quot;) that approved a go-private merger with an affiliate of Vista Equity Partners (&quot;Vista&quot;).  In re Solera Holdings, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11524-CB (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2017).  In doing so, Chancellor Bouchard relied on the doctrine set forth in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), and applied the business judgment rule to the directors&apos; decision because the merger—which at the time of suit had already closed—had been approved by a disinterested majority of Solera&apos;s stockholders in &quot;a fully-informed and uncoerced vote.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Jan 2017 19:49:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Finds Fee-Shifting Bylaw Facially Invalid Notwithstanding Its Limitation To Actions Brought In Violation Of An Exclusive-Forum Bylaw 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Finds-Fee-Shifting-Bylaw-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 27, 2016, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied in part a motion to dismiss a putative shareholder class action challenging a fee-shifting bylaw recently adopted by Paylocity Holding Corporation.  Solak v. Sarowitz, C.A. No. 12299-CB (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2016).  Specifically, the Court found the fee-shifting bylaw was facially invalid even though it only applied to actions filed outside of Delaware, which would contravene Paylocity&apos;s valid exclusive-forum bylaw. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2017 20:06:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Dismisses Quasi-Appraisal Claim Challenging Short-Form Merger
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Dismisses-Quasi-Appraisal-Claim</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On January 4, 2017, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware dismissed a putative class action complaint against United Capital Corporation (&quot;United Capital&quot;), its board of directors, and A.F. Petrocelli, who is board chairman and CEO, and the owner of 94% of United Capital&apos;s stock, in connection with a short-form merger through which Petrocelli acquired all outstanding stock of the company.  In re United Capital Corp., Stockholders Lit., C.A. No. 11619-VCMR (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 2017).  Plaintiffs sought a quasi-appraisal remedy for allegedly inadequate disclosures in the notice of merger.  The court found the disclosures provided sufficient material information to the minority shareholders to enable them to determine whether to pursue an appraisal and dismissed the claims.  

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2017 17:41:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Employs Transaction Price To Determine Fair Value In Appraisal Action 
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Employs-Transaction-Price</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 16, 2016, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery relied on the final deal price to determine the fair value of stock in Lender Processing Services, Inc. (&quot;LPS&quot;), in an appraisal action brought by shareholder petitioners after Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (&quot;Fidelity&quot;) acquired LPS.  Merion Capital L.P., et al. v. Lender Processing Services, Inc., C.A. No. 9320-VCL.  While the court conducted its own DCF (discounted cash flow) analysis drawing from expert submissions, Vice Chancellor Laster ultimately deferred entirely to the deal price, finding that the sale process was fair and based on meaningful competition in a well-functioning market, and thus generated reliable evidence of fair value.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jan 2017 18:08:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Employs-Transaction-Price</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Resolves Dispute Among Appraisal Petitioners By Appointing Lead Appraisal Counsel
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Resolves-Dispute-Among-Ap</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 8, 2016, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to appoint lead counsel in an appraisal action—over the objection of one group of petitioning shareholders—invoking the inherent power of the Court to manage its operations.  In re Appraisal of Rouse Properties, Inc., C.A. No. 12609 (Del. Dec. 8, 2016).  In so deciding, Vice Chancellor Slights analogized appraisal proceedings to class actions and found that the appointment of lead counsel in an appraisal proceeding did not infringe on petitioning shareholders&apos; statutory right to &quot;participate fully&quot; in the action. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2016 15:13:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Resolves-Dispute-Among-Ap</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Holds That Employer May Not Avoid Advancing Former Executive&apos;s Litigation Expenses By Claiming Hiring Was Induced By Fraud
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-That-Employer-May-No</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 28, 2016, in a decision penned by Chief Justice Leo E. Strine Jr., the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s ruling that fraud in the inducement could not be raised as a defense to a summary advancement proceeding.  Trascent Mgmt. Consulting, LLC v. Bouri, No. 126, 2016 (Del. Nov. 28, 2016).  More specifically, the Court held: &quot;Where a party has employed an officer under a contract where that party agreed to provide for advancement [of legal fees and costs] . . . until a court&apos;s final judgment that the officer is not entitled to indemnification, that party may not escape the obligation by injecting into a summary advancement proceeding a defense based on the argument that the underlying contract under which the parties are operating is invalid altogether, because of fraud in the inducement.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2016 19:55:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-That-Employer-May-No</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Dismisses Pair Of &quot;Demand-Refused&quot; Derivative Suits, Highlighting The Difficulties In Bringing Such Actions 
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Pair-Of-ldqu</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 30, 2016, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a pair of shareholder derivative suits against nominal defendant The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (&quot;BNYM&quot;) that sought to hold certain of its current and former directors and officers liable for allegedly causing or permitting certain misconduct to occur in the bank&apos;s foreign exchange business.  Zucker v. Hassell, et al., C.A. No. 11625-VCG (Del. Ch. Ct. Nov. 30, 2016); Kops v. Hassell, et al., C.A. No. 11982-VCG (Del. Ch. Ct. Nov. 30, 2016).  The Court dismissed both complaints for failure to adequately plead that BNYM&apos;s board of directors wrongfully refused the shareholders&apos; respective litigation demands, further reinforcing the difficulties that would-be plaintiffs face in satisfying the pleading standards required to obtain derivative standing to sue on behalf of a Delaware corporation.   

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2016 19:50:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Dismisses-Pair-Of-ldqu</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Dismissal Of Derivative Suit After Finding Directors Lacked Independence
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-Deri</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On December 5, 2016, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed a dismissal of a shareholder derivative action after finding that the complaint adequately pled that a majority of the directors of Zynga Inc. (&quot;Zynga&quot;) lacked the independence to impartially consider a lawsuit asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against Zynga&apos;s controlling stockholder and former CEO and another director.  Sandys v. Pincus, C.A. No. 9512-CB (Del. Dec. 5, 2016). 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Dec 2016 19:50:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Reverses-Dismissal-Of-Deri</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Dismisses Stockholder Claims As Barred By Prior Court-Approved Settlement Agreement, Res Judicata And The Business Judgment Rule
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Dismisses-Stockholder-Claims-As</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 23, 2016, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed derivative claims asserted by GAMCO Asset Management (&quot;GAMCO&quot;), stockholder of Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc. (&quot;CCOH&quot;), against CCOH and its board, CCOH&apos;s controlling stockholder, iHeartCommunications Inc. (&quot;iHC&quot;) and iHC&apos;s parent company, iHeartMedia Inc. (&quot;iHM&quot;), and two private equity funds with a combined controlling interest in iHM and iHC.  GAMCO Asset Management Inc. v. iHeartMedia Inc., C.A. No. 12312-VCS (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2016).  The Court found that plaintiff&apos;s claims were released by an earlier settlement of related issues, barred by res judicata, and that the business judgment rule protected the CCOH board and controlling stockholders from GAMCO&apos;s claims for breach of fiduciary duty. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 05 Dec 2016 19:56:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Dismisses-Stockholder-Claims-As</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Fraud Claim As Barred By Purchase Agreement Anti-Reliance Provisions
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Fraud-Claim-As-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 30, 2016, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted, in part, ValueClick Inc.&apos;s motion to dismiss in a fraud and contract dispute over alleged misrepresentations relating to the sale of certain of its subsidiaries to IAC Search, LLC.  IAC Search, LLC v. Conversant LLC (f/k/a ValueClick, Inc.), C.A. No. 11774-CB, 2016 WL 6995363 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2016).  ValueClick, now known as Conversant LLC, sold six subsidiaries — including Investopedia, LLC — to IAC for $90 million in January 2014 pursuant to a Stock and Asset Purchase Agreement (the &quot;Purchase Agreement&quot;).  In its complaint, IAC alleged that ValueClick fraudulently induced IAC to overpay for Investopedia by supplying false information to IAC during the due diligence process.  IAC also asserted several claims for breaches of representations and warranties included in the Purchase Agreement.  Although the Court upheld some of the breach of contract claims, Chancellor Bouchard found that &quot;certain provisions of the [Purchase Agreement] add up to a clear disclaimer of reliance on extra-contractual statements that bar[] IAC&apos;s claim for fraud.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 05 Dec 2016 17:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Fraud-Claim-As-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal For Pleading Inadequacy When Plaintiffs Could Have Demanded Books And Records To Develop Facts
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-For-Pleading</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 16, 2016, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a Delaware Court of Chancery decision by Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III that dismissed derivative and direct claims against two board members of Premium of America, LLC (&quot;Premium&quot;) and an affiliate.  Joseph Penar Family Trust v. Adams, No. 250-2016 (Del. Nov. 16, 2016), aff&apos;g, C.A. No. 10441 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2016).  Plaintiffs—members of Premium, a Delaware limited liability company (&quot;LLC&quot;)—had alleged that defendants misappropriated funds when liquidating the company&apos;s assets in breach of their fiduciary duties.  The Supreme Court held that the Chancery Court &quot;correctly determined that the appellants&apos; failure to allege in a non-conclusory fashion the circumstances of the alleged misappropriation required dismissal of the amended complaint.&quot;  

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Nov 2016 19:57:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Affirms-Dismissal-For-Pleading</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Awards Appraisal Value In Merger Of Pennsylvania-Based Community Banks
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Awards-Appraisal-Value-In</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On November 10, 2016, Chancellor Andre Bouchard of the Delaware Chancery Court granted the appraisal petition of former stockholders in Farmers &amp; Merchants Bancorp of Western Pennsylvania, Inc. (&quot;F&amp;M&quot;), awarding a &quot;fair value&quot; of $91.90 per share, rather than the merger price ($83 per share) at which the bank was actually acquired in October of 2014 by NexTier, Inc., another community bank in western Pennsylvania.  Dunmire et al. v. Farmers &amp; Merchants Bancorp of Western Pennsylvania, Inc., C.A. No. 10589-CB (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016).  The judicially determined appraisal amount reflects the Court&apos;s decision to reject the valuations and certain methodologies advanced by both parties&apos; experts and instead to rely exclusively on a &quot;discounted net income&quot; valuation—a method that both parties agreed was conceptually appropriate—as applied by the Court.   

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Nov 2016 17:26:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Awards-Appraisal-Value-In</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Relies On Deal Emails To Interpret An Ambiguous Non-Compete Covenant In A Stock Purchase Agreement, Reverses A Preliminary Injunction And Permits Recovery Of Loss Suffered Therefrom  
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Relies-On-Deal-Emails-To-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 31, 2016, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery entered a final post-trial decision resolving a dispute concerning the proper scope of a post-closing non-compete covenant entered into by parties to a stock sale.  Brace Industrial Contracting, Inc. v. Peterson Enterprises, Inc., Consol. C.A. No. 11189-VCG (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2016).  Although Vice Chancellor Glasscock had previously ruled for plaintiffs, preliminarily enjoining defendants from competitive activities that plaintiffs claimed were barred by the covenant, the Court&apos;s final decision lifted the preliminary injunction after considering extrinsic evidence to interpret the disputed contractual terms.  

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Nov 2016 18:15:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Relies-On-Deal-Emails-To-</guid>
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					      <title>Southern District Of Texas Dismisses Securities Claims For Purported Proxy Misstatements And Omissions Because Other Disclosures Contained In The Proxy And Prior SEC Filings Rendered At-Issue Information Immaterial
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Southern-District-Of-Texas-Dismisses-Securities-Claims</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 21, 2016, Judge Sim Lake of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed with prejudice a putative securities class action against Eagle Rock Energy Partners, L.P. (&quot;Eagle Rock&quot;), Vanguard Natural Resources LLC (&quot;Vanguard&quot;), their affiliates and their directors.  Braun v. Eagle Rock Energy Partners, L.P., 4:15-cv-01470 (S.D. Tex., Oct. 21, 2016).  Plaintiffs, a purported class of Eagle Rock unitholders, asserted that the joint proxy filed in connection with Vanguard&apos;s $474 million acquisition of Eagle Rock did not adequately warn about a potential debt covenant breach by Vanguard and was therefore false or misleading.  The Court found that the disclosures in the proxy, taken together with Vanguard&apos;s other public filings, rendered the alleged misstatements and omissions immaterial.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 31 Oct 2016 18:58:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Southern-District-Of-Texas-Dismisses-Securities-Claims</guid>
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					      <title>Shareholder Fails To Demonstrate Demand Futility Because Allegations Did Not Plead That Board Consciously Ignored Supposed Red Flags Regarding BSA/AML Controls
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Shareholder-Fails-To-Demonstrate-Demand-Futility-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 18, 2016, Chancellor Andre Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a shareholder derivative action against the directors of Capital One Financial Corporation (&quot;Capital One&quot;), finding that plaintiff failed to plead demand futility in connection with his breach of fiduciary duty claims.  Reiter v. Fairbank, C.A. No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016).  The Court held that the allegations—relying in large part on records obtained from Capital One under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which the Court found were incorporated by reference into the complaint—did not &quot;reasonably permit . . . an inference that the defendants consciously allowed Capital One to violate the law&quot; so as to demonstrate bad faith and excuse the demand requirement.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Oct 2016 19:29:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Shareholder-Fails-To-Demonstrate-Demand-Futility-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Dismisses Cash-Out Merger Challenge, Holding That Informed Stockholder Vote Triggered Business Judgment Review Notwithstanding &quot;Disquieting&quot; Allegations
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Dismisses-Cash-Out-Merger-Challenge</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 12, 2016, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a putative shareholder class action alleging fiduciary breaches by the board of directors of OM Group, Inc. (&quot;OM&quot;) arising from OM&apos;s cash-out merger with Apollo Global Management, LLC (&quot;Apollo&quot;).  In re OM Group, Inc. S&apos;holders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 11216-VCS (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2016).  The conduct of directors in cash-out mergers is typically subject to enhanced scrutiny under Revlon.  Because OM&apos;s shareholders had voted overwhelmingly to approve the merger in an uncoerced vote that the Court found to be fully informed, the Court found the board&apos;s conduct was protected by the &quot;irrebutable business judgment rule&quot; under Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), and dismissed the case.  The Court reached this conclusion despite allegations of an egregiously flawed sales process that the Court described as &quot;disquieting.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Oct 2016 19:28:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Dismisses-Cash-Out-Merger-Challenge</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Challenge To Controlling Stockholder Take-Private Deal
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Challenge-To-Controlling-Shareholder</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On October 10, 2016, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss in an action against the directors of bookseller Books-A-Million, Inc. and other defendants following a &quot;squeeze-out&quot; merger by the company&apos;s controlling shareholders.  In re Books-A-Million, Inc., C.A. No. 11343, (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016).  Vice Chancellor Laster found that the complaint did not sufficiently allege deviations from the framework established by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn, et al. v. M&amp;F Worldwide Corp. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;M&amp;F Worldwide&quot;).  Therefore, the Court reviewed the transaction under the &quot;business judgment rule&quot; and dismissed the complaint.  

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Oct 2016 19:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Challenge-To-Controlling-Shareholder</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Declines To Apply Revlon Or Unocal Scrutiny To Board Adoption Of Dissolution Plan 
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Declines-To-Apply-Revlon-or-Unocal-Scrutiny</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
​On September 29, 2016, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a shareholder action against the directors and officers of Longview Energy Company (&quot;Longview&quot;) in connection with a board decision to dissolve the company following the sale of a significant portion of its assets.  The Huff Energy Fund, L.P., v. Robert D. Gershen, et al., C.A. No. 11116-VCS (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2016).  The Court held that defendants had not breached their fiduciary duties after rejecting plaintiff&apos;s request to apply Revlon or Unocal scrutiny to the dissolution and finding in any event that the approval by stockholder vote &quot;irrebutably reinstat[es] the business judgment rule.&quot;      

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2016 19:24:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Declines-To-Apply-Revlon-or-Unocal-Scrutiny</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Post-Closing Merger Challenge Alleging Inadequate Disclosures Of Projections And Financial Advisor Fees
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Post-Closing-Merger</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 28, 2016, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a shareholder challenge to the acquisition of Millennial Media, Inc. (&quot;Millennial&quot;) by AOL Inc. (&quot;AOL&quot;).  Nguyen v. Barrett, C.A. No. 11511-VCG (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2016). Plaintiff had sought post-closing damages for the Millennial board&apos;s alleged failure to disclose (1) certain unlevered free cash flows and (2) details of compensation for Millennial&apos;s financial advisor.  The Court rejected both claims.    
    
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						      <pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2016 21:13:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Dismisses-Post-Closing-Merger</guid>
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					      <title>Third Circuit Halts Pennsylvania Hospital Merger On Antitrust Grounds, Reversing Previous Loss By FTC
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Third-Circuit-Halts-Pennsylvania-Hospital-Merger-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 27, 2016, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a District Court ruling and granted the preliminary restraining order sought by the Federal Trade Commission (&quot;FTC&quot;) and the state of Pennsylvania to enjoin a merger of two state hospital systems pending administrative review by the FTC.  FTC v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center, No. 16-2365 (3d Cir. Sept. 27, 2016).  The Court rejected as legally incorrect the District Court&apos;s formulation of the geographic market for evaluating the possible anti-competitive effects of the proposed merger.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2016 13:16:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Third-Circuit-Halts-Pennsylvania-Hospital-Merger-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Denies Litigation Financier&apos;s Request For Litigation Fees, Notwithstanding Benefit To Company
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Litigation-Financiers-Request</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On September 19, 2016, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a fee application submitted by Preferred Spectrum Investments, LLC (&quot;PSI&quot;), a third-party that had funded successful shareholder litigation against Preferred Communication Systems, Inc. (&quot;PCSI&quot;).  Judy v. Preferred Communication Systems, Inc., Consol. C.A. No. 4662-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2016).  In rejecting PSI&apos;s application, the Court held that litigation financiers that are not parties to the action lack standing to seek a fee award under Delaware&apos;s &quot;common benefit doctrine,&quot; and that &quot;parties cannot obtain an equitable fee award when they use litigation in support of a takeover.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Sep 2016 17:19:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Denies-Litigation-Financiers-Request</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds Duke Energy Stockholders&apos; Derivative Suit Following Ouster Of CEO Partially Barred By Collateral Estoppel As A Result Of An Earlier Dismissal In North Carolina
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Duke-Energy-Stockholders-Suit</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 31, 2016, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss derivative claims against eleven directors of Duke Energy Corp. (&quot;Duke&quot;).  In re Duke Energy Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 7705-VCG, 2016 WL 4543788 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2016).  The Court made two key rulings: 1) some, but not all, of plaintiffs&apos; claims were precluded by a prior ruling by a North Carolina court; and 2) for the non-precluded claims, plaintiffs adequately alleged demand futility.  

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2016 19:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-Duke-Energy-Stockholders-Suit</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Books And Records Demand Concerning Board&apos;s Alleged Failure To Properly Account For U.S. Tax Liabilities On Foreign Earnings
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Rejects-Books-And-Records-Demand-Earnings</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 31, 2016, Judge Abigail LeGrow, sitting by designation on the Delaware Court of Chancery, held that Pfizer, Inc. (&quot;Pfizer&quot;) did not need to make its books and records available for inspection to a shareholder purportedly investigating whether the board breached its fiduciary duties by failing to comply with applicable accounting standards.  Beatrice Corwin Living Irrevocable Trust v. Pfizer, Inc., C.A. No. 10425-JL (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2016).  In rejecting this shareholder demand pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (&quot;DGCL&quot;), the Court found that the shareholder had not shown any &quot;credible basis to infer mismanagement or wrongdoing by the board.&quot;

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:27:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Rejects-Books-And-Records-Demand-Earnings</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Issues Back-to-Back Decisions Regarding the Application Of Corwin Liability Shield In Post-Closing Merger Challenges  
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Issues-Back-to-Back-Decisions-Regarding-Merger-Challenges</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 24, 2016, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a shareholder action seeking post-merger damages for breach of fiduciary duty against the directors and officers of C&amp;J Energy Services, Inc..  City of Miami General Employees and Sanitation Employees Retirement Trust v. Jerry M. Comstock Jr., et al., C.A. No. 9980-CB (Del. Ch. August 24, 2016) (&quot;C&amp;J&quot;).  The Court held that allegations that the majority of the board was interested in the transaction during its consideration were insufficient to rebut the business judgment presumption that applied once a majority of shareholders voted to approve the transaction.  The following day, on August 25, 2016, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed an action brought by former shareholders of Auspex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duty against the company&apos;s directors and officers, which was also based on a sale of the company that had been overwhelmingly approved by the company&apos;s shareholders.  Larkin v. Shah, C.A. No. 10918-VCS (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016) (&quot;Auspex&quot;).  Both decisions turned on the  application of the Delaware Supreme Court&apos;s decision in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), which held that the business judgment rule applies to a court&apos;s review of a transaction that is approved by a majority of a company&apos;s disinterested and uncoerced stockholders upon a fully informed vote.  

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Sep 2016 19:20:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Issues-Back-to-Back-Decisions-Regarding-Merger-Challenges</guid>
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					      <title>Central District of California Denies Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Suggesting that Forum-Shopping May Have Motivated Litigants&apos; Conduct
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Central-District-of-California-Denies-Motion-to-Set-Aside-Judgment</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 17, 2016, Judge George H. King of the United States District Court for the Central District of California denied a joint motion to vacate the court&apos;s prior dismissal of a shareholder derivative action so that the court could approve a proposed settlement.  In re CytRx Corp. S&apos;holder Deriv. Litig., 14-6414-GHK-PJW, Dkt. 109 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016).  Judge King found no grounds for vacatur and openly questioned whether forum-shopping—specifically, an attempt to avoid the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s scrutiny of a proposed settlement—motivated the parties&apos; attempt to revive the California action.  This ruling highlights the impact of the Chancery Court&apos;s increasing disfavor towards disclosure-only settlements of shareholder actions, and the alertness of other forums to litigants&apos; efforts to &quot;avoid the glare of the Delaware Chancery Court&apos;s spotlight.&quot; 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Aug 2016 19:16:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Central-District-of-California-Denies-Motion-to-Set-Aside-Judgment</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Utilizes DCF Method to Determine Fair Value of ISN Software Corp.
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Utilizes-DCF-Method-to-De</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 11, 2016, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery relied on his own discounted cash flow (&quot;DCF&quot;) analysis to determine the fair value of ISN Software Corp. (&quot;ISN&quot;) in an appraisal action brought by two minority shareholders following the merger of ISN with its wholly-owned subsidiary.  In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig., C.A. No. 8388-VCG (Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 2016).  In so ruling, the Court rejected not only the valuation advocated by ISN&apos;s expert but also the valuations espoused by the minority shareholders&apos; experts, noting that &quot;[i]n a competition of experts to see which can generate the greatest judicial skepticism regarding valuation . . . this case, so far, takes the prize.&quot;  

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Aug 2016 13:31:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Utilizes-DCF-Method-to-De</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Slashes Attorneys&apos; Fee Request In Mootness Dismissal Context Despite Applying More Lenient Standard Based On Shareholder Benefit 


</title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Slashes-Attorneys-Fee-Request</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 4, 2016, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery awarded counsel to shareholders of an acquired company $50,000 in attorneys&apos; fees—less than 20 percent of their requested fee award—in a mootness proceeding.  In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11263-VCG (consol.) (Del. Ch. Ct. Aug. 4, 2016).  The Xoom decision signals that despite the Court&apos;s previously expressed openness to awarding attorneys&apos; fees to plaintiffs&apos; counsel for securing supplemental disclosures in the mootness context, see In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 129 A.3d 884, 898-99 (Del. Ch. 2016), that it will still heavily scrutinize the &quot;get&quot; part of the equation—i.e., the benefit of the additional disclosures to shareholders—even when there is no &quot;give&quot; (i.e., a broad class-wide release of claims) against which to weigh it.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Aug 2016 19:15:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Slashes-Attorneys-Fee-Request</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Seventh Circuit Follows Delaware Chancery&apos;s Trulia Holding To Reverse Approval Of Settlement In Strike Suit
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Seventh-Circuit-Follows-Delaware-Chanceryrsquos-Trulia</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 10, 2016, a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court judge&apos;s approval of a disclosure-only settlement in a putative stockholder class action challenging the acquisition by Walgreen Co. (&quot;Walgreens&quot;) of Alliance Boots Gmbh (&quot;Boots&quot;).  In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 15-3799 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016).  Writing for the majority, Judge Richard Posner rejected the proposed settlement, which contemplated $370,000 in plaintiffs&apos; attorneys&apos; fees in exchange for six additional disclosures to the stockholder class, finding it &quot;inconceivable&quot; that the new disclosures actually benefited the class.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Aug 2016 13:32:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Seventh-Circuit-Follows-Delaware-Chanceryrsquos-Trulia</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Chancery Applies Entire Fairness Standard, Denies Dismissal of Shareholder Suit Based on Claims that Directors Usurped Corporate Opportunity and Approved Merger to Avoid Liability
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Applies-Entire-Fairness-Standard</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 28, 2016, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Chancery Court largely denied motions to dismiss a breach of fiduciary suit brought by former minority stockholders of Riverstone National, Inc. (&quot;Riverstone&quot;) against CAS Capital Ltd. (&quot;CAS&quot;), the majority stockholder of Riverstone, the Riverstone board (&quot;Director Defendants&quot;), and, nominally, Riverstone.  In re Riverstone Nat&apos;l, Inc. Stockholder Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 9796-VCG (Del. Ch. July 28, 2016).  The Court applied the entire fairness standard to the merger because plaintiffs alleged that the Director Defendants usurped corporate opportunities and then caused Riverstone to enter into a merger with Greystar Real Estate Partners (&quot;Greystar&quot;) to extinguish said claims (the &quot;Usurpation Claims&quot;).  Applying Delaware&apos;s &quot;reasonably conceivable&quot; pleading standard, the Court held that plaintiffs adequately pleaded a claim for breach of loyalty in connection with the approval of the merger.

Read more]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Aug 2016 19:14:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Applies-Entire-Fairness-Standard</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Grants Motion to Dismiss in Caremark Action Against Qualcomm Directors and Officers 
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Grants-Motion-to-Dismiss-in-Caremark</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On August 1, 2016, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Chancery Court granted a motion to dismiss &quot;Caremark&quot; claims against directors of Qualcomm, Inc. for failure to plead that demand on the board of directors was futile, finding that the complaint failed to set forth particularized allegations of fact supporting an inference that a majority of the board faced a substantial likelihood of personal liability.  Melbourne Mun. Firefighter&apos;s Pension Trust v. Paul E. Jacobs, et al. and Qualcomm, Inc., C.A. No. 10872, memo. op. (Del. Ch. Aug 1, 2016).  The complaint alleged that directors and officers of Qualcomm consciously disregarded antitrust enforcement actions in several international jurisdictions, ignored red flags regarding the firm&apos;s compliance with international antitrust laws, and failed to remedy its business practices to comply with international antitrust laws, resulting in the imposition of fines and judgments against the company from multiple regulators in a number of jurisdictions, including a $975 million fine issued by the National Development and Reform Commission of the People&apos;s Republic of China. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Aug 2016 19:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Grants-Motion-to-Dismiss-in-Caremark</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Ninth Circuit Dismisses Director Defendant from Investor Suit to Cure Jurisdictional Defect, Affirms Dismissal for Failure to Make Demand
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Ninth-Circuit-Dismisses-Director-Defendant-from-Investor-Suit</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 18, 2016, a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a shareholder derivative action against Wynn Resorts, Limited (&quot;Wynn Resorts&quot;) and eleven individuals—including Steve Wynn—who sit or sat on its board of directors.  La. Mun. Police Employees&apos; Retirement Sys. v. Wynn, __ F. 3d __, No. 14-15695, 2016 WL 3878228, (9th Cir. July 18, 2016).  Its ruling confirmed that the federal courts may dismiss, sua sponte, a &quot;stateless&quot; defendant if necessary to perfect their diversity jurisdiction; that trial court determinations regarding demand futility are reviewed for abuse of discretion in the Ninth Circuit; and that plaintiffs alleging demand futility must plead their case with particularity.   

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Aug 2016 19:09:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Ninth-Circuit-Dismisses-Director-Defendant-from-Investor-Suit</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court of Chancery Dismisses Most Fiduciary Duty Breach Counterclaims Against Star Athlete Director 
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Dismisses-Most-Fiduciary-Duty</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 19, 2016, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed most (but not all) breach of fiduciary duty counterclaims asserted by a sports apparel startup against its former director, Yankees baseball great Derek Jeter.  Jeter v. RevolutionWear, Inc., C.A. No. 11706-VCG (Del. Ch. Ct. Jul. 19, 2016).  The decision highlights that directorial fiduciary duties cannot be expanded by contract.  Specifically, the Court held that Jeter&apos;s alleged contravention of certain marketing-related obligations that were part of his director agreement with the company, RevolutionWear, Inc. (&quot;RWI&quot;), did state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because such contractual obligations &quot;do not alter the fiduciary obligations of the director&quot; even though they &quot;may give rise to breach-of-contract claims.&quot;  

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jul 2016 19:08:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Dismisses-Most-Fiduciary-Duty</guid>
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					      <title>Southern District of New York Grants Partial Summary Judgment Rejecting Successor Liability in Copyright Infringement Dispute
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Southern-District-of-New-York-Grants-Partial-Summary</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 15, 2016, Judge Naomi Buchwald of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted partial summary judgment to defendant Cowen &amp; Company, LLC (&quot;Cowen&quot;) on successor liability claims brought by Energy Intelligence Group, Inc. and Energy Intelligence Group (UK) Limited (together, &quot;EIG&quot;).  Energy Intelligence Grp., Inc. v. Cowen &amp; Co., No. 14-cv-03789 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016).  The Court held that the assignment of the assets of Dahlman Rose &amp; Company LLC (&quot;Dahlman&quot;) to Cowen following the acquisition of Dahlman by Cowen&apos;s parent company, Cowen Group, did not create successor liability for alleged copyright infringement by Dahlman.  In so holding, the Court rejected the plaintiffs&apos; argument that two exceptions to the rule against successor liability for the assignment of assets applied, namely that Cowen had either expressly assumed Dahlman&apos;s tort liability or that the acquisition was a de facto merger.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jul 2016 16:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Southern-District-of-New-York-Grants-Partial-Summary</guid>
				    </item>
			
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Grants Appraisal Rights to Shareholders in DFC Global Corporation Following Acquisition by Private Equity Fund
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Grants-Appraisal-Rights-to-shareholders</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On July 8, 2016, Chancellor Andre Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a petition for appraisal of former stockholders of DFC Global Corporation (&quot;DFC&quot;) at a &quot;fair value&quot; of $10.21 per share, rather than the price ($9.50 per share) at which DFC was acquired by a private equity fund in June 2014.  In re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp., C.A. No. 10107-CB (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016).  The judicially-determined appraisal value reflects an equally weighted blend of (1) a discounted cash-flow analysis, (2) a comparable company analysis, and (3) the actual transaction price of the deal. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Jul 2016 13:42:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Grants-Appraisal-Rights-to-shareholders</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court Of Chancery Holds That Business Judgment Rule Applies When Informed Majority Of Stockholders Tenders Shares In A Two-Step Merger
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Business-Ju</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 30, 2016, Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a breach of fiduciary duty action brought by former shareholders of Volcano Corporation against the company&apos;s board of directors and financial advisor. In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. CV 10485-VCMR, 2016 WL 3583704 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2016). The Court held that because a fully informed majority of stockholders had tendered their shares during the first step of a two-step merger, the business judgment rule applied to the board&apos;s decision to approve the merger. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Jul 2016 19:05:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-Of-Chancery-Holds-That-Business-Ju</guid>
				    </item>
			
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Denies Williams&apos; Request to Enjoin ETE from Terminating $38 Billion Deal
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Denies-Williamsrsquo-Request-to</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 24, 2016, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Chancery Court issued a memorandum opinion denying a request by plaintiff The Williams Companies Inc. (&quot;Williams&quot;) to enjoin defendant Energy Transfer Equity L.P. (&quot;ETE&quot;) from terminating its merger agreement with Williams.  Williams Cos. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., C.A. No. 12168-VCG, memo op. (Del. Ch. June 24, 2016).  Vice Chancellor Glasscock held that ETE was contractually entitled to terminate the merger because a mutual condition precedent—the issuance of a tax opinion by ETE&apos;s counsel, Latham &amp; Watkins LLP (&quot;Latham&quot;), that the transaction should receive tax-free treatment under Section 721(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the &quot;721 Opinion&quot;)—was not satisfied.  Central to the decision was the Vice Chancellor&apos;s conclusion that Latham&apos;s determination was made in good faith.  Although Williams has appealed the decision, ETE terminated the merger as of June 29, 2016.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Jul 2016 16:32:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Denies-Williamsrsquo-Request-to</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Court of Chancery Rejects the Imposition of Non-Competition Restrictions on Selling Shareholders in Context of a Forced Sale
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Rejects-the-Imposition</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 21, 2016, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery accepted a custodian&apos;s plan for a judicially ordered sale of a company over the objections of one of the three shareholders of the company, but rejected a proposal to impose expanded non-compete obligations on selling shareholders.  See In re TransPerfect Global, Inc, et al., C.A. Nos. 9700, 10449-CB, Letter Op. (Del. Ch. June 21, 2016).  Specifically, the Court held that the plan &quot;address[ed] the dual goals of maintaining the Company as a going concern and maximizing stockholder value&quot; but that &quot;it would not be appropriate to impose non-competition or non-solicitation restrictions on a selling stockholder as a condition of the sale of the Company absent evidence of wrongdoing.&quot;  

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jun 2016 13:44:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Rejects-the-Imposition</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court of Chancery Finds Suit against Lululemon Chairman and Board Is Precluded by Previous Dismissal of New York Lawsuit
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Finds-Suit-against-Lul</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 15, 2016, Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard of the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a derivative action against current and former directors of Lululemon Athletica, Inc., finding that plaintiffs&apos; claims were precluded by a previous dismissal of similar allegations in a New York based action.  Laborers District Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund v. Bensoussan et al., C.A. No. 11293-CB (Del. Ch. June 14, 2016).

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jun 2016 19:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Finds-Suit-against-Lul</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Northern District of Illinois Denies FTC&apos;s Bid To Enjoin Chicago Hospital Merger
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Northern-District-of-Illinois-Denies-FTCrsquos-Bi</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On June 14, 2016, Judge Jorge Alonso of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the Federal Trade Commission&apos;s (&quot;FTC&quot;) motion for a preliminary injunction against the merger of Advocate Health Care (&quot;Advocate&quot;) and NorthShore University HealthSystem (&quot;NorthShore&quot;), which operate hospitals in Chicago&apos;s northern suburbs. Order, Federal Trade Comm&apos;n v. Advocate Health Care Network, No. 15 C 11473 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2016), ECF No. 472. The Order held that the FTC failed to show a likelihood that it would succeed on the merits of its antitrust claims.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jun 2016 13:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Northern-District-of-Illinois-Denies-FTCrsquos-Bi</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Court of Chancery Invokes Equitable Exception to Rule That Demand Futility Is Assessed as of the Time Complaint Is Filed
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Invokes-Equitable-Exce</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
Under well-established Delaware law, a plaintiff seeking to pursue a shareholder derivative suit on behalf of the corporation must first either (a) make a demand on the company&apos;s board of directors and have such demand wrongfully refused or (b) establish that such a demand would be futile.  Shareholder plaintiffs that opt for the latter approach often claim that the majority of directors who would have been tasked with deciding whether the company should act upon their demands were (or are) unable to reliably exercise their business judgment on the company&apos;s behalf, particularly in cases where the lawsuits would target those same board members.

Read More]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jun 2016 15:07:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Court-of-Chancery-Invokes-Equitable-Exce</guid>
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					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Grants Appraisal Petition After Finding Dell MBO Transaction Provided Stockholders Less Than Fair Value
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Grants-Appraisal-Petition</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Chancery Court recently issued an important opinion in In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc. C.A. No. 9322-VCL (May 31, 2016), holding that merger consideration offered to Dell, Inc&apos;s common stockholders did not reflect the &quot;fair value&quot; of Dell&apos;s shares. The decision will require the company to pay dissenting stockholders a 28% premium as compared to the consideration that was received by stockholders who did not exercise their appraisal rights. The opinion is notable for several reasons, including because the Court declined to accept that the negotiated market price for the deal was the best available indication of the fair value of the company. Instead, the Court challenged the accuracy of prevailing stock market valuations of Dell, and after criticizing several aspects of the sale process, ultimately concluded that neither the stock price nor the price negotiated during the sale process fairly reflected the fair value of the company. 

Read more]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jun 2016 13:46:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Grants-Appraisal-Petition</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Finds &quot;Bad Faith&quot; Claims Actionable Against Disinterested, Independent Directors Only When the Action Complained of Is &quot;Otherwise Inexplicable&quot;
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Finds-ldquoBad-Faithrdquo</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
In a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision, In re Chelsea Therapeutics International Ltd. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 9640-VCG (Del. Ch. May 20, 2016), Vice Chancellor Glasscock explained that the good faith requirement of the duty of loyalty offers an equity judge a &quot;fiduciary out&quot; to the application of the business judgment rule.  According to the Vice Chancellor, the court can consider the presence of &quot;bad faith&quot; in connection with a board decision, even if the directors were disinterested and independent.  But consideration of &quot;bad faith&quot; in this context is relevant only in the rare instance where the nature of the board action cannot be understood to be in the corporate interest.  In this case, the court rejected plaintiffs&apos; &quot;pursuit of that rare bird,&quot; dismissing the claims brought by representative stockholders.

Read More]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2016 13:48:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Finds-ldquoBad-Faithrdquo</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Chancery Court Enjoins Directors From Implementing Board Reduction Plan
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Enjoins-Directors-From-Im</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Chancery Court enjoined certain directors of Cogentix Medical, Inc. from implementing a plan to reduce the size of the Company&apos;s board to defeat a proxy fight.  Pell v. Kill, C.A. No. 12251-VCL (Del. Ch. May 19, 2016).  The opinion&apos;s application of Delaware&apos;s standard for reviewing director action that affects shareholder voting strongly favors protecting stockholder voting rights.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2016 13:48:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Court-Enjoins-Directors-From-Im</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Concludes &quot;Holder Claims&quot; Are Direct But Questions Viability Under Delaware Law
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Concludes-ldquoHolder-Clai</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 24, 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that former stockholders&apos; claims against a corporation, under New York or Florida law, for damages allegedly caused by holding already-purchased stock in reliance on purported misrepresentations constitute direct claims.  Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Invest. P&apos;ship, MFS, Inc., No. 614 2015 (&quot;AHW&quot;).  This ruling addressed a certified question from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which sought guidance on whether so-called &quot;holder claims&quot; were direct or derivative in nature.  The ruling is most notable because the court expressed reservations about the validity of holder claims under Delaware law, although it did not decide the issue.

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						      <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2016 13:47:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Concludes-ldquoHolder-Clai</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Chancery Bars Appraisal Claims Where Evidence from Third Parties Confirms Appraisal Shares Were Voted in Favor of the Transaction
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Bars-Appraisal-Claims-Where-Evi</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
The Delaware Chancery in In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322-VCL (Del. Ch. May 11, 2016) considered whether mutual funds who were beneficial owners of Dell shares could pursue an appraisal action in the face of evidence showing that the shares were mistakenly voted in favor of a merger by an intermediary custodial bank.  The court ruled that the petitioners were barred from seeking an appraisal and, in so holding, provided a helpful framework for the burden-shifting analysis for proof of compliance with appraisal statute requirements.

Read More]]></description>
					      
						      <pubDate>Mon, 23 May 2016 13:49:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Chancery-Bars-Appraisal-Claims-Where-Evi</guid>
				    </item>
			
					 <item>
					      <title>Delaware Derivative Action Barred by Dismissal of Competing Action in Arkansas
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Derivative-Action-Barred-by-Dismissal-of</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
The Delaware Chancery in In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Del. Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 7455-CB (Del. Ch. May 13, 2016) dismissed derivative litigation on issue preclusion grounds after another court dismissed a competing derivative action. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 23 May 2016 13:49:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Derivative-Action-Barred-by-Dismissal-of</guid>
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					      <title>Federal Court Declines To Enjoin Hospital Merger Finding the FTC&apos;s Proposed Market &quot;Impermissibly Narrow&quot;
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Federal-Court-Declines-To-Enjoin-Hospital-Merger-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
The federal government has enjoyed a recent string of successful challenges to proposed mergers on antitrust grounds.  These have ranged from the blocking of the combination of Staples and Office Depot by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia earlier this month to the abandonment of merger plans by Time Warner Cable and Comcast, as well as Halliburton and Baker Hughes, in the wake of government scrutiny.  But this trend was interrupted when Judge John E. Jones III of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied a motion for a preliminary injunction brought by the Federal Trade Commission (&quot;FTC&quot;) and the Pennsylvania Attorney General against the proposed merger of two Harrisburg-area hospital groups.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 23 May 2016 13:49:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Federal-Court-Declines-To-Enjoin-Hospital-Merger-</guid>
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					      <title>Government Wins Again In Bid To Stem the Wave of Industry Consolidation, Obtains Preliminary Injunction Against Staples-Office Depot Merger
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Government-Wins-Again-In-Bid-To-Stem-the-Wave-of-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
The ongoing trend of companies in a wide range of industries seeking to grow quickly by acquiring competitors has increasingly been met with government resistance over the past few years.  For example, approximately one year ago, cable and broadband provider Comcast abandoned its plans to acquire Time Warner Cable in the wake of scrutiny from Department of Justice antitrust regulators.  And earlier this month, oilfield-services giants Halliburton and Baker Hughes announced that they would walk away from their $30 billion merger in the face of opposition from antitrust regulators (which requires payment by Halliburton to Baker Hughes of a $3.5 billion breakup fee).  Last week, Judge Emmet Sullivan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia sided with the Federal Trade Commission (&quot;FTC&quot;) and entered a preliminary injunction blocking the combination of the country&apos;s two largest office supply retailers, Staples and Office Depot, after holding a two-week trial.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 16 May 2016 13:52:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Government-Wins-Again-In-Bid-To-Stem-the-Wave-of-</guid>
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					      <title>Delaware Supreme Court Holds Approval of Deal by Disinterested, Informed Stockholders Requires Dismissal of Aiding-and-Abetting Claims Against M&amp;A Advisor
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-Approval-of-Deal-by-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On Friday, May 6, an en banc Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery&apos;s dismissal with prejudice of a claim against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &amp; Smith (&quot;Merrill Lynch&quot;) for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty while serving as financial advisor to Zale Corp. (&quot;Zale&quot;) in its sale to Signet Jewelers (&quot;Signet&quot;).  Singh v. Attencorough, No. 645, 2015 (Del. May 6, 2016) (en banc).  The decision has significant implications for (i) the effect of stockholder approval of a merger on the standard of review and (ii) investment banker conflicts. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 16 May 2016 13:51:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Delaware-Supreme-Court-Holds-Approval-of-Deal-by-</guid>
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					      <title>The New York Court of Appeals Adopts Delaware&apos;s Standard for Evaluating Shareholder Class Actions Challenging Going-Private Mergers
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/The-New-York-Court-of-Appeals-Adopts-Delawarersqu</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 5, 2016, in In the Matter of Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., Shareholder Litigation, No. 54, 2016 WL 2350133 (N.Y. May 5, 2016), the New York Court of Appeals adopted Delaware&apos;s standard of review of shareholder class actions challenging going-private mergers.  Specifically, New York courts are now required to evaluate board approval of such mergers under the deferential &quot;business judgment rule&quot;—provided certain shareholder-protective conditions are present. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 09 May 2016 16:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/The-New-York-Court-of-Appeals-Adopts-Delawarersqu</guid>
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					      <title>Fiduciary Duty Claims on Behalf of Master Limited Partnership Against General Partner Dismissed as a Result of Delaware&apos;s Flexible Limited Partnership Regulations, Notwithstanding &quot;Harsh&quot; Consequences
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Fiduciary-Duty-Claims-on-Behalf-of-Master-Limited</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
In Peter Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 11314-VCS, memo. op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2016), newly appointed Vice Chancellor Slights of the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed class and derivative claims brought by an investor in a master limited partnership, Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (the &quot;MLP&quot;), against the general partner, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and its controlling parent (together, &quot;Enbridge&quot;), and Enbridge&apos;s affiliates and directors.  This opinion is the latest in a series of Delaware court decisions reinforcing that, under Delaware law, &quot;a limited partnership agreement may eliminate the fiduciary duties owed by the general partner to the partnership and its limited partners in favor of&quot; specifically delineated contractual obligations. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 09 May 2016 13:53:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Fiduciary-Duty-Claims-on-Behalf-of-Master-Limited</guid>
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					      <title>New York Follows Delaware, Applies Business Judgment Rule to Going-Private Mergers
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Follows-Delaware-Applies-Business-Judgment</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
On May 5, 2016, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that courts should apply the business judgment rule in shareholder lawsuits challenging going-private mergers, as long as shareholders were adequately protected—a decision that expressly follows the approach of the Delaware Supreme Court in its seminal case, Kahn et al. v. M&amp;F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (&quot;MFW&quot;). In the Matter of Kenneth Cole Productions Inc. S&apos;holder Litig., No. 54, 2016 WL 2350133 (N.Y. May 5, 2016) (&quot;KCP&quot;). KCP marks the first time that New York&apos;s highest court determined that the business judgment rule should apply in such situations. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 09 May 2016 13:52:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/New-York-Follows-Delaware-Applies-Business-Judgment</guid>
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					      <title>OptimisCorp v. Waite, No. 523, 2015 (Del. Apr. 25, 2016)
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/OptimisCorp-v-Waite-No-523-2015-Del-Apr-25-2016</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
A unanimous Delaware Supreme Court criticizes directors&apos; use of deceptive &quot;Pearl Harbor-like&quot; tactics against another director, even in the name of protecting the company from perceived misconduct.   OptimisCorp v. Waite, No. 523, 2015 (Apr. 25, 2016).

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 02 May 2016 13:56:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/OptimisCorp-v-Waite-No-523-2015-Del-Apr-25-2016</guid>
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					      <title>Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 2016 WL 1569077 (Del. Apr. 18, 2016)
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					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Genuine-Parts-Co-v-Cepec-2016-WL-1569077-Del-Apr-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
The Delaware Supreme Court is the latest court to weigh in on the increasingly contentious question of whether a foreign corporation&apos;s compliance with a state&apos;s statutory registration requirements amounts to a broad consent to general personal jurisdiction within that state.  Writing for the majority in a rare 4-1 split decision, Chief Justice Strine held that it would be &quot;unacceptably grasping&quot; in today&apos;s economy to require foreign corporations to acquiesce to Delaware&apos;s exercise of general jurisdiction as a price of doing business in the state.  In so ruling, the Court partially overruled its own decision in Sternberg v. O&apos;Neil, 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988), which held that registering to do business in the state pursuant to 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 371 and designating an agent for service of process pursuant to 8 Del. C. &amp;sect; 376 amounted to &quot;actual consent&quot; to Delaware&apos;s exercise of general jurisdiction.

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 02 May 2016 13:55:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Genuine-Parts-Co-v-Cepec-2016-WL-1569077-Del-Apr-</guid>
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					      <title>Caskey v. OpKo Health Inc., C.A. No. 11415-VCS, hearing (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2016)
 </title>
					      <link>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Caskey-v-OpKo-Health-Inc-CA-No-11415-VCS-hearing-</link>
					      <description><![CDATA[
The newest Vice Chancellor on the Chancery Court, Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights, will be formally installed by public investiture on Friday, May 13, 2016 and recently tackled the rarely discussed &quot;pecuniary duty&quot; in denying from the bench defendants&apos; motion to dismiss in Herbert Caskey, MD v. OpKo Health Inc. 

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						      <pubDate>Mon, 02 May 2016 13:54:00 GMT</pubDate>
						    
					      <guid>https://www.lit-ma.aoshearman.com/Caskey-v-OpKo-Health-Inc-CA-No-11415-VCS-hearing-</guid>
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